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Preface 
 
It is now more than six and a half years ago, January 2011, I was 20, when 
I decided to apply to the research master of the Erasmus Institute for 
Philosophy and Economics (EIPE). I was torn between the job security and 
acclaim I imagined being an academic economist would have, and my 
passion for doing philosophy. Additionally, as a student, I had been much 
more successful in my economics courses, than the philosophy ones. EIPE 
seemed to be a good fit, but, it is at a philosophy faculty, and the courses 
were mostly philosophical. It was difficult to make a choice between 
different programs, but, while I struggled in the first semester, I am very 
glad now I decided to make the decision to go to EIPE.  
Being the youngest and most junior in my year of four, with 
Philippe Verreault-Julien, Darian Heim, and Vaios Koliofotis, I learned a 
lot from my classmates. I learned a great deal from my teachers, in 
particular Jack Vromen, Marcel Boumans, Julian Reiss, Ingrid Robeyns 
and Conrad Heilmann, and the PhD students who were there during my 
time at EIPE, particularly Francois Claveau, Attilia Ruzzene, Thomas 
Wells, Sine Bagatur, Morten Byskov, and Melissa Vergara Fernandez. 
Constanze Binder, who was a postdoc when I arrived, has been a great 
counselor as well, with whom I share many research interests. Many of 
the ideas discussed in chapter 6 have been elaborately discussed with 
her. When writing my master’s thesis – about the philosophy of statistical 
inference in econometrics – both Conrad Heilmann and Julian Reiss were 
incredibly helpful supervisors. EIPE has been central to my development, 
not only as an academic, but as a person. 
 In February 2014, I was offered the opportunity to continue my 
PhD at the Erasmus University, an opportunity I owe to Harry 
Commandeur, Werner Brouwer and Jack Vromen, who were very helpful 
and dedicated supervisors in the years to come. I am particularly grateful 
to Jack Vromen and Werner Brouwer, who took the main supervisory 
responsibility, while both were serving as deans of the Faculty of 
Philosophy and the Institute of Health Policy & Management (iBMG) 
respectively. Their counsel, encouragement, and (particularly in case of 
prof. Brouwer) jokes have been very valuable to me, as much in the 
beginning of the PhD writing process up until now.  
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  Conrad Heilmann continued to offer much support during my PhD, 
during review meetings, by providing comments on my papers, and by 
offering advice on all things related to doing a PhD and life thereafter. 
When I thank him for the things he has done, he often points out that the 
has received much help from more senior people when he was a graduate 
student. I hope I will be able to continue this “chain of helpfulness”. 
 Because of Job van Exel I was able to engage in an empirical project 
we did together that led to chapter 2 of this thesis. We presented this 
chapter in an early stage in a OECD workshop on the measurement of 
wellbeing in Turin in 2014. Doing this together was a great experience for 
me.  
 In the fall of 2015, I spent a term in Cambridge, visiting the history 
and philosophy of science department, supervised by Anna Alexandrova. 
I greatly benefited from this experience, and am very grateful for the time 
that Anna made available for me. The conversations I had with her, as 
well as with Elina Vessonen, helped me develop my thoughts a lot, which 
is particularly visible in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
 I am grateful to all audiences of conferences, workshops, and 
seminars where I have presented work. One particular place I want to 
mention is the peer-review circle, originally organized by Jojanneke 
Vanderveen for research master students in philosophy to present their 
work, but later turned into a place where PhD students in practical 
philosophy can present early ideas and papers. This group has been an 
enormous support, and I would particularly like to thanks Jojanneke 
Vanderveen, Huub Brouwer, Tjidde Tempels, Beatrijs Haverkamp, Andrea 
Gammon, and Daphne Brandenburg for being part of this group. 
 I am also grateful to Mark Chekola, who I met several times while 
he was visiting Rotterdam, for carefully reading my work and providing 
many insightful comments.  
 All my EIPE PhD colleagues, Caglar Osman Dede, James Grayot, 
Philippe Verreault-Julien, Huub Brouwer, Daphne Truijens, Melissa 
Vergara Fernandez, and Vaios Koliofotis at EIPE, Martijn Hendriks at 
EHERO and Mariska Hackert at iBMG have been great fellow travelers in 
the PhD writing process. Someone who belongs in this list is Christiaan 
Broekman, who has greatly inspired the consequentialist in me, in 
practice and theory. 
 My time as editor of the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and 
economics has been educational for me. I thank Tom, Joost, Tyler, 
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Francois and Luis for giving me the opportunity to do this, and Philippe, 
Huub, Caglar, and Erwin for being great colleagues.  
 On the evening of 3 September 2015, I was ready to go to bed when 
I quickly checked my email and saw I had received a message from a 
journal I had submitted to, that suggested that major revisions were 
required before my article (now chapter 4 of this thesis) could be 
published. I started to nervously read through the comments as I was 
telling Nina about the news. Nina started to congratulate me (jump on 
the bed), and took my phone to start reading the comments that I was 
too nervous to read through, meanwhile elaborately reporting all the nice 
comments that the referees had provided, and briefly summarizing the 
critical ones. This scene depicts very well what Nina has meant to me in 
the writing of this thesis. It has been a struggle to write this thesis. Nina 
has been my calm retreat when it became too hectic, and a reason to keep 
writing when I felt there were none left. Without Nina, I would not have 
been able to finish this project. 
 Lastly, my family and friends, to whom I also owe debt that goes 
much beyond this thesis: my parents – who are always there for me –, 
Hannah – who has always been my example –, Pieter – who is both a 
brother and a friend –, Marleen – who has been making me laugh since 
1990 –, Emma – my partner in politics – and Roos – whose moral 
conscience turned me vegan –, Robert, Anneke, Rob, Michiel, Philippe, 
Genevieve, Huub, Sophie, Michel, Laura and Floris. Thanks. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
What is the best life for you? Is it better for you to spend a lot of time 
and energy in your career so you can be successful at it, or is it better to 
spend it leisurely on friends, family and romantic partners? Should you 
spend your money on a new game computer, or is it better to save up for 
a vacation with friends? Is it better for you to be a parent and raise a 
family, or to be childless and have more freedom? Such questions are not 
only important in our own lives, but make a difference for policymakers 
as well. They may wonder whether it is better for its citizens to improve 
the quality of air in cities, or improve the accessibility of cars? Is it better 
for the people if medicine research is funded or if taxes are cut? And in 
particular, such questions play a role in ethical decision making, when 
we are concerned with the wellbeing of others. For example, in the 
context of generational justice, is it worse for future generations that we 
leave them with a large financial debt, or is it worse to leave them with a 
warmer climate than ours in which biodiversity has been much reduced?  
 Such questions can be considered very personal. Perhaps, as some 
self-help books may suggest, it is best to follow your gut feelings if it 
comes to such choices. But this is rather unsatisfactory if you want to 
make a rational decision about these important questions. Moreover, we 
may not want to leave something as important as the decision to counter 
climate change or not to a feeling in our gut. Perhaps, in order to answer 
these questions, we need science. If science could tell me that I would be 
better-off spending time on leisure rather than on my career, it would be 
irrational to ignore this. If so, and my job does not involve something of 
great social value, it may even be irrational for me to choose to work 
hard. 
  Like all sciences, a science of wellbeing has to deal with 
methodological caveats. It may be that it would be good for me to spend 
much time on my career, but that the same does not apply to you. 
However, such considerations always play a role when we think about 
causal relationships. Smoking may cause cancer in me, but not in you. 
But to a science of wellbeing, there are also a number of unique problems 
attached. This thesis sets out to answer to what extent it is feasible to 
scientifically study questions about wellbeing. But before I explain what 
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kind of concerns may arise about a science of wellbeing, it is good to first 
explain the notion of wellbeing in some more detail, and go over some of 
its history in economics and philosophy. 
  The concept of wellbeing describes how good life is for the person 
who is living it. So, your wellbeing is how your good life is for you 
(Tiberius 2006). This concept is related closely to the concept of “the 
good life”, and to the concept of happiness. Throughout this thesis I will 
distinguish these three concepts in the following way. While the concept 
of wellbeing refers only to prudential value—that is, value, only for you—
the concept of the good life is broader and also includes moral value. The 
concept of the good life presents an answer to the question How should 
one life? So, on some views on wellbeing it is possible that a cruel mobster 
who enjoys a comfortable life with everything he needs and without 
feelings of torment is leading a life high on wellbeing, while we would not 
say that this person is leading the good life. No one should live the life 
of a cruel mobster, as it is obviously morally bad. There are some 
substantive views on wellbeing (such as some Aristotelian views) that 
maintain that what is good for you cannot be immoral. On these views 
doing immoral things is not only bad ethically, but also harms one’s own 
wellbeing. On such a substantive view, the two concepts end up being the 
same. However, for the purpose of clarity, we will separate these two 
concepts throughout the thesis.   
 Furthermore, the concept of wellbeing is distinct from the concept 
of happiness. Happiness is a reference to a psychological state. If we say 
we are happy, we are describing what our psychological state is. While 
there are some theories of wellbeing that restrict what wellbeing is to 
psychological states, not all of them do. For example, in one well-known 
view on wellbeing it does not only matter whether we are happy, but that 
the source of our happiness must also be real (or authentic, see Sumner 
1996). While in almost all cases happiness plays a role to wellbeing, not 
in all cases is happiness the only things that matters to wellbeing. 
 
Where we are in philosophy: A short history of wellbeing 
Discussions about the good life, wellbeing, and happiness, while not 
always clearly distinguished, have a long history. Aristotle maintained 
that a good life is a virtuous life, and the best of lives is the contemplative 
life. Aristotle used the term Eudaimonia to describe a good life. This term 
is often translated to happiness, but Aristotle rejected the idea that 
happiness consists in pleasure, but rather, to Aristotle, happiness is the 
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3 
 
fulfilment of one’s human nature. Around the same time, Epicurus 
proclaimed that one should live in accordance with finding pleasure in 
simple things in life, such as friendships. The classic Greek philosophers 
generally were in pursuit of the good life. They now only sought to find 
an answer to the question What is a good life for you?, but also to the 
question What is a good life in general? Ideas developed by these ancient 
philosophers still have their influence and counterparts in contemporary 
debates. 
 The philosophical debate on wellbeing is also highly influenced by 
19th century utilitarian philosophers Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, 
and, in much lesser degree, Henry Sidgwick. While Epicurus believed one 
should live to strive for one’s own happiness, utilitarians developed the 
idea that one should live to maximize the happiness of all. While they all 
agreed that happiness consists in pleasure, they had widely differing 
views on what pleasure was. While Bentham (1789) had a very liberal view 
on pleasure in which any type of felt pleasure differs only in terms of its 
quantity, intensity and ability to bring about further pleasure, Mill (1871) 
also believed that pleasures were qualitatively different, and that 
qualitatively better pleasures are more valuable. For Mill, reading poetry 
was qualitatively more pleasurable than playing the simple game of push-
pin. Sidgwick (1907) again, denied this, but believed that pleasure was a 
feeling that was apprehended as desirable, leaving space for valuational 
differences without incorporating categories of pleasure. 
 Hedonism espoused by the 19th century utilitarians led to a large 
critical discussion. Hedonism was mostly confronted with two important 
objections. The first is whether it could properly distinguish between 
sophisticated human lives and lives filled with simplistic (or even 
animalistic) pleasures: the philosophy of swine problem. While this 
problem was exactly the kind of problem Mill wanted to solve with the 
introduction of qualitative hedonism, many, such as G.E. Moore (1903), 
raised doubts about whether such a move could be justified without 
acknowledging other values in life besides pleasure.  
A second problem was introduced by Robert Nozick (1974), who 
posed his argument in the form of a thought-experiment. Imagine that 
one can plug into a machine that generates the most amazing 
experiences. Plugged into the machine one can have great experiences 
while forgetting that one is plugged into a machine. Can someone who 
spends her life in the machine have a prudentially good life? If not, 
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pleasure cannot be the only thing that matters to wellbeing, but whether 
experiences are real or not must make a difference as well.  
As a result of these problems, hedonism lost ground as a 
mainstream philosophical view on wellbeing. In Derek Parfit’s Reasons 
and Persons (1984) he took stock of the main views on wellbeing in 
philosophy. Besides hedonism, he identified desire-satisfactionism and 
objective list theories as other important branches of wellbeing theories. 
Desire-satisactionism (Rawls 1971; Railton 1986) is the view that 
wellbeing consists in the satisfaction of desires. Many philosophical 
accounts of desire-satisfactionism maintain that in order for a satisfied 
desire to contribute to wellbeing, it should be a well-informed, rational 
desire. Different from hedonism, desire-satisfactionism is not a mental-
state view. If one has a desire, and the world corresponds to it, one’s life 
is made better, regardless of whether one knows this is the case. So, if 
one has a desire for one’s experience to be real, living in the experience 
machine frustrates this desire, even if those experiences feel good and 
one never learns finds out. 
Objective list theories on the other hand, list a number of goods 
that make a life go well that are independent of whether a person desires 
these goods. Sometimes, but not always, such theories are based on 
Aristotelian conceptions of the good life, in which fulfilling one’s nature 
is what it means for someone’s life to go well. Martha Nussbaum’s list of 
capabilities  one needs to have for a fully human life (Nussbaum 2011) is 
sometimes considered to be such an Aristotelian objective list theory of 
wellbeing. Another list states that wellbeing consists in Achievement, 
Friendship, Happiness, Pleasure, Self-Respect, and Virtue (Fletcher 2013). 
So, even if you do not value friendship, this objective list theory 
maintains that friendship makes your life go better.  
Even after over 33 years, Parfit’s taxonomy is a good guide to the 
main views within the philosophical literature on wellbeing. While there 
are many hybrid views—such as preference-hedonism (Heathwood 
2006)—or views that, on the surface, fit poorly within this framework—
such as value-based views (Tiberius 2008), the taxonomy still plays an 
important role in structuring the discussion.  
 
Where we are in economics 
For much of its history, economics was considered a moral science, 
concerned with the question how best to manage the state, and one’s 
personal life. Economics is, in an important sense, a science concerned 
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with value. Its language is tainted with notions pertaining to personal 
value, such as benefit, utility, better off, development, and welfare. Most 
central of all is the notion of utility. This central notion is nevertheless 
not completely unambiguous. John Neville Keynes first distinguished two 
branches of economics: positive and normative economics; the former 
being concerned with matters of fact about the economy and economic 
behavior, the latter with questions of normativity, how the economy 
should be. The latter does not only bear on matters of facts, but also 
pertains to matters of value.  
Utility plays a role in both branches of economics. In positive 
economics, utility is the mathematical representation of the preferences 
of an agent (Fumagalli 2013). Such preferences can be inferred from how 
people actually choose. Utility in this sense is a tool to help to explain 
(and possibly predict) economic behavior. If it comes to normative 
questions, utility is a normative notion, capturing an important sense of 
value. More of it is considered better than less. Utility is used as a term 
that stands at par with wellbeing, or, as economists say: welfare. These 
two usages of utility may, but need not, coincide.  
 Economists in the 19th century did not make this distinction, and 
with them Mill and Bentham used the term utility synonymously with 
wellbeing and happiness. Many economists went along with Bentham and 
Mill’s idea (Mill himself being a renowned economist) that utility was 
synonymous with pleasure (and the absence of pain). One such economist 
was Frances Edgeworth (1881), who explicated his vision that one day, 
utility could be measured by means of a hedonimeter: a device that could 
measure from our physiology how much pleasure we are experiencing 
(see Colander 2007). However, in the beginning of the 20th century—
perhaps under the influence of logical-empiricist strands in philosophy—
more skepticism emerged towards the place of something as intangible 
as pleasure in economics. In an influential book on economics, Lionel 
Robbins (1932) dismissed pleasure as a scientific concept because of its 
personal nature: “There is no means of testing the magnitude of A's 
satisfaction as compared with B's. If we tested the state of their blood-
streams, that would be a test of blood, not satisfaction. Introspection 
does not enable A to discover what is going on in B's mind, nor B to 
discover what is going on in A's” (Robbins 1932 [original emphasis]).  
In the new welfare economics that developed, economics shifted 
towards a preference-satisfaction approach to utility. In this approach, 
the possibility of making interpersonal comparisons of welfare or utility 
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is excluded. It became a common understanding that the degree of 
preference-satisfaction is not something that can meaningfully be 
compared among individuals. While an economist may judge that an 
increase in opportunities to choose (for example, through an increase in 
income) may increase someone’s welfare, no judgment is made about 
how one person’s welfare compares to that of someone else.  
While this preference-based view was, and still is, the mainstream 
view in economics, in recent decades the debate about how wellbeing 
should be conceived of and measured in economics has resurfaced. A 
first camp that started to question this hegemony, questioned Robbins’ 
very skepticism about the ability to measure happiness. Starting from 
Richard Easterlin’s seminal work in the 1970’s (Easterlin 1974), a 
literature emerged in economics that took a central idea from 
psychology: measuring happiness or life satisfaction through self-reports 
on a fixed scale—called measures of subjective wellbeing (SWB). While 
this view acknowledges that such measures may be imperfect, defenders 
point out many measurements used in (social) scientific practice are 
imperfect, and that measures of SWB actually result in plausible 
statistical relationships with related concepts. This strand, which has 
particularly been growing since the late 1990’s, is now called happiness 
economics. Chapter 3 and 4 engage with this literature in economics. 
A second strand that started to question the preference-
satisfaction hegemony started from philosopher-economist Amartya Sen 
(1985a, 1992, 1999, 2009), who argued that measures of preference-
satisfaction, as well as desire and happiness-based measures, are too 
heavily reliant on people’s aspirations and wants, which are mutable. 
Particularly in the context of policy-guidance, this may lead to unfair 
assessments of people’s wellbeing. Amartya Sen particularly argues that 
those in the worst of situations may adapt their aspirations downwards, 
and consequently be satisfied with little, but this should not mean that 
their lives are good for them. This criticism plays a central role in chapter 
3. As an alternative, Sen, together with other utility-critical scholars in 
economics and philosophy (particularly Nussbaum 2000, 2011), 
proposed to evaluate wellbeing within the more concrete space of things 
that people are and things they do—so called functionings—and the 
opportunity to achieve this—so called capabilities. The capability 
approach that emerged from this has led to a development of measures 
concerning wellbeing broadly construed—such as poverty, social 
progress, and development. One notable example of its yields is the well-
Chapter 1 
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known human development index. This approach plays a central role in 
chapter 6. 
   
Wellbeing as an object of economic investigation 
The question this thesis is engaged with is: To what extent can wellbeing 
successfully be an object of scientific investigation within economics? In 
order to understand this question, it is important to keep in mind the 
different contexts and purposes for which wellbeing is used (Alexandrova 
2012b, 2015). In particular, someone may be interested in the question 
what wellbeing is without having any particular application in mind. The 
philosophical debate about wellbeing can be crudely characterized as 
such. In this case one is merely interested in the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for wellbeing. In the scientific context, one is not merely 
interested in the best conception of wellbeing, but also in the possibility 
of making such conceptions measurable. For example, Robbins’s reasons 
for rejecting hedonism as a view on welfare in economics discussed 
above was not that it is an implausible view on wellbeing, but rather that 
it was practically impossible to use it as an object of scientific 
investigation. Another reason why one may be interested in wellbeing is 
to use it as a guide for policy. If a policymaker wants to device a policy 
aimed at the worst off in society, it may be required to have criteria about 
who the worst off are. In such a policy-context it may be particularly 
important that a measure one employs is accurate, and not only avoids 
structural mismeasurements, but also avoids vulnerability to deliberate 
manipulation.  
 This thesis is primarily concerned with the second purpose: 
measuring wellbeing for purely scientific purposes. However, it is no 
secret that many economists interested in the concept of wellbeing are 
not merely interested for positive reasons, but are motivated by their aim 
to provide policy recommendations. Some happiness economists have 
explicitly endorsed utilitarianism as a guide to policy (Veenhoven 2004). 
Capabilitarian theories are often applied in the context of policy-
guidance as well. Moreover, in both these cases, the purely theoretical 
question of what wellbeing really is, is never far away. While in some 
cases disagreements between contenders of measures of wellbeing are 
centered around limited measurability of certain concepts, often they are 
reducible to disagreement about the nature of wellbeing.  
 In table 1.1 these different contexts of investigation are 
summarized. Philosophical theories of wellbeing aim to develop views 
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that are axiologically correct. Axiological means “pertaining to value”. In 
the context of wellbeing, being axiologically correct means that it 
correctly specifies what makes our life go well for us. Philosophical 
accounts thus aim to be correct about what wellbeing is—without being 
concerned with whether they are empirically accessible. Measuremental 
accounts of wellbeing, on the other hand, are concerned with both these 
things. In case of policy-guiding accounts of wellbeing, the standards are 
different again. In terms of the axiological adequacy required for such 
accounts, it highly depends on the type of account. For example, Martha 
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities that all societies should guarantee to their 
citizens relies on wellbeing, but does not require to us to know exactly 
how well off each individual in society; but only that they have sufficient 
capabilities to achieve it. Happiness economists who endorse 
utilitarianism as a policy aim are committed to the view that wellbeing is 
close enough to measures of subjective wellbeing, and that we can 
measure it well enough to get at reliable estimates of aggregate wellbeing. 
  While many measuremental accounts of wellbeing often are closely 
related to philosophical accounts of wellbeing, or often take on such an 
account, there are also important differences. Hedonism is not the same 
as subjective wellbeing (see chapter 4), and objective measures of 
wellbeing are not the same as objective list theories (further discussed in 
chapter 7). 
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Table 1.1 
 Axiological 
adequacy 
requirement 
epistemic 
accessibility 
requirement 
Examples 
Philosophical 
theories of 
wellbeing 
Yes No Hedonism, 
(informed) 
desire-
satisfactionism, 
objective list 
theories 
Measuremental 
accounts to 
wellbeing 
Yes Yes Subjective 
wellbeing, 
preference-
satisfaction 
measures 
Policy-guiding 
accounts of 
wellbeing 
Yes, but with 
respect to 
aspects of 
wellbeing that 
are relevant 
for policy. 
Yes, estimates 
about 
aggregate 
wellbeing 
should be 
possible, and 
particularly, 
should not be 
vulnerable to 
deliberate 
manipulation. 
Utilitarian SWB 
advocates, 
Martha 
Nussbaum’s 
capability list. 
 
Look ahead 
A first chapter is a co-written exploratory piece, which is an empirical 
investigation in people’s conceptions about their own wellbeing. In the 
chapters that follow I first treat the most prominent measuremental 
accounts of wellbeing in the context of economics. I first assess to what 
extent the concept of happiness allows for self-assessed measurement, 
such as is standard in happiness economics (chapter 3 and 4), I then 
analyze to what extent recent proposals to measure wellbeing by means 
of preference-satisfaction succeed (chapter 5), and to what extent the 
capability approach can offer a feasible alternative to such approaches 
(chapter 6). In this part of the thesis (chapter 3-6), I almost exclusively 
focus on epistemic problems within the three approaches. Taking for 
granted the axiological commitments of such accounts, I assess to what 
extent they can provide us with successful measures of wellbeing. 
However, one crucial philosophical problem with measures of wellbeing 
is that philosophy is deeply divided on the question what the nature of 
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wellbeing is. The adequacy of such wellbeing measures in general 
depends (among other things) on their axiological adequacy. Chapter 7 
assesses this problem, which I call the problem of conceptual 
uncertainty. In the conclusion (chapter 8), I get back to my research 
question, and reflect on the significance of these problems in light of the 
status of wellbeing as an object of economic investigation. While some of 
the arguments presented may espouse some pessimism with respect to 
this status, I suggest that overall skepticism may not be warranted. 
However, an equivalent of Edgeworth’s hedonimeter to measure 
wellbeing across (economic) contexts and purposes—a welfarimeter, if 
you will—may not yet be around the corner.
Chapter 2 
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Chapter 2: What Constitutes 
Wellbeing? 
Five views on 'a good life' of people from the 
Netherlands.1 
 
1. Introduction 
More and more social scientists are committed to the view that it is 
important and worthwhile to measure wellbeing. A particular interest in 
this effort is taken by policy makers. A significant example is former 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress, who wrote a report on the 
matter that received much attention in academics as well as in policy 
circles (Fitoussi, Sen, and Stiglitz 2009), or former UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s initiative to measure and promote national wellbeing in 
the UK (Matheson 2011). Wellbeing is a complex and controversial 
subject, but the currently vivid debate about wellbeing seems to concur 
on one aspect: income is not a satisfactory measure of wellbeing. The 
debate about how we should conceptualize wellbeing in a policy context, 
if we are to go “beyond GDP”, is ongoing (see Bruni, Comim, and Pugno 
2008; Fleurbaey 2009; van Hoorn, Mabsout, and Sent 2010; Bleys 2012; 
Decancq and Schokkaert 2016). Two strands of literature have been 
particularly influential in the debate: the capability approach, initiated by 
Amartya Sen (Sen 1985a, 1992, 1999, 2009, Nussbaum 2000, 2003, 2011; 
Robeyns 2005; Deneulin and Shahani 2009), and the subjective wellbeing 
(SWB)—or happiness—approach, (Easterlin 1974, 1995; Veenhoven 2004; 
Layard 2005; Dolan, Peasgood, and White 2008). While the debate is 
ongoing, many policy institutions have taken a multi-dimensional route 
in which wellbeing is measured multi-dimensionally, with subjective 
happiness measures as one of the dimensions (e.g. Fitoussi, Sen, and 
                                         
1 This chapter is based on the paper ‘What constitutes well-being? Five views on 'a good 
life' of people from the Netherlands.’ Co-authored with Job van Exel, Werner Brouwer, 
and Maximilian Held. 
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Stiglitz 2009; Durand 2015). Examples include the UK wellbeing wheel of 
measures2, the OECD Better Life Index3, and the EU Quality of Life Index.4 
 While the literature on subjective wellbeing tends to consider 
people’s own evaluations of their life as constitutive of—or as good 
evidence for—wellbeing, it is divided, firstly, on whether such evaluations 
should be about direct experiences of pleasure (Kahneman et al. 2004) or 
as more cognitive evaluations of life as a whole (Binder 2014). Secondly, 
whether wellbeing should be measured by one unidimensional SWB 
measure (Veenhoven 2004), or whether SWB is just one among several 
dimensions of wellbeing (Diener et al. 1985) remains controversial as 
well.  
 The capability approach is more explicit in taking wellbeing to be 
inherently multi-dimensional, with the dimensions being functionings—
doings and beings—and capabilities—real freedoms to such 
functionings—that people have reason to value (Sen 1985a; Nussbaum 
2011; Robeyns 2016). However, authors within the capability approach 
are divided about the following two questions that are central the 
formulation of a multi-dimensional wellbeing measure:  
 
1. Which capabilities and functionings constitute wellbeing? 
2. How should these different capabilities and functionings be weighed 
against each other? 
 
As a response to the first question, Martha Nussbaum has famously 
argued for a specific list of capabilities, while Amartya Sen maintains that 
the set of functionings should be determined by public deliberation. In 
light of the difficulty such proposals leave for the second question, in 
developing capability-based wellbeing measures, some have 
controversially used life-satisfaction in empirical practice (Anand et al. 
2009; cf. Richardson 2015). While it is acknowledged among at least some 
capability scholars that empirical input on people’s personal values can 
be valuable in this debate5 (e.g. Alkire 2007; Van Ootegem and 
                                         
2 See: https://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/wellbeing/measuring-national-well-being/first-
annual-report-on-measuring-national-well-being/rpt---national-well-being-wheel-of-
measures.pdf 
3 See: http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org.  
4 See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/qol/index_en.html.  
5 Sen (1985, 2009) has expressed skepticism about subjective approaches to identifying 
well-being on numerous occasions, but has acknowledged the evidential value of well-
deliberated views (see chapter 6). 
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Spillemaeckers 2010), few have attempted to investigate the different 
conceptions of wellbeing that people have empirically.6 
  In this study we aim to empirically investigate the aspects of life 
that people believe to be constitutive to their wellbeing—personal 
wellbeing values (Haybron and Tiberius 2015). Personal wellbeing values 
are different from preferences in that they are more stable, more 
abstract, and involve the quality of our own lives (as compared to some 
other values people may hold). For example, people may have a 
preference to eat fast-food, while they value a healthy life style. We 
believe knowing more about these values can help fill the indeterminacy 
of wellbeing constructs in both approaches to wellbeing measurement 
discussed above. However, the normative framework we employ is 
minimal. We explicitly do not take a stance on the nature of wellbeing. 
However, irrespective of the nature of wellbeing—be it values, informed-
preferences, happiness or an objective list of goods—personal wellbeing 
values have some significance. An important commitment that is largely 
shared among philosophical theories of wellbeing—even among some 
objective list views (Fletcher 2013, see also chapter 7)—is that wellbeing 
in some way depends on the individual valuational makeup. Because 
different people have different values and desires, different aspects of 
life matter in different ways to people. This even applies to hedonistic 
theories: Even if happiness is ultimately the only good contributing to 
wellbeing, different aspects in life will affect happiness in different ways 
depending on their personal make-up. Beside unequivocal importance 
attached to wellbeing values in contemporary theories of wellbeing, and 
in particular the variety of views on wellbeing, we believe they are 
important for two pragmatic reasons. 
 
1. Firstly, while the study of wellbeing has gained a lot of popularity in 
the social sciences, their application to policy is still largely 
controversial. One important reason for this is the threat of 
paternalism when value-laden measures of wellbeing are used to 
guide policy. Robert Sugden (2006, 2008) has even argued that 
regardless of how wellbeing constructs are developed, if they are 
used to guide policy, they will necessarily run into the risk of 
                                         
6 Although some notable exceptions are Boulanger et al., (2011), Van Ootegem and 
Spillemaeckers (2010), Carr (2013), Tafaodi et al. (2012) and Bonn and Tafarodi (2013), 
and in the context of poverty: Narayan, Chambers, Shah and Petersch (2000), and 
Giacaman et al. (2007) in the occupied territories of Palestine.  
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threatening the freedom and wellbeing of those who deviate from the 
view of the good life a measure represents. In a recent article Daniel 
Haybron and Valerie Tiberius (2015) defend a view called pragmatic 
subjectivism which holds that regardless the policy maker’s view on 
wellbeing, there are good reasons to base wellbeing policy on 
personal wellbeing values. The charge of paternalism seems much 
less applicable in case wellbeing policy is based on people’s own 
views of what makes life good for them. 
 
2. Secondly, we believe that learning about personal wellbeing values 
has important implications for the valuation of wellbeing measures. 
In case people’s wellbeing values are roughly similar within the 
population studied, it seems acceptable to measure wellbeing by 
means of an objectively valued uniform wellbeing index, even on 
subjective conceptions of wellbeing—such as is often pragmatically 
done in empirical studies using the capability approach. However, if 
evidence is found that personal wellbeing values vary widely, using 
objectively valued indices would be contentious on accounts of 
wellbeing that are (in part) subjective. 
 
An important assumption in this chapter is that people are reasonably 
good sources of their own values in the following sense. When confronted 
with a set of values that could plausibly constitute their wellbeing, they 
are able to ordinally rank them. 
  For our empirical investigation, we used Q methodology (Watts and 
Stenner 2012), a scientific method for the study of subjective views that 
enables us to identify communalities and differences in viewpoints 
among individuals on what constitutes wellbeing. Q methodology has 
been used before to study a variety of subjective phenomena such as 
European identity (Robyn 2004), attitudes towards policy proposals (e.g. 
Ellis, Barry, and Robinson 2007) and public views on principles for health 
care priority setting (van Exel et al. 2015), just to name a few. Q 
methodology has also been suggested as an appropriate investigation 
tool in the context of deliberative democracy (Dryzek 1990; Dryzek and 
Niemeyer 2008), fitting particularly well with the democratic 
commitments within the capability approach. Furthermore, Brown (2006) 
has advocated the importance of Q methodology in political spheres for 
its ability to help identify not only the population’s opinions at large, but 
also the marginalized opinions. For similar reasons, Wolf (2013) has 
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suggested that Q methodology would be an excellent source of 
information to inform choices in quality of life measurement. The 
method has already been used to study conceptions of quality of life in 
the context of health (Stenner, Cooper, and Skevington 2003), as part of 
a study exploring democratically legitimate indicators of wellbeing for 
Belgium (Boulanger et al. 2011), and in a study on wellbeing conceptions 
in Australia (Carr 2013). The current study is unique in using Q 
methodology to study the variety of conceptions of the good life in a 
large sample of citizens. 
 
2. Methods and Data 
We used 36 statements representing potential constituents of a good life. 
In order to arrive at this set of statements, we constructed a taxonomy of 
different theories and lists of multidimensional wellbeing (see table 2.1). 
A number of lists were selected originating from different literatures, 
namely: the capability approach (Robeyns and van der Veen 2007; 
Nussbaum 2000; Qizilbash 1998), policy research of governmental 
organizations (Durand 2015; Fitoussi, Sen, and Stiglitz 2009), and general 
social indicator studies (Narayan et al. 2000; Ranis, Stewart, and Ramirez 
2000; Cummins 1996). An important source in this process was Alkire’s 
(2002) work on multidimensional wellbeing lists that indicates that the 
convergence of all these lists proposed in the literature is remarkable. 
Here, we selected 11 dimensions of wellbeing that roughly cover the 
aforementioned lists.7 
  The identification of these domains was based on a judgment of 
how the different lists would fit most parsimoniously within the chosen 
domains.8 Based on these 11 dimensions, a set of 36 statements was 
developed that we judged to be representative of the range of topics 
                                         
7 As one referee pointed out to us, it may seem surprising that SWB itself is not part of 
this list. This is not because we believe SWB, or happiness, is not an important feature 
of life, but because it is a concept of a higher level of abstraction than our dimensions. 
We believed that all dimensions and statements should be of roughly the same level of 
abstraction, and should be unambiguously interpretable. SWB is compatible with our 
framework in two possible ways. SWB is means subjective evaluation of life – which is 
compatible with the view that it is an evaluation of roughly these dimensions – or as an 
experience – in which case it can either be seen as pleasure – which is captured with the 
dimension of mental well-being. 
8 The final taxonomy excludes two categories from the analyzed lists, both of which 
were only included in one list (care and equality). The exclusion of these two categories 
is defensible on the grounds that they are neither an essential part of individual well-
being: inequality being a feature of society, while care seems to be a causal influence 
rather than a constituent of well-being. 
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covered by the 11 dimensions, phrased at a comparable level of 
generality. 
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Table 2.1: Taxonomy of different lists categorized into 11 domains 
No  Domain Theories Statements 
 Capability approach Human development and social indicator research 
 
 
 
Robeyns 
and van der 
Veen (2007) 
Nussbaum 
(2000) 
Qizilbash 
(1998) 
Stiglitz et al. 
(2009) 
OECD (2013) Narayan et 
al. (2000) 
Cummins 
(1996) 
Ranis et al. 
(2006)  
1  Physical 
health 
Physical 
health 
Bodily health Nutrition, 
health, 
sanitation, 
rest  
Health Physical 
health 
Bodily health Health Bodily 
wellbeing 
16. Having a healthy lifestyle 
18. The prospect of many healthy 
years ahead  
25. Feeling physically well 
36. Being physically able to do my 
daily activities 
2  Safety Security Bodily 
integrity 
Security Personal 
insecurity 
Secure 
environment 
Security Safety Political 
security (1) 
4. Being in a stable environment with 
little risk of dramatic events in my 
personal life 
22. Being in an environment where 
opinions can be freely expressed 
24. Being in an environment with 
little risk of natural disaster or social 
unrest 
28. Being free to go where I want to 
be 
34. Being in an environment where 
everyone’s values are respected 
3  Recreation 
and leisure 
Recreation  Play Enjoyment (1) Personal 
activities 
Work-life 
balance 
  Leisure 
conditions 
21. Going on vacation 
32. Spending time on leisure 
4  Mental 
wellbeing 
Mental 
health 
Emotions / 
senses, 
imagination 
and thought 
(1: intrinsic) 
Enjoyment (2)  Mental 
health and 
subjective 
wellbeing 
Psychologica
l wellbeing 
Emotional 
wellbeing 
Mental 
wellbeing 
13. Feeling mentally well 
17. Absence of stress and anxiety 
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No  Domain Theories Statements 
 Capability approach Human development and social indicator research 
 
 
 
Robeyns 
and van der 
Veen (2007) 
Nussbaum 
(2000) 
Qizilbash 
(1998) 
Stiglitz et al. 
(2009) 
OECD (2013) Narayan et 
al. (2000) 
Cummins 
(1996) 
Ranis et al. 
(2006)  
5  Political 
representatio
n 
Political 
influence 
and 
participatio
n and 
freedom 
from non-
discriminati
on 
Control over 
one’s 
environment 
(political)  
Liberty 
(negative 
freedom) 
Political 
voice and 
governance 
Civic 
engagement 
and good 
governance 
  Political 
freedom / 
political 
security (2) 
7. Feeling represented in political 
decision making that affects my daily 
life 
11. Voting in elections 
27. Being part of political decision making 
that affects my daily life 
6  Mental 
development 
Knowledge 
and 
intellectual 
developmen
t 
Practical 
reason/ 
senses, 
imagination 
and thought 
(2: 
instrumental
) 
Basic 
intellectual 
and physical 
capacities and 
literacy / 
autonomy and 
self-
determination 
/ 
understanding  
Education (1: 
instrumental
) 
Education (1: 
instrumental
) 
Freedom of 
choice and 
action 
 Empowerme
nt / mental 
development 
5. Being up to date with respect to the 
things that I find important 
15. Being able to form an opinion 
about the things that I find important. 
19. Living a spiritual life 
33. Being able to make my own 
choices in life 
35. Being educated in a way that 
suits me 
7  Environment
al conditions 
Shelter/ 
mobility/ 
living-
environmen
t 
Control over 
one’s 
environment 
(material), 
other 
species 
Shelter Environment
al conditions 
/ economic 
insecurity 
Housing / 
quality of 
the natural 
environment  
  Environment
al conditions  
6. Feeling at home in the environment 
where I live 
8. Living in an environment with 
sufficient open and natural spaces 
12. Living in an environment with 
facilities that are important to me (e.g. 
libraries, cinemas, nightlife, museums) 
30. Feeling at ease in the house 
where I live in 
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No  Domain Theories Statements 
 Capability approach Human development and social indicator research 
 
 
 
Robeyns 
and van der 
Veen (2007) 
Nussbaum 
(2000) 
Qizilbash 
(1998) 
Stiglitz et al. 
(2009) 
OECD (2013) Narayan et 
al. (2000) 
Cummins 
(1996) 
Ranis et al. 
(2006)  
8  Social 
relations 
Social 
relations 
Affiliation Significant 
relations with 
others and 
some 
participation 
is social life 
Social 
connections 
Social 
connections 
Social 
wellbeing 
Intimacy and 
friendship / 
community 
Social 
relations / 
community 
wellbeing 
10. Having friends and meeting 
them regularly 
14. Being part of a community or 
group in which members support one 
another 
23. Having a nice romantic 
relationship 
26. Having a good relationship with 
my family 
31. Being appreciated by my social 
environment 
9  Material 
wellbeing 
 Control over 
one’s 
environment 
(material) 
  Income and 
wealth 
Material 
wellbeing 
Material 
wellbeing 
Economic 
security 
1. Being able to meet my material needs 
3. Having a good income relative to my 
social environment 
10  Labor 
conditions 
Labor    Availability 
and quality 
of jobs 
  Work 
conditions 
9. Having a meaningful daily activity 
(work or other) 
11  Achievement
s 
  Self-respect 
and aspiration 
/ 
achievements 
Education (2: 
in terms of 
achievement
) 
Education (2: 
in terms of 
achievement
) 
 Productivity  2. Living according to my own values 
20. Having accomplished 
something—or accomplishing 
something—I am proud of 
29. Contributing to society. 
 Omitted Care       Inequalities  
Note: The bracketed numbers indicate that a specific category of one of the lists fitted in more than one domain. Statements were randomly assigned a number. 
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Respondents and Procedure 
Respondents were recruited from an existing, renowned panel 
(http://www.centerdata.nl/en/about-centerdata). A sample of the people 
who had previously signed up for this panel, aimed to be roughly 
representative of the adult general population in the Netherlands in 
terms of age, gender and level of education, received an invitation to 
participate in our study. This invitation contained brief information 
about the purpose of our study and the content of the questionnaire. By 
accepting the invitation to participate in this particular study, they 
provided consent for the use of the information they provided for the 
purposes of our study. Respondents received no incentive and were free 
to terminate their participation in the study at any point in the 
questionnaire. The data from respondents who stopped before the end 
of the statement sorting task were disregarded. The questionnaire was 
pilot-tested in a sample of 100 respondents, who generally found the 
questionnaire to be feasible, comprehensible and interesting. 
Respondents completed the questionnaire online. They were 
consecutively asked to: 
 
1. read all the statements, which were presented to them in random 
order; 
2. in the process of reading to place each statement into one of three 
piles, labelled as unimportant, neutral or important for “a good life 
for you”; 
3. by pile, in the order important-unimportant-neutral, locate all 
statements onto the sorting grid according to their relative 
importance for “a good life for you”; 
4. after finishing, to clarify their ranking in writing by providing an 
explanation for the (un)importance of the four statements placed in 
the far left and right columns of the sorting grid for their view on as 
good life as well as by providing a short description of their view in 
an open text field; 
5. and respond to a number of questions about various aspects of their 
life, including basic demographic characteristics. 
 
For the purpose of our research interest, we wanted people to reflect on 
the life that they believed to be good in terms of wellbeing. We believed 
it was more natural for people to do this when they were asked to reflect 
on what constitutes a good life for them, rather than to ask them about 
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what they held to be personal wellbeing values directly (see also Haybron 
and Tiberius 2015). We hence asked respondents to rank the statements 
in relation to how strongly they related to “a good life for you” (Haybron 
and Tiberius 2015). For the purpose of brevity and readability, in the 
following we will use “a good life” and “wellbeing” interchangeably, 
without an intended shift in meaning. In total our sample included 1,529 
respondents from the adult population of the Netherlands, 82 (5.4%) of 
which were initially excluded for either taking fewer than 4 minutes to 
finish the Q sort (i.e. speeding) or failing to complete the statement 
ranking task. The average age of respondents was 55 (range 16-92) and 
56% were women, meaning that the sample was not fully representative 
of the Dutch population in terms of age and gender (but was roughly so 
in terms of level of education). 
 
Data 
For the analysis and treatment of the data, the pensieve package for Q 
methodology was used in R. After the sorting, statements placed in each 
column were given a rank score: Here, -4 for the column on the left up to 
+4 for the column on the right of the sorting grid (see figure 2.1).9  
  
                                         
9 Please note that respondents saw 1 to 9 as the column numbers in order to take away 
the connotation of their ranking of the statements in a forced grid with positive, neutral, 
or negative scores.  
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Figure 2.1: Sorting grid used for the ranking of statements 
 
 
Missing Values 
To minimize the data loss that would result from excluding all such 
participants that did not complete their ranking from the analysis, a 
pairwise complete observations method was applied, resulting in a final 
exclusion of 26 participants (1.7%), thus leaving 1,503 participants for 
analysis.  
 
Factor Extraction 
The essence of Q methodology is the usage of a by-person factor 
extraction to achieve a number of factors that are summaries of variation 
between different individuals and represent a significant proportion of 
variation within the dataset. Factor scores are computed for each of the 
36 statements, which are translated back into a full ranking of the 
statements and, together with the qualitative data, are interpreted as 
viewpoints. A viewpoint thus takes the form of a particular way a person 
that correlates 100% with the factor would have ordered the set of 
statements.  
  For factor extraction we used principal components analysis. In 
order to determine the number of factors to be extracted from the data, 
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we apply the Kaiser-Guttman cutoff of Eigenvalues greater than one 
(Kaiser 1960; Guttman 1954), with values adjusted by a parallel analysis 
(Horn 1965). Parallel analysis corrects for the fact that Eigenvalues 
greater than one may be due to random variation in large datasets. Due 
to the size of the dataset at hand, we believe this is the best available 
method for determining the factor retention.  
  The parallel analysis suggests that 4-5 factors may be retained, 
depending on the correlation coefficient used (Pearson's r is more 
generous). Because the choice of correlation coefficient is somewhat 
arbitrary and conservative  we stick to the more generous 5 factor 
solution in the below. The factor extraction of five factors yields an 
explained variance of 47.6%. 
 
Factor Rotation 
Because the unrotated loadings and the resulting factor scores are hard 
to interpret (Thompson 2004, 39), especially in the context of Q 
Methodology (Brown 1980, p33ff), we applied quartimax rotation.10 
 
Factor Scores 
The factor scores reproduced here are simple loadings-weighted averages 
of the raw statement rankings provided by participants, a simple 
procedure otherwise known as regression scores.  For each factor, 
statements were placed in the sorting grid (see figure 2.1) based on their 
factor scores, from lowest score into the outmost left column (-4) to the 
highest score in the outmost right column (+4) (see table 2.3). In the 
description of the factors in the results section, we will make reference 
to this placement of statements as follows: (st.17, +4), meaning that 
statement 17 had a rank score +4 in that factor.  
                                         
10 The criteria used for the selection of the rotation method were the following: 1) 
Authenticity: Every factor should include, as far as possible, many high loaders who 
load only on that factor. It seems quite unattractive to interpret a factor score which, in 
this form, has not been produced by (at least some) participants. 2) Well-Defined Scores: 
Factor scores should, as far as possible, produce a definitive ranking of items, shared 
by many people. This implies that factor scores should have little spread (a low, 
loadings-weighted standard deviation of raw scores). 3) Specificity: Factor scores should 
not, as far as possible, be highly correlated with other factor scores. Q Methodology 
seeks to highlight differences in viewpoints, and, if empirically observable, the rotation 
procedure should highlight such differences for interpretation. We did not use two 
other criteria sometimes mentioned in the literature, namely an equal contribution of 
factors to the overall explained variance, as well as the absence of bipolar factors. While 
both of those are inconveniences – especially bipolar factors – we consider them to be 
essential empirical findings, not artefacts of the rotation procedure. 
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  In addition, we will use some of the explanations given by 
respondents who loaded highly on that view (‘exemplars’) for illustration 
purposes. As much as possible we use literal translations from the 
original Dutch explanations, but some were slightly edited for legibility. 
One of the questions used asked the respondents to briefly describe their 
view on wellbeing in their own words. Beside looking at the answers to 
these answers of the exemplars of the viewpoints for their interpretation, 
we also did a more systematic analysis of the words used to describe the 
good life in order to compare the usage of words that related to particular 
viewpoints between exemplars of these viewpoints and the rest of the 
sample. We selected the words on conceptual grounds, and used a 
statistical program in STATA to count their frequency. 
 
3. Results 
General results 
As a first impression of the data, table 2.2 presents average rank scores 
of the highest and lowest ranking statements for the full respondent 
sample (n=1,503). Striking is the consensus among respondents about 
the importance of health in their conceptions of a good life (shown by 
the high average rank scores of statements 13, 18, 25 and 36) and the 
apparent unimportance of political participation (statements 7 and 27) 
and spirituality (statement 19). For example, only 2.4% of the respondents 
ranked feeling represented in political decision making higher than +1, 
and being part of political decision making was only ranked that highly 
by 1.5% of the respondents. Common reasons provided by respondents 
for their very low ranking of political participation statements were 
cynicism about politicians’ motivations (“there is no point, they do 
whatever they want to anyway” id. 15), perceived lack of effect of 
participation in our political system (“the amount of influence you can 
have as an individual is so minimal I won’t waste my energy with that” 
id. 848) and general lack of interest (“It is generally important, but 
unfortunately I don’t care” id. 713). With respect to spirituality, 46% of 
respondents ranked it as being the least important for a good life, and 
only 8% ranked it higher than +1. The general attitude reflected by those 
is that spirituality is either too vague (“spirituality is too woozy for me” 
(id.1)), or related to religion, which in turn is not appreciated (“…too 
much suffering due to religious faith”, id.193). 
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Table 2.2: highest and lowest ranking statements in the overall sample 
  Mean Std. 
dev. 
St
. 
Highest averages 
1
3 
Feeling mentally well 1.57 1.71 
1
8 
The prospect of many 
healthy years ahead 
1.38 2.05 
2
5 
Feeling physically well 1.31 1.64 
 Feeling at home in the 
environment where I live 
1.26 1.74 
3
6 
Being physically able to do 
my daily activities 
1.08 1.74 
6 Feeling at ease in the house 
where I live in 
1.08 1.59 
2 Living according to my own 
values 
1.03 2.00 
 Lowest averages 
 
7 
Feeling represented in 
political decision making 
that affects my daily life 
-2.25 1.55 
1
9 
Living a spiritual life -2.39 2.14 
2
7 
Being part of political 
decision making that 
affects my daily life 
-2.53 1.44 
 
 The first of the five viewpoints is a wide-ranging factor; 1,067 
people loaded significantly onto this viewpoint, of which 1,037 loaded 
positively. The four other viewpoints that were identified had more 
evenly divided loadings among the respondents.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
11 Overall, there were far more positive than negative correlations between the rankings 
of statements by participants, which means that most people appear not to sort the 
items in a diametrically opposed fashion. In other words, participants seem to think 
differently about conceptions of the good life, rather than in inverse ways. As a result 
of this, in the following we will discuss these viewpoints from the perspective of the 
positive loaders, as we cannot expect the negative loaders to represent the inverse 
viewpoint. 
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Table 2.3: The five viewpoints 
Dimen-
sion 
No. Statement Health 
and 
feeling 
well 
Hearth 
and 
home 
Freedom 
and 
Auton-
omy 
Social 
relations 
and 
purpose 
Individual
-ism and 
Independ-
ence 
Health 16 Having a healthy 
lifestyle 
1 1 -2 0 -2 
18 The prospect of many 
healthy years ahead 
4 1 -3 0 -1 
25 Feeling physically well 3 0 0 1 -1 
36 Being physically able to 
do my daily activities 
3 -3 0 0 0 
Safety 4 Being in a stable 
environment with little 
risk of dramatic events 
in my personal life 
-1 0 -1 -4 -4 
24 Being in an environment 
with little risk of natural 
disaster or social unrest 
0 3 -3 -4 -3 
22 Being in an environment 
where opinions can be 
freely expressed 
0 0 2 -2 0 
28 Being free to go where I 
want to be 
2 -1 3 -3 1 
34 Being in an environment 
where everyone’s values 
are respected 
0 -1 4 0 -1 
Recreat-
ion and 
Leisure 
21 Going on vacation -1 -1 -4 1 4 
32 Spending time on leisure 0 -4 0 1 1 
Mental 
Wellbeing 
13 Feeling mentally well 4 2 1 1 -1 
17 Absence of stress and 
anxiety 
1 2 -1 0 -3 
Political 
represent
-ation 
7 Feeling represented in 
political decision 
making that affects my 
daily life 
-3 -2 -1 -1 0 
11 Voting in elections -2 -1 0 -2 0 
27 Being part of political 
decision making that 
affects my daily life 
-4 -3 -2 0 0 
Chapter 2 
 
27 
 
Dimen-
sion 
No. Statement Health 
and 
feeling 
well 
Hearth 
and 
home 
Freedom 
and 
Auton-
omy 
Social 
relations 
and 
purpose 
Individual
-ism and 
Independ-
ence 
Mental 
developm
ent 
5 Being knowledgeable 
with respect to the 
things that I find 
important 
-1 1 0 -1 1 
15 Being able to form an 
opinion about the things 
that I find important. 
0 1 3 -1 2 
19 Living a spiritual life -4 -4 -1 2 -3 
33 Being able to make my 
own choices in life 
2 -3 4 -2 4 
35 Being educated in a way 
that suits me 
-2 -2 0 1 2 
Environm
ental 
condition
s 
6 Feeling at home in the 
environment where I live 
3 4 1 0 -1 
8 Living in an 
environment with 
sufficient open and 
natural spaces 
0 3 -1 -1 -2 
12 Living in an 
environment with 
facilities that are 
important to me (e.g. 
libraries, cinemas, 
nightlife, museums) 
-3 0 -2 0 1 
30 Feeling at ease in the 
house where I live in 
2 0 1 -1 0 
Social 
relations 
10 Having friends and 
meeting them regularly 
1 2 2 4 0 
14 Being part of a 
community or group in 
which members support 
one another 
-2 0 1 3 -4 
23 Having a nice romantic 
relationship 
0 -2 -3 4 2 
26 Having a good 
relationship with my 
family 
1 0 1 2 -2 
31 Being appreciated by my 
social environment 
-1 -2 0 2 1 
Material 
wellbeing 
1 Being able to meet my 
material needs 
0 4 -2 -3 3 
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Dimen-
sion 
No. Statement Health 
and 
feeling 
well 
Hearth 
and 
home 
Freedom 
and 
Auton-
omy 
Social 
relations 
and 
purpose 
Individual
-ism and 
Independ-
ence 
3 Having a good income 
relative to my social 
environment 
-3 1 -4 -2 3 
Achievem
ent 
9 Having a meaningful 
daily activity (work or 
other) 
1 2 2 3 0 
2 Living according to my 
own values 
2 3 3 -3 3 
20 Having accomplished 
something—or 
accomplishing 
something—I am proud 
of 
-1 0 0 3 2 
29 Contributing something 
to society 
-2 -1 2 2 -2 
 
 
Viewpoint 1: Feeling well and being healthy 
This wide-ranging viewpoint captures a relatively large share of the 
variance in the Q sorts, and as such presents a wide consensus view on 
how people perceive of their wellbeing. Central in this view point is the 
importance of health features and feeling well. Feeling well (st.13, +4) is 
centrally important and is motivated by its intrinsic value, but also for 
enabling the value of all the other important things. One exemplar 
explained: “If you are not feeling well, it feels as if all the other aspects 
in life are not worth it. You will not be able to enjoy anything” (id. 595). 
In terms of health, both longevity (st.18, +4), feeling healthy (st.25, +3), 
as well as physical ability (st.36, +3) are considered important. Similarly, 
many cite the intrinsic value of health as one of the main reasons for why 
they consider it so important: “Health is the most important thing there 
is!” (id. 228). At the same time, a respondent wrote “I want to stay 
independent of others” as a motivation, which resonated among a 
number of other respondents as well. Lastly, homeliness is also an 
important aspect of wellbeing for this viewpoint (st.6, +3; st.30, +2). One 
respondent explained: “Because this is your basis. If you do not feel 
comfortable here, how can you feel comfortable anywhere?” (id. 44). 
  Like in the overall sample (see table 2.3), statements about political 
participation (st.27, -4; st.7, -3 & st.11, -2) and spirituality (st.19, -4) rank 
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very low. Similarly, relative income compared to others (st.3, -3), as well 
as having cultural facilities close by (st.12, -3) were considered among the 
least important statements to wellbeing in this view. About the latter, 
respondents generally wrote that “If this is a little further away, I can 
always travel to get there” (id. 1,483). About relative income, a typical 
participant eloquently wrote: “a rich man is not happier than someone 
who knows he has enough” (id.29). 
  Overall, it are down-to-earth immaterial personal things that 
matter to wellbeing in this general view point, much more than material 
and public goods. 
 
Viewpoint 2: Hearth and home 
Viewpoint 2 is a homely view. Those who load highly onto this viewpoint 
value feeling at home, and value open spaces and safety in the 
environment where they live (st.6, +4, st.8, +3, st.24, +3). One exemplar 
explained that “This brings peace and solidarity. I like greeting people 
and having acquaintances in the neighbourhood” (id. 955). Furthermore, 
exemplars value being able to meet their material needs (st.1, +4), and 
living according to their own values (st.2, +3). To some, living according 
to their own values was closely tied to the Dutch culture: “I feel very 
Dutch. I lived in South America for 13 years, so I know there are 
differences.” (id. 1,161) But, for both living according to your own values 
as well as meeting material needs, many reasons are given that relate to 
wanting to be independent of others for their needs: “being dependent 
on others for elementary things seems terrible to me” an exemplar 
explained in relation to material needs (id. 1,355). Furthermore, having 
friends (st.10, +2), having a meaningful daily activity (st.9, +2), and feeling 
mentally well (st.13, +2) were also considered important. 
 Overall, the view represents a homely take on wellbeing that is 
characterized by a regard for one’s living place, quality of one’s social 
and physical environment, and being able to take care of their own needs. 
One exemplar put it as follows: wellbeing is: “living in a nice and safe 
environment, among people you know and trust, where helping each 
other if necessary is the norm.” (id.1265). 
 
Viewpoint 3: Freedom and autonomy 
The third viewpoint emphasizes statements that are all strongly related 
to individual freedom and personal autonomy. It is particularly making 
one’s own choices (st.33, +4), respect for everyone’s values (st.34, +4), 
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being able and free to form opinions (st.15, +3; st.22, +2), living according 
to your own values (st.2, +3), and being free to go wherever you want to 
go (st.28, +3) that are valued in this viewpoint. These statements all fit 
very closely together in their relationship to personal freedom and 
autonomy. The respect for everyone’s values was explained by one 
exemplar as follows: “Not everyone needs to have the same values and 
norms, if we just accept this and do not try to impose anything on each 
other” (id. 474). One exemplar put the relationship between autonomy 
and living well quite strongly: “This is, to me, the essence of life: taking 
responsibility for my own choices, and being mentally able to make these 
choices” (id. 1,452).  
The key of this view is captured well by one exemplar who wrote: 
“Living in freedom, surrounded by people who respect each other” (id. 
234). Or similarly: “Living in freedom in a country that has freedom of 
speech, but where people nevertheless respect one another” (id. 295).  
  
Viewpoint 4: Social relationships and purpose 
Social relationships and having a sense of purpose are essential to this 
viewpoint. Friendships (st.10, +4), romantic relationships (st.23, +4), as 
well as the community (st.14, +3) are highly valued. Family relations 
(st.26, +2) and being appreciated by the social environment (st.31, +2) 
also rank highly. One exemplar explained that: “a good life means at least 
that you are surrounded by people with whom you can share life, for 
better or worse, and whom you can trust” (id. 1,174). Or, in relationship 
to friends, one exemplar explained her choice of ranking friendships so 
highly: “For me this social aspect is simply the most important part of a 
good life” (id. 1,325). Accomplishment (st.20, +3), a meaningful daily 
activity (st.9, +3), and contributing something to society (st.29, +2) all 
matter to this viewpoint. The exemplars explain that having a sense of 
purpose is important to them: “I need a purpose in my life to strive for” 
(id. 937), or I “want to be useful” (id. 943).  
  Overall, other people and one’s relationship to them is crucial to 
this view. This is summed well by one of its exemplars: “For me a good 
life is giving and receiving love, participating in society, space for 
relaxation, doing things that you find fulfilling and enjoyable.” (id. 995). 
 
Viewpoint 5: Individualism and Independence 
This viewpoint values being independent of others: being able to make 
your own choices in life and living according to your own values are both 
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valued highly (st.33, +4, st.2, +3). An exemplar explained: “I want to do 
things my way. Make my own choices, go my own way, and arrange my 
life according to my own needs.” (id.344). Different from the other views, 
and in particular the Freedom and Autonomy view, this viewpoint is also 
characterized by materialism, not only as a means to meet material needs 
(st.1, +3), but also to be better off than others (st.3, +3), and going on 
vacation (st.21, +4). One exemplar explained that he wanted “to work 
hard, and be compensated by material goods (money), so I can fulfil my 
desires in life.” (id. 1,065). Another simply explained that it was valued 
because he wanted “to be free” (id. 60). One exemplar saw wellbeing in 
terms of “being healthy, having many friends, and making lots of money” 
(id. 855). This viewpoint also represents a high regard for 
accomplishment (st.20, +2).  
  Besides the high regard for personal income and vacations, another 
difference with the Freedom and Autonomy view is the importance 
attached to romantic relationships (s.23, +2). The individualism of this 
view is also visible in what is considered unimportant. Community and 
contributing to society were considered among the least important in this 
view (st.14, -4, st.29, -2).  
 Overall, the viewpoint describes a perspective on wellbeing in 
which being able to strive for individual goals is most important, both 
materially as well as in terms of not being restricted by others.  
 
Qualitative data 
While many respondents—even those who score high on viewpoints 2-
5—summarize their view on wellbeing in terms of more generic 
statements about health, family, and happiness, it is remarkable that 
there are substantial differences among exemplars in the way they 
summarize wellbeing in a sentence (see figure 2.2). This difference is 
most striking in case of the Freedom and Autonomy view, in which case 
exemplars are 2.4 times more likely for someone to use the words “free”, 
“freedom”, “choose”, or “responsibility” in their answers compared to the 
sample average. In case of Social Relationships and Purpose exemplars 
were 1.6 times more likely to use a number of words that are related to 
others in their view on wellbeing. The difference for the first viewpoint, 
Feeling Well and Being Healthy, is much less pronounced. The reason for 
this is that over a third of the sample loads positively onto this viewpoint, 
and it constitutes a large share of the explained variance.  
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 While this rough summary of the qualitative results cannot do full 
justice to all the explanations we received from the respondents, it shows 
that qualitative and quantitative results do align, as the variation in the 
rankings of statements summarized in the factor arrays corresponds to 
what participants loading on those factors explained in their own words. 
 
figure 2.2: keywords mentioned in the qualitative descriptions 
 
The keywords used are the following*: 
VP1: “health”, “happiness” 
VP2: “house”, “home”, “family” (nuclear, dutch: “gezin”), “environment”, “location”, 
“harmony”, “nature” 
VP3: “free”, “freedom”, “choose”, “responsibility” 
VP4: “people”, “other(s)”, “social”, “friends”, the dutch:“gezellig” (difficult to 
translate, coming close to friendly (cozy) atmosphere) 
VP5: “independent”, “own”, “self” 
 
 
Demographics and viewpoints 
There are some notable demographic differences between exemplars of 
different viewpoints (table 2.4). The exemplars of the first viewpoint are 
very similar, in terms of demographics, compared to the whole sample—
which is to be expected given the large number of exemplars. However, 
in particular the exemplars of the Individualism and Independence view 
are significantly richer (p<.01), higher educated (p<.01), and younger 
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(p<.01) than the rest of the sample. Given this view is the only view that 
values relative income, these results show that such a valuation is not 
merely aspirational. The exemplars of the Hearth and Home view on 
other hand are significantly more likely to be female (p<.05) and older 
(p<.01), and the exemplars of the Social Relationships and Purpose view 
and the Freedom and Autonomy view are more likely to be college 
educated (p<.05, p<.01, respectively).  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
We observed five viewpoints on wellbeing among the general public in 
the Netherlands. Most importantly, we find strong evidence for plurality 
within these views. A large amount of common variance is caught by the 
first factor, which captures a central and simple idea about wellbeing: 
health and happiness are central to how people perceive their wellbeing. 
Furthermore, we saw that there are four viewpoints which in different 
degrees helps to explain people’s views on wellbeing. These five views 
together are able to explain 47.6% of the variance. This means that 52.4% 
of the variance is left unexplained by these viewpoints and is due to 
individual idiosyncrasies. While there appears to be much agreement on 
the importance of health and feeling well, of which the endorsement of 
the first viewpoint is indicative, there is also much difference in how 
people perceive wellbeing, of which the latter four viewpoints are 
indicative. Even though a clear common picture arises, we must also 
conclude that to a large extent, concrete perceptions of wellbeing remain 
in the eye of the beholder; but such perceptions are likely to be made up 
of a mix of these five views, with the first view being most prominent. A 
number of these findings deserve further discussion.  
  We find a large consensus with respect to the features that were 
not found to be considered very important to a good life: political 
participation and representation. This is closely in line with some other 
empirical work on wellbeing conceptions in developed countries (e.g. Van 
Ootegem and Spillemaeckers 2010). There are three possible 
interpretations of this finding. Firstly, it could be that people have such 
bad connotations with politics that they rank it low even though on 
further reflection they would contend that it is quite an important part 
of their wellbeing. While this could be an explanation, from the written 
comments we know that there are at least some participants who say that 
it is important, but simply not so important for their wellbeing. A second 
interpretation is that political participation does not matter greatly for 
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wellbeing. Political governance is surely a major causal factor in creating 
freedom and opportunities within a country, and, especially when it goes 
awry, a major part of concern, but perhaps not in itself something 
intrinsically part of wellbeing in people’s conceptions of the concept. 
Quite interestingly, one of the empirical quality of life studies cited above 
(Giacaman et al. 2007) found that in the Palestine territories, political 
representation was seen as one of the wellbeing values. In this vein, a last 
possible interpretation we can give to our finding is that political 
representation is a very important part of people’s conceptions of 
wellbeing, but something that people stop appreciating as soon as it is 
achieved sufficiently. In other words, people adapt to political 
representation. Regardless of the correct interpretation, the finding 
seems significant in itself, and deserves further study. 
  Both the happiness approach and the capability approach are 
motivated from dissatisfaction with material measures of wellbeing. We 
find that material wellbeing does not seem to play a very central role 
generally. Only in one particular view, that we have called Individualism 
and Independence, material goods seem to play a central role. The lack 
of importance attached to material goods in general can be taken as an 
indication that material measures of wellbeing overemphasize the 
material aspects of wellbeing. On the other hand, defenders of material 
measures may cite the instrumental value that income and wealth have. 
In this vein, some of the written comments indicate that it is not 
necessarily the status of being rich, or having sufficient income itself that 
is valued, but rather the independence and dignity this provides 
alongside the enjoyable opportunities that come with it (such as 
vacations). It could be suggested that material measures are a good proxy 
of wellbeing in virtue of this feature. Nevertheless, the low appreciation 
in most of the views we found justifies questioning this framework in 
western societies. The responses show the importance of the distinction 
stressed by Sen, between “being well off” and “being well” (1985). In 
analogy to political participation and representation, thresholds and 
adaptation may play a role and in countries in which the level of material 
wealth is lower than in the Netherlands, and perhaps a matter of daily 
concern, material aspects may be valued higher. 
 Looking on the more positive side—at what does matter to 
wellbeing in people’s perceptions—a general interpretation of the results 
is that particularly feeling well and being healthy are particularly central 
to people’s conceptions of their wellbeing. This is captured by our central 
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viewpoint. Nevertheless, on the importance of a large number of other 
central aspects, such as freedom, mental wellbeing, social relationships, 
and independence, our respondents were much more divided. 
Furthermore, even with the disagreements on the importance of these 
aspects aside, a large unexplained variance remained.  
 We believe our findings have some significant implications for 
formulating conceptualizations and developing measures of wellbeing. 
For the capability approach, the heterogeneity of wellbeing values 
challenges the idea that there is consensus about a list of goods that 
constitute wellbeing, as certain aspects matter much more to some than 
to others. In considering the validity of SWB measures of wellbeing, 
individuals value a variety of goods beside mental wellbeing, implying 
that purely affective measures may not capture all that people 
subjectively value. Finally, thresholds and adaptation may play a role for 
some goods, like income, political participation and spirituality, meaning 
that people only value them as important for their wellbeing when, in a 
certain context or period of time, a subsistence or aspiration level for 
those goods is not met.  Further study is necessary regarding how to deal 
with this heterogeneity in wellbeing research.  
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Chapter 3: Which Problem of 
Adaptation?12 
 
1. Introduction 
Regardless of which theory of wellbeing one believes to be correct, most 
people will agree that happiness is one of the most central aspects of 
human wellbeing. A recent strand of economic literature has utilized this 
observation: rather than measuring human wellbeing by means of 
economic prosperity, economists have started to explore the feasibility 
of measuring happiness or satisfaction with one’s life. An important idea 
behind this is that economic prosperity cannot be seen as having intrinsic 
value to people by itself: after all, what is the point of economic 
prosperity, if it does not make us happier, or more generally, better off? 
The measurement of people’s perception of their happiness or 
satisfaction with life in the social sciences has come to be known as the 
measurement of subjective wellbeing (SWB). The study of SWB has seen a 
flourishing decade in economics and has formed its own subfield called 
happiness economics. Nevertheless, not everyone is equally enthusiastic 
about this new current in economics. Paper titles such as “Against 
happiness” (Stewart 2014) and “happiness is not wellbeing” (Raibley 
2012) demonstrate that some believe there is a darker side to the 
seemingly cheerful attempt to re-incorporate happiness into the 
discipline of economics (see for instance Annas 2004; Barrotta 2008; Sen 
2008; Adler and Posner 2008; Deneulin and Shahani 2009; Hausman 
2010; Nussbaum 2012; Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013). What is most 
controversial about SWB is not that happiness, or satisfaction with life, is 
something good generally. The controversy lies in the widely regarded 
assumption that SWB—a psychological state concept—is a measure of 
wellbeing simpliciter—a concept describing how good life is for the 
person living it (See for example Angner 2008, 2010 for discussions). It 
is this underlying assumption that has attracted quite some critical 
attention from philosophers and economists alike. While many 
                                         
12 This chapter was originally published as Van der Deijl, Willem J.A. (2017). “Which 
Problem of Adaptation?” Utilitas, 1-19. doi:10.1017/S095382081600043. Some 
modifications to the published article have been made. 
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researchers working with SWB express a more nuanced view in which SWB 
is only taken to be part of a multi-dimensional wellbeing concept, in this 
chapter I focus on the popular view among happiness researchers that 
SWB is a measure of human wellbeing (WB) in general. For brevity, I will 
refer to the view as the SWB-WB view.  
This chapter focuses on one particular widely discussed objection 
to the SWB-WB view: the adaptation problem (Sen 1985a, 1985b, 1987, 
1999, 2008, 2009, Nussbaum 2000, 2003, 2011, 2012). Adaptation occurs 
when a change in happiness (or satisfaction) due to external 
circumstances is mitigated, not due to a restoration of the external 
circumstances, but due to an internal change in aspiration, expectations 
or desires. Adaptation is most commonly discussed in the context of bad 
circumstances: the phenomenon that desires, aspirations or ambitions 
are restricted due to limiting circumstances such as prolonged 
deprivation. When this occurs, an individual may still think of themselves 
as happy or satisfied, despite their seemingly bad position. This 
phenomenon is discussed as a problem in a variety of contexts, such as 
the fair distribution of resources.13 However, in this chapter, I will only 
be concerned with the problem the phenomenon poses for the SWB-WB 
view.  
That the phenomenon of adaptation poses a problem to the SWB-
WB view is widely acknowledged; however, it is less clear why adaptation 
is a problem. While there are some exceptions (e.g. Chekola 2007; Taylor 
2014), no systematic attempt has been made to clearly define the 
different adaptation problems, or identify the different consequences for 
the empirical literature on happiness. One perspective about the 
phenomenon of adaptation is that it poses a problem to the SWB-WB view 
because it illustrates that happy people may not be leading good lives, 
and consequently, happiness is not sufficient for wellbeing. Because this 
pertains to the nature of wellbeing, we can call this view the Axiological 
Argument. Another interpretation of the problem identifies the crux of 
the problem elsewhere. On this alternative reading the phenomenon of 
adaptation provides an argument for the view that people are limited in 
their abilities to evaluate their own happiness. This interpretation of the 
adaptation problem—the Epistemic Argument—does not draw upon a 
                                         
13 There are at least two other targets for which adaptation is discussed to cause a 
problem. The first is the view that social benefits should be distributed according to 
happiness measures. The second is the view that that rationality requires that an agent 
act on her preferences. For the latter, see Bovens, (1992), Bruckner (2009, 2011), and 
Colburn (2011) 
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view on the nature of wellbeing, but only on our ability to evaluate our 
own psychological states.  
There is, however, a third perspective on the adaptation 
phenomenon, namely, that adaptation does not pose a problem to the 
SWB-WB view at all. On this perspective, adaptation to negative 
circumstances genuinely improves one’s life; and adaptation to positive 
circumstances—such as hedonic treadmill adaptation (Layard 2005)—
genuinely mitigates an increase in wellbeing from improved 
circumstances (Bruckner 2009; Feldman 2010, chap. 8). This view is not 
only common among philosophers, but also among SWB researchers. 
Richard Layard, for instance argues: “Clearly the secret of happiness is to 
seek out those good things that you can never fully adapt to” (Layard 
2005, 49; see also Comim 2005). 
I argue that there is a genuine problem of adaptation. However, I 
do believe the different interpretations of the problem have been a source 
of confusion that has left space for the perspective that adaptation is not 
actually problematic for the SWB-WB view. The plausibility of the view 
that adaptation is not a problem depends on the plausibility of the views 
that do take adaptation to be a problem. Biting the bullet on the problem 
of adaptation may be a plausible position, but whether it is in fact a 
problem depends on how we understand the adaptation problem. In this 
chapter, I have two goals. First, I want to convince the reader that there 
are indeed two separate problems of adaptation for the SWB-WB account 
that are distinct and have different implications. Secondly, while most 
philosophers seem to interpret the adaptation problem axiologically, I 
provide arguments for why the Epistemic Argument is a particularly 
salient problem for the SWB-WB account.  
SWB measures come in two forms: measures of happiness and 
measures of life-satisfaction.14 In the philosophical literature, life-
satisfaction views on wellbeing—i.e. taking a person’s attitude towards 
her life as a whole to be constitutive of wellbeing15—are significantly 
different from hedonic views—i.e. taking overall pleasure, or enjoyment, 
of experiences in life to be constitutive of wellbeing (e.g. Crisp 2006; 
                                         
14 Some philosophers as well as SWB researchers take the view that SWB is a measure of 
desire-satisfaction views of wellbeing (Bruckner 2010; Schimmack 2009). On this view, 
the epistemic and Axiological Arguments can also be made, but in a slightly different 
form. For the purpose of simplicity, I will focus on the case of (psychological) happiness 
and wellbeing. 
15 (see Sumner 1996) However, for Sumner, wellbeing only consists in life-satisfaction 
when a person’s life-satisfaction is “authentic”; that is, autonomous and informed. 
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Tännsjö 2007).16 Both can be seen as happiness-accounts, in the sense 
that both life satisfaction and pleasure are popular interpretations of 
happiness (Haybron 2005); though, they differ significantly on what 
happiness entails. In the empirical literature, the concept of happiness 
and life-satisfaction are generally not seen as contrasting (e.g. Veenhoven 
2000), though sometimes as different components of SWB.17 For the 
purpose of simplicity, I will mostly focus on the general notion of 
happiness, without making this distinction.18 Nevertheless, at some 
points in the argument the distinction will be important, at which point I 
will address this explicitly. 
 
2. Adaptation 
The problem of adaptation has been introduced in the context of welfare 
measurement by Amartya Sen. Sen has stressed the importance of 
adaptation in considering the “utilitarian approach”,19 or “happiness 
approach” repeatedly in his work (Sen 1985a, 1985b, 1999, 2008, 2009). 
In On Ethics and Economics he formulates it as follows:  
 
[T]he hopeless beggar, the precarious landless labourer, the 
dominated housewife, the hardened unemployed or the 
over-exhausted coolie may all take pleasures in small 
mercies, and manage to suppress intense suffering for the 
necessity of continuing survival, but it would be ethically 
deeply mistaken to attach a correspondingly small value to 
the loss of their wellbeing because of this survival strategy 
(1987, 45–46). 
 
In more recent formulations, Sen focusses more specifically on the 
happiness scales used in SWB research: “(…) the use of the happiness 
scale can be quite misleading if it leads to ignoring the significance of 
                                         
16 The use of “pleasure” is sometimes considered to have confusing connotations, for 
which reason the term “enjoyment” is often used by contemporary hedonists without 
intending a change in meaning (Crisp 2006) 
17 Both life satisfaction views (e.g. Dolan, Peasgood, and White 2008) as well as 
(Benthamite) hedonic views (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997; e.g. Veenhoven 2000; 
Blanchflower and Oswald 2004) are sometimes considered to be the central concept 
behind the empirical literature on SWB. See also chapter 4. 
18 Sen does not make the distinction (see below). However, it is important to consider 
that the problem is significantly different for different conceptions of happiness.  
19 Needless to say, utilitarianism comes with a commitment to sum-ranking that is not 
relevant for the present purpose, as it is unrelated to identifying happiness with 
wellbeing. 
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other deprivations that may not be at all well-judged in the scale of 
happiness” (2009, 282).  
That these examples pose a serious threat to the SWB-WB view 
should be clear. If a person clearly has a low wellbeing, but nevertheless 
has a high reported happiness or satisfaction with life, reported 
happiness or satisfaction with life are bad measures of her wellbeing. 
However, Sen does not specify exactly why he believes this to be the case. 
On an axiological reading, the problem is that happiness and wellbeing 
do not correlate well even if we are perfectly able to judge our own 
happiness. On this reading happiness and wellbeing are simply not the 
same: 
 
The Axiological Argument: 
1) The happy deprived are genuinely happy 
2) The happy deprived do not have a correspondingly high wellbeing 
3) Hence, genuine happiness and wellbeing are distinct 
Those who endorse the Epistemic Argument, do not buy into the first 
premise of the Axiological Argument—the deprived in Sen’s examples do 
not appear to be genuinely happy. While they agree that the people in 
Sen’s example do not have a high degree of wellbeing, the reason for this 
is not (only) that happiness does not constitute wellbeing, but that under 
these conditions people are bad evaluators of their own happiness.  
 
The Epistemic Argument: 
1) The deprived are not happy 
2) The deprived do report to be happy 
3) Hence, reported happiness is a bad indicator of genuine happiness. 
The Axiological Argument is essentially a philosophical argument about 
the nature of wellbeing. On this interpretation, the problem of adaptation 
is a problem for philosophical theories that identify wellbeing with 
happiness. In particular, both accounts of happiness we have discussed 
(pleasure or satisfaction with life) conceive of happiness in terms of 
mental states.20 While mental-state accounts of wellbeing were prominent 
in the 19th century, the view lost popularity due to a number of prominent 
                                         
20 Defining happiness in terms of mental-states is not completely uncontroversial. Daniel 
Haybron defends a view on which happiness is constituted by emotional states, which 
need not have phenomenological components, further discussed below. However, this 
is solely an account of happiness not of wellbeing. 
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counter-examples that were formulated against it (Weijers 2011a; 
Silverstein 2000). Most notable among them is Robert Nozick’s 
experience machine objection: Imagine that there would be a machine 
that would create a dream world for you if you plug in, in which you can 
experience the most incredible things (1974). Your life would be highly 
pleasurable and you would feel deeply satisfied. Nevertheless, the 
objection goes, a life lived in an experience machine would not be 
considered a fully good life, and thus, while this life would be optimal in 
terms of happiness, it would not be in terms of wellbeing (see Weijers 
and Schouten 2013 for a recent review). 
  The view that adaptation is mostly a problem for the conceptual 
identification of wellbeing and happiness—just like Nozick’s experience 
machine example—is not rare in the literature. Erik Angner, for instance, 
puts the two problems at par: “Philosophers have traditionally made the 
point [that happiness is not wellbeing] by reference to thought 
experiments like Robert Nozick’s experience machine, (…), or evocative 
vignettes like Amartya Sen’s descriptions of destitute beggars, landless 
labourers, overworked servants, and subjugated housewives.” (Angner 
2013, 233). Similar interpretations are given by many philosophers 
writing on the topic (Sumner 1996; Tiberius and Hall 2010; Austin 2016). 
 While the Epistemic Argument is less widespread, there is some 
recognition that the Axiological Argument is not the only way of 
analysing what problem(s) adaptation poses to the SWB-WB view. In 
particular, Marc Chekola, in a wider discussion about happiness, observes 
that there are two different ways of looking at the problem: 
 
One would be to claim that the person thinks he’s happy, but he 
really isn’t. (…) Another possibility, and the one I prefer, is to allow 
that he may indeed have a happy life, but one involving severe and 
unjustified limitations. Were he to have more opportunities open 
to him for a life with richer alternatives he would have a better life. 
So he may well be living a happy life, but not such a good life 
(Chekola 2007, 72). 
 
While Chekola prefers the Axiological Argument, he acknowledges that it 
is not the only way to see the problem. There are also philosophers 
writing on the topic who emphasize the epistemic challenge that 
adaptation poses. In an article called “Do we know how happy we are?” 
Daniel Haybron writes: 
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Everyone knows that we often adapt to things over time: what was 
once pleasing now leaves no impression or seems tiresome, and 
what used to be highly irritating is now just another feature of the 
landscape. Could it also be that some things are lastingly pleasant 
or unpleasant, while our awareness of them fades? I would suggest 
that it can (2007a, 400).21 
 
The conclusions of the two separate arguments can both be held at the 
same time—happiness may not identify with wellbeing, while at the same 
time, happiness and people’s perceptions of happiness may diverge as 
well. However, it is also perfectly possible to accept one argument 
without accepting the other.22 The two problems for the SWB-WB view are 
thus analytically independent but compatible.   
 
3. Adaptation as an axiological problem 
Is the problem of adaptation viewed from the perspective of the 
Axiological Argument convincing? While many philosophers commenting 
on happiness research take this perspective, I will argue that it is not. The 
Argument suffers from a number of weaknesses, but the most serious 
weakness is that the counter-example it is based on leaves much room 
for interpretations compatible with happiness-accounts of wellbeing; this 
makes the argument vacuous. Rather than showing that such views fail 
to be plausible in cases of adaptation, it presupposes it.  
First, regardless of whether those defending a happiness-account 
of wellbeing should be convinced by the argument, it is important to point 
out that few happiness researchers have been affected much by the force 
of the Axiological Argument. Many researchers take measures of SWB to 
be a direct measure of general human wellbeing even if they acknowledge 
                                         
21  As a matter of fact, the epistemic interpretation of adaptation is also covered by what 
Daniel Haybron calls as ‘scale norming’: “Scale norming can be a source of adaptation. 
Insofar as this happens, then we have a second reason for thinking that hedonic 
adaptation may be less extensive than self-reports would suggest: for these reports may 
reflect a kind of ‘scaling adaptation,’ in which subjects’ scales change over time. Lasting 
changes in hedonic state may thus be obscured by adjustments in the scales we use to 
rate our experience” (Haybron 2007a, 404) 
22 Sen’s citations given above do not clearly favour one of the interpretations of the 
argument. There are places in which they do. For instance, in On Ethics and Economics 
Sen writes that there is a “basic problem”, “to wit, the insufficient depth of the criterion 
of happiness or desire-fulfilment in judging a person's wellbeing” (1987, 46), indicating 
an axiological interpretation. Nevertheless, in The Idea of Justice, Sen concludes that 
from the adaptation problem: “our perceptions may tend to blind us to the deprivations 
that we do actually have, which a clearer and more informed understanding can bring 
out” (p. 284), indicating an epistemic interpretation. There is thus support for both 
arguments in Sen.  
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Sen’s adaptation argument (see for example Layard 2005; Dolan, 
Peasgood, and White 2008; Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh 2010). Perhaps 
this is due to a substantive disagreement with the argument, but that is 
not often spelled out. Rather, Sen’s argument is often rejected on the 
basis of simply being mistaken empirically (see for example D. A. Clark 
2009; D’Ambrosio, Clark, and Ghislandi 2016; Suppa 2015). The poor do 
not regard themselves as happy, neither do the unemployed. This 
empirical argument avoids the more crucial conceptual point that 
philosophers have in mind.  
  There are at least two prima facie problems for the Axiological 
Argument. At least when it comes to the hedonic interpretation of 
happiness, it is not at all clear whether the first premise—that the happy 
deprived are genuinely happy—is plausible.23 The compatibility of 
deprivation and pleasure that is assumed is not at all obvious. First, we 
must observe that the deprived are highly likely to experience many 
disadvantages in their life which negatively affect their happiness: 
becoming ill, being overworked, the loss of loved ones who die too soon, 
etc. Even if they do adapt to their circumstances must they feel the strain 
of these disadvantages. The claim that the deprived can be happy only 
seems plausible if the standards of what it means to be happy are not set 
very high, in which case the conclusion of the argument loses support. A 
second prima facie problem with the first premise is that even if the 
deprived happy are genuinely happy when they report it, their lives as a 
whole may be less happy in the probable case that deprivation leads to a 
reduction in the length of their life. In short, being deprived—i.e. lacking 
necessities of life—does not go without consequences, even on 
happiness-accounts of wellbeing. 
The point that it is conceptually possible to be deprived and still 
be genuinely happy is not undermined if these observations are correct. 
But scrutiny reveals that such conceptual possibilities may be more 
hypothetical than Sen makes it seem. 
  The second premise—that the happy deprived do not have a 
correspondingly high wellbeing—is also contentious, as it is based on 
intuitions that are very unlikely to be shared by someone who also has 
intuitions supporting a happiness account of wellbeing. Like the 
                                         
23 As life satisfaction may be more robust with respect to personal tragedies, this 
problem may not have force if it comes to life satisfaction views of wellbeing. The same 
caveat does not apply to the second prima facie problem. The fact that deprivations rob 
someone of their ability to be happy, or satisfied, arguably still holds with respect to 
this view. 
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Experience Machine counter-example, the Axiological Argument uses the 
adaptation phenomenon as an intuition-pump. Just like the Experience 
Machine objection shows that, even from the perspective of the mental-
state theorists, there is something counter-intuitive about mental-statism 
in certain cases, the Axiological Argument counts on the reader 
intuitively agreeing with the second premise. Even a fierce defender of 
mental-state accounts has to admit that there is something unsatisfactory 
about saying that a person in the experience machine lives a fully 
prudentially good life (Crisp 2006). 
But, does the same apply to adaptation? If we start from the 
intuition that wellbeing consists in happiness, it is unlikely that we also 
have the intuition that a genuinely happy person living in deprivation is 
not leading a good life. In fact, the intuition that an adapted poor person 
does not lead a happy life may seem quite paternalistic to someone with 
intuitions supporting happiness-based account on wellbeing. For 
instance, Marc Fleurbaey and Didier Blanchet write:  
 
If happiness is really the ultimate goal of people in life, the 
[objection] (…) [is] not compelling. (…) Sen’s objection points to the 
real phenomenon of adaptation, but the correct attitude about this 
phenomenon is to worry about the ills to which people do not 
adapt, such as pain and noise, rather than insisting that the ills to 
which they do adapt are still priorities (2013, 169). 
 
The Axiological Argument does not demonstrate that the judgement that 
the happy deprived are leading lives with a high degree of wellbeing is 
counter-intuitive; it simply assumes that it is. In this sense, it is question 
begging. The intuition is not obvious and not independent of the view one 
holds on the nature of wellbeing. Someone defending a happiness-
account of wellbeing may agree that the experience machine example is 
counter-intuitive for her view, but is unlikely to share the intuition that 
the happy deprived are not leading good lives. 
  If the deprived really do have the same quality of experience (and 
live equally long lives) it is not obvious that their lives are still worse in 
virtue of having lowered aspirations. There has been a wide array of 
schools of thought that have emphasized that the key to a good life is 
living a simple life, satisfying only a minimal amount of ambitions and 
desires, such as Buddhist, Epicurean and Stoic thought; but the idea 
arguably also captures a key Christian insight (McMahon 2004; Harris 
2014). It is not at all implausible that a reduction of desires and ambitions 
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may genuinely improve a person’s life by making her happier. In short, 
neither of the premises supporting the Axiological Argument is obvious, 
and taking them for granted begs the question.   
  There is a final, more pragmatic reason to resist the Axiological 
Argument in the context of wellbeing measurement, which does not 
concern the specifics of the Axiological Argument. The wellbeing debate 
has known a number of instances where intuitions of philosophers have 
gone in different directions. Despite Nozick’s experience machine, there 
are still mental-statists (see Weijers 2014), and despite well-known 
counter-examples to desire-satisfactionism (such as 1971 grass-counter; 
or Parfit 1984’s stranger on the bus) there are still defenders who are 
willing to bite the bullet (Lukas 2009). Because intuitions clash, the 
debate is not easily resolved. Adaptation, as an Axiological Argument, 
suffers from the same fate. There is something unfruitful about the usage 
of intuition-pumps in this context: because intuitions clash, they are 
unlikely to resolve debates. Thus, regardless of whether the Axiological 
Argument is question begging or not, an argument that relies on 
contentious intuitions does not stand on firm ground. 
 
4. Adaptation as an epistemic problem 
The epistemic version of the adaptation argument, as I will argue in this 
section, succeeds in providing a convincing argument that does not rely 
on contentious intuitions about wellbeing.  
  The idea that we are imperfectly able to evaluate our own 
happiness is actually a widespread idea (Haybron 2007a; Tännsjö 2007; 
Marsh 2014; but also Mill 1871 see chapter 4).24 There are a variety of 
ways in which the Epistemic Argument can be made precise. An 
important question that needs to be addressed is, How could one 
possibly be incorrect about their own happiness? In fact, there are a 
number of ways in which adaptation may lead to a misjudgement of a 
psychological state. Below I briefly discuss these issues and then provide 
a thought experiment—borrowed from Marc Fleurbaey and Didier 
Blanchet (2013)—to argue that adaptation poses a severe epistemic 
challenge to the SWB-WB view.  
  To appreciate the epistemic argument one must first consider how 
different happiness-accounts of wellbeing vary. Hedonism about 
                                         
24 However, only Haybron explicitly cites the adaptation phenomenon as an argument in 
favour of such a view 
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happiness comes in various forms, each with different epistemic 
challenges. While some hedonists maintain that pleasure is a specific 
experience (Tännsjö 2007), others (starting from Mill 1871) take pleasure 
to be heterogeneous, with some types of pleasurable experience being of 
a higher quality than others (see also Crisp 2006).25 Life satisfaction views 
are epistemically significantly different from these views because they 
take happiness to be a person’s self-assessment of life, which seems more 
accessible from a researcher’s perspective than pleasurability of 
experience (Sumner 1996). A different notion of happiness is Haybron’s 
recently developed account on which happiness is an emotional state, 
which may or may not directly enter experience (Haybron 2005, 2008). 
  What is required for the Epistemic Argument to be sound is a 
conceptual distinction between the judgement of one’s own happiness 
and happiness itself. For Haybron’s emotional state view this is most 
evidently the case. On Haybron’s view stress, anxiety, and even 
depression, may (to some extent) go unnoticed by people even if these 
emotional states do constitute unhappiness (see also Haybron 2007a). A 
person may judge herself to be happy, while she is under more stress 
than she realizes. For qualitative hedonists, like Mill, there is also quite 
clearly such a distinction (see also Schmidt-Petri 2003, 2006). Mill 
famously argued that people who have only experienced low-quality 
pleasures believe that they are happy, while people who have experienced 
high-quality pleasures may be less satisfied (by comparison) but 
nevertheless are happier. Even monist hedonists draw the same 
distinction. Torbjörn Tännsjö, in an article defending monist hedonism, 
writes: 
 
The fact that I can directly experience (introspectively) what 
hedonic situation I am in, does not presuppose that I can always 
make correct judgements about it. It is certainly true that, at any 
time, I feel what I feel, but this does not mean that my description 
of my state must be correct. And when I compare the state I am in 
right now, and the state I was in some time ago, I may very well 
reach the wrong conclusion (2007, 86). 
However, on the life satisfaction view, the distinction between judgement 
of one’s own happiness and happiness itself is not as obvious. Could 
someone judge her own satisfaction with life wrongly? In order to 
                                         
25 Fred Feldman (2010) also defends a version of the view. However, his view differs 
from other hedonists because he takes pleasure to be attitudinal. 
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understand this question it is important to see the difference between 
content errors of judgements and scale errors of judgements.26 Making a 
content error of judgement involves a failure to take into account a 
relevant part of the concept in a judgement of happiness. When someone 
misidentifies her own happiness, or misses out on an important part of 
happiness, she commits a content error. Making a scale error, on the 
other hand, means that the degree of happiness is not proportionately 
identified in relation to an intended scale. The concept of scale error is 
illustrated in case of making a judgement about length. Because the 
concept of length is quite clear, it is not easily misidentified. However, in 
judging whether something is “tall” or not, different people may have 
different views. A Filipino would most likely judge me—roughly 1.80 
meters in height—to be tall, while for Dutch standards, I am actually quite 
small.27 Different people may use different standards to make 
judgements of degree.  
Content errors of judgement may be definitionally ruled out in case 
of the life satisfaction conception of happiness, because it may be 
conceptually impossible to misidentify one’s own satisfaction. Scale 
errors, however, are not. There is at least one way in which two people 
who report equal degrees of satisfaction may not in fact be equally happy, 
even on a life satisfaction-view of happiness. Just like in the case of 
length, people may hold different standards about the meaning of “very 
satisfied”, in particular about the meaning of “very”. A person who has 
experienced a large amount of satisfaction in life and is back at a normal 
level will most likely judge her satisfaction to be lower than someone who 
comes from a very dissatisfied state. So, even for life satisfaction views—
for which the possibility of content errors may be excluded—there is a 
conceptual distinction between actual happiness and happiness 
judgement, which is due to the possibility of scaling errors. Two people 
who equally judge themselves to be “very satisfied” with their life, may 
not be equally satisfied, if their interpretation of degree (in this case 
“very”) is not the same. By focusing on scaling errors, the Epistemic 
Argument can now be precisely formulated so that it applies to the 
variety of happiness conceptions that I discussed above:  
                                         
26 Taylor (2014) discusses a similar distinction in the adaptation context. 
27 I do not want to argue, of course, that any of these perspectives is correct. There is no 
context-independent standard for counting as tall. So, “error” may be a misleading term. 
What is important though is that people have diverging standards on what is “tall”, so 
that taking any one standard will make the other person’s judgement erroneous.  
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A. When someone undergoes adaptation, she changes the standards 
by which she evaluates her happiness. 
B. For this reason, a person who has undergone adaptation applies 
different standards of evaluation to their happiness than people 
who have not undergone the same (degree of) adaptation. 
C. Reported happiness does not represent the degree of happiness 
well in comparisons, when two reports have resulted from 
different degrees of adaptation.  
  So far, I have argued that the Epistemic Argument is valid. But is it 
also sound? One example which illustrates its soundness is the debate 
about the Easterlin paradox. The paradox is based on findings which 
suggest that while the rich are reportedly happier than the poor within 
countries, and rich countries are happier on average than poor countries, 
the increase in prosperity of the past four or five decades has not led to 
significant increases in happiness scores over time in western societies 
(A. E. Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). 
Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers for instance report the noted 
problem that SWB may not be informative of quality of life over time 
because it captures people’s judgements of their “relative wellbeing”: “If 
individuals assess their life relative to contemporary standards, then as 
countries and the world grow richer, reported satisfaction may not 
change” (2008, 24). Marc Fleurbaey and Didier Blanchet provide us with 
the following thought experiment to illustrate this point: 
Imagine a scenario in which, over the next century, the 
situation of European countries stagnates, whereas Northern 
America benefits from a multiplication of its GDP per capita 
by 10, and the life expectancy of its population doubles (this 
would mimic the current gap between the rich countries and 
the poor countries). The Weber-Fechner interpretation would 
have it that European satisfaction would remain as high as it 
is nowadays. It appears more realistic to conjecture that, 
contemplating the much greater standard of living and 
longevity in Northern America, the Europeans would revise 
their view of what the “best possible life” is and would have 
a substantially lower satisfaction as a result. (2013, 189–90) 
28 
                                         
28 Fleurbaey and Blanchet only describe the Axiological Argument of adaptation under 
the heading of adaptation, and do not describe this thought experiment as adaptation. 
However, as it illustrates quite clearly what I mean by adaptation in the Epistemic 
Which Problem of Adaptation? 
 
50 
 
There are two aspects of Fleurbaey and Blanchet’s illustration that are 
particularly powerful. First, it not only shows that it is plausible that 
people do adapt their standards of evaluation, but it also illustrates how 
absurd it would be if people would not. It is almost unthinkable that 
Europeans would judge their own happiness by the same standards in 
the scenario where the US maintains the standards of living of today, as 
they would in the scenario that they describe. In other words, it is almost 
unthinkable that people’s benchmarks would not adapt, even though 
their lives do not change substantively. Second, Fleurbaey and Blanchet’s 
suggestion that our standards adapt explains—or is compatible with—
many of the behaviours of the SWB data. It explains why the poorest 
countries in the world also report the lowest levels of happiness—the 
standards used are influenced by their disadvantaged position. It also 
explains why the richest people report highest levels of happiness within 
countries—whose standards will be affected by their advantaged 
position. At the same time, it explains why countries do not appear to get 
happier over time if they do get richer: people apply contemporary 
standards to their self-evaluation. In short, it provides a plausible story 
that is compatible with the evidence, while their thought experiment 
shows that its alternative—the idea that happiness has truly been left 
unaffected by societal changes over time—is implausible. 
 If applied to Sen’s examples, the Epistemic Argument would 
illustrate that the lives of the deprived who report to be happy are not in 
fact happy. Their standards of judgement have adjusted, but their actual 
levels of happiness have not. Deprivation not only makes a person 
resilient in the face of bad external circumstances, but it reduces the 
standards that they use to evaluate their happiness. Thus, it is plausible 
that people who are genuinely unhappy in perpetually deprived 
circumstances report less unhappiness than those who have not endured 
it for the same length of time. The Epistemic Argument does not take the 
process of adaptation to genuinely improve happiness, but only improve 
the perception thereof. Not only is this a plausible interpretation of Sen’s 
examples but, if the arguments in the former section are convincing, it is 
a better argument for considering why there is a gap between reported 
happiness and wellbeing than the Axiological Argument. 
 
                                         
Argument in terms of scale errors of judgement, I believe it is justified to use the 
example as such. 
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5. Can the Epistemic Argument be tackled empirically? 
The Epistemic Argument turns the adaptation problem into an empirical 
challenge: can we really capture how happy people are? If correct, the 
Epistemic Argument provides reasons to be sceptical about this 
challenge. Nevertheless, even if correct, it is still an open question how 
bad the problem is for happiness research. It may very well be that while 
adaptation would distort happiness measures, the effect is small.  An 
empirical challenge may have to be tackled by empirical technology. In 
fact, a potential objection to the efficacy of the Epistemic Argument is 
that SWB measurements have been under extensive scrutiny and that 
none of these tests indicate severe measurement problems with the SWB 
measurements.  
The most common way measures are empirically tested is through 
construct validation. Construct validation—as it is used in psychometric 
practice—implies an assessment of the statistical evidence of the 
measures given our expectations of how these measures should behave 
if they were good measures of what they are aimed to measure. In the 
present discussion this is the concept of happiness (see Diener et al. 
2009; Veenhoven 2012b; see Alexandrova and Haybron 2016 for a 
general critical assessment of this approach in the context of SWB). 
Examples of construct validation results include high correlations of SWB 
measures with unemployment (A. E. Clark and Oswald 1994), facial 
expression (Ekman, Davidson, and Friesen 1990), or neurological activity 
(Urry et al. 2004). Andrew Oswald and Stephan Wu (2010) construct an 
objective wellbeing measure on the basis of real-estate prices, and find it 
correlates well to aggregate happiness measures in the areas. John 
Helliwell (2006) discusses the predictive value of SWB measures for 
suicide probability. Lucas et al. (1996) show that there is a correlation 
between optimism and reported happiness, but the correlation is not 
high enough to suspect that they measure the same concept.  
  SWB measures have done reasonably well for the standards of 
construct validation. If SWB would be “just noise” (Di Tella and 
MacCulloch 2006, 28), as some sceptics in fact have suggested (Johns and 
Ormerod 2007), the measures would not pass a construct validation test. 
This should provide some confidence that these measures indeed capture 
something consistently. However, the adaptation problem does not imply 
that SWB is “just noise”. The Epistemic Argument drives a wedge between 
perceived degrees of happiness and actual degrees of happiness in 
certain contexts. In particular, it does so when people have suffered 
Which Problem of Adaptation? 
 
52 
 
prolonged deprivation. If the Epistemic Argument succeeds, measures of 
SWB capture perceived degrees of happiness. Similar to actual degrees of 
happiness, we would expect perceived degrees of happiness to correlate 
to unemployment, facial expressions, suicide probability etc. In fact, it is 
likely correlated to actual happiness and in many cases very closely.  
Unfortunately, an implication of the Epistemic Argument is that 
the wedge between perceived and actual degrees of happiness implies 
that there is a limit to the empirical testing of measurement problems. 
As measures of SWB cannot provide us with direct information on actual 
degrees of happiness, we cannot test how closely related actual 
happiness and measures of SWB truly are. What we would need are 
variables that are correlated with actual, not just perceived, happiness. It 
is difficult to think of variables that can fulfil this role. This implies that 
there is a limit to how much confidence construct validation can provide 
for measures of SWB.  
  Because it cannot be assessed by empirical means how bad the 
Epistemic Argument really is, its assessment must remain suggestive. On 
the one hand, we can worry that the problem is ubiquitous and severe. 
After all, there is no reason to assume that everyone applies the same 
standards of evaluation. Nevertheless, given that the study of SWB, and 
happiness economics in particular, concentrates on relationships at the 
group level, general scepticism may not be warranted. In lack of a specific 
worry that two groups being compared have adapted differently, it is 
likely that differences in measures due to different applied standards of 
assessment “average out” on a group level.  
  The real worry arises when comparisons are made between groups 
that have presumably adapted differently and for that reason apply 
different standards to assess their happiness. The problem is that in 
these cases, the degrees of perceived happiness do not correspond to 
degrees of actual happiness. To provide an example, consider the finding 
that Latin American countries reach high levels of reported happiness 
despite low levels of economic prosperity (Inglehart et al. 2008; a fortiori, 
Graham 2011 discusses high reports of SWB in Afghanistan). Without 
questioning the authors’ conclusions (Latin American countries may of 
course indeed be very happy), it follows from the Epistemic Argument 
that there is good reason to doubt that the observed measures of SWB 
can be interpreted as degrees of happiness that can be compared among 
countries. Growing up in Latin American countries would likely result in 
different degrees of adaptation than growing up in, for example, 
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European countries. This would effectively make comparisons in actual 
happiness on the basis of SWB difficult.  
Another crucial example pertains to the empirical results 
discussed in section 3 that have been used to argue that adaptation does 
not actually occur. For example, the fact that the unemployed do report 
low levels of SWB has been taken as evidence that adaptation does not 
occur. However, if the Epistemic Argument is correct, we still have good 
reasons to be sceptical about interpreting the degrees of perceived 
happiness in SWB measures as degrees of actual happiness. It may be that 
actual levels of happiness are more sensitive to unemployment than 
measures of SWB. As such, even in light of corroborating empirical 
findings, whether adaptation affects empirical results in such cases 
remains an open question. 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
We have arrived at the following conclusion. There are two distinct 
adaptation arguments against the measurability of wellbeing by means 
of reported happiness. While the Axiological Argument is prominent in 
many philosophical reflections on the field of research, I have argued that 
such an interpretation of the argument would not be very convincing for 
someone who starts with intuitions supporting a happiness account of 
wellbeing. Moreover, the available evidence seems to render the 
axiological problem vacuous. The Epistemic Argument challenges the 
relationship between reported and actual happiness in the context of 
adaptation. While there is room for a denial of the problem of adaptation 
of the Axiological Argument, the Epistemic Argument poses a significant 
problem for SWB as a measure of wellbeing. Even if the Axiological 
Argument does not convince you that happiness accounts of wellbeing 
are false, the Epistemic Argument of adaptation should convince you that 
we cannot measure happiness in a comparable way when adaptation has 
occurred. Because the Epistemic Argument does not depend on contested 
philosophical intuitions, it is much more difficult to bite the bullet on the 
adaptation problem. The problem presents a genuine challenge to the 
field of research in cases in which we may doubt people share standards 
of happiness. Consequently, adaptation is a genuine problem, limiting the 
confidence we should have in our ability to compare our own happiness 
to that of others. 
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Chapter 4: What Happiness 
Economics  
can learn from John Stuart Mill29 
 
 
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to 
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, 
are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of 
the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. 
- John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 
 
 
1. Introduction: Happiness and subjective wellbeing 
“Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?” 
(European social survey). If you answer this question—on a scale from 0-
10—with a high number, and you answer it faithfully, is your life going 
well for you? This question, and variations thereof, is the key 
measurement instrument defining the concept of subjective wellbeing to 
the measurement of wellbeing in the social sciences. Not every SWB 
researcher would answer the question with a clear “yes,” but many 
believe that SWB can capture happiness, and that happiness is, in the very 
least, an important part of wellbeing (e.g. Kesebir and Diener 2008). Many 
researchers seem to understand SWB as a concept that is close to 
Bentham’s notion of happiness (see Fleurbaey & Blanchet, 2013). In fact, 
explicit references to Bentham’s philosophy are not at all rare in the SWB 
literature (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997; Kahneman et al. 2004; 
Veenhoven 2010; Dolan and Metcalfe 2012). The particular conception of 
happiness that social scientists use is closely connected with the question 
of how—if at all—happiness can be measured. On Bentham’s hedonistic 
perspective, measuring happiness by means of asking people about their 
experiences seems a straightforward methodology.  
                                         
29 This chapter was originally published as van der Deijl, W. (2016). “What happiness 
science can learn from John Stuart Mill.” International Journal of Wellbeing, 6 (1). Some 
modifications to the published article have been made. 
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Bentham understands happiness as a unidimensional quality of 
experience. On this view, it seems plausible that people are able to 
recognize and evaluate their own happiness. Nevertheless, Bentham’s 
hedonism is quite controversial in philosophy for its treatment of 
pleasure (e.g. Nussbaum 2004; cf. Tännsjö 2007). Much criticism of the 
SWB approach about the measurement of happiness or wellbeing seems 
to have focused on the unsatisfactory features of the hedonist 
conception of happiness underlying the approach in one way or another 
(O’neill 2006; Nussbaum 2008; Sen 2008; Raibley 2012; Fleurbaey and 
Blanchet 2013; Stewart 2014; Crespo and Mesurado 2014). In a critical 
essay of the hedonistic foundation of positive psychology, Martha 
Nussbaum writes: “Modern psychology follows Bentham. Indeed, 
Kahneman explicitly traces his own conception of ‘hedonic flow’ to 
Bentham [citation supressed]”. And yet, is Bentham correct?” (2008, S82). 
Nussbaum certainly believes that Bentham was not, and represents many 
fellow philosophers in this. 
 One way in which hedonism can be made more acceptable to those 
who oppose the view, is by moving towards a qualified version of 
hedonism, such as John Stuart Mill’s view on happiness (Mill 1871; see 
e.g. Sen 2006; Nussbaum 2008). Mill retained Bentham’s view that 
happiness is constituted by pleasure, but departed from Bentham by 
suggesting that pleasures—that is, pleasurable experiences30—do not 
only differ in terms of duration and intensity,31 but also differ 
qualitatively. Because Mill’s view on happiness seems more plausible to 
critics by virtue of its more nuanced treatment of pleasure, his view on 
happiness is sometimes proposed as a more attractive alternative (e.g. 
Nussbaum 2008). By virtue of its more nuanced treatment of pleasure, 
Mill’s account seems to provide a more attractive and plausible basis to 
serve as a foundation for the study of happiness. However, Mill’s view 
also makes happiness more difficult to measure. As I will argue, there is 
a perspective in Mill’s view on happiness that problematizes the 
orthodoxy within the SWB literature to use self-reports as measures of 
happiness, particularly in cases where qualitatively different lives are 
compared. In this essay, I will analyze this perspective and its relevance 
for SWB research. I illustrate the problem Mill’s perspective poses with 
                                         
30 I follow Schmidt-Petri (2006) here in making a distinction between “a pleasure” and 
“pleasure” in Mill. 
31 To Bentham, pleasures – meaning pleasurable experiences – also differ in other 
categories that seem to be less central here: certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity 
and extent. 
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the example of SWB research on the happiness of parents compared to 
the childless. I argue that the perspective does not rely on a 
metaphysically demanding interpretation of Mill’s qualitative hedonism, 
but is based on a simple and plausible assumption about the quality of 
experience. While on some conceptions of happiness it may seem 
plausible that people have the ability to evaluate their happiness 
independently of the kind of experiences they have already had, I argue 
that Mill’s rejection of this idea is convincing and compatible with a 
variety of views on happiness. Hence, it raises serious doubts that SWB 
can capture happiness in a satisfactory fashion, particularly in cases 
where lives with qualitatively different experiences are compared.  
 Sections 2 and 3 are preliminaries. In section 2, a necessary 
condition for measuring happiness by means of self-reported SWB 
measures is discussed, and in section 3, Mill’s qualitative perspective on 
pleasure is presented. Section 4 presents the main argument: Mill’s 
qualitative perspective on happiness is plausible, but creates doubt it can 
be measured by self-reports. Section 5 discusses the example of SWB 
research on the effect of parenting on happiness. Objections and the 
relevance of Mill’s perspective for alternative views on the nature of 
happiness are discussed in sections 6 and 7 respectively. In section 8, I 
discuss the relationship between this argument and the adaptation 
problem discussed in the previous chapter. Section 9 concludes and 
discusses implications for future happiness research. 
 
2. Measuring SWB 
There is a large variety of SWB research. Nevertheless, as discussed in 
chapter 3, we can say that SWB roughly comes in two types of constructs, 
which are sometimes considered to be similar in meaning, and sometimes 
considered to be different views on what SWB should capture: life 
satisfaction and happiness (e.g. Veenhoven 2010; Hansen 2012). On the 
Benthamite view, SWB captures pleasurable—or enjoyable32—experiences 
in life, and many SWB researchers would see an evaluation of enjoyable 
experiences in life to be a very similar exercise to evaluating satisfaction 
with life (e.g. MacKerron 2012).33 However, some researchers do take life-
                                         
32 Bentham uses the word “pleasure,” but modern formulations of hedonism often 
replace “pleasurable” by “enjoyable”(Crisp 2006) to de-emphasize the connotation with 
bodily pleasures.  I follow Crisp in using the two terms interchangeably. 
33 Ruut Veenhoven, for instance, writes: “Satisfaction is also the subjective experience 
Jeremy 
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satisfaction to be an altogether different conception of happiness (see 
Haybron 2007b for a discussion), and thereby deviate from the 
Benthamite underpinnings I have thus far described. It is also common 
to understand life satisfaction as a wholly different concept from 
happiness altogether. For the purposes of simplicity, I will focus my 
attention on SWB research that aims to capture a hedonistic notion of 
happiness. However, in section 6 I will address some of the implications 
of the argument for research aimed at capturing life satisfaction 
conceptions of happiness as well. 
 The study of subjective wellbeing is not necessarily committed to 
the view that subjective wellbeing is a sufficiently good measure of 
wellbeing simpliciter, though many authors are (see Angner 2010). What 
the field of study is committed to is the view that subjective experiences, 
or attitudes towards life, can be meaningfully rated on a scale with a 
reasonably limited amount of error (e.g. Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2002).34 This 
does not imply that someone with a higher self-reported happiness rating 
is necessarily happier than someone with a lower rating (see Angner 
2013); people may be imperfect in their judgment. People may make 
mistakes. However, in order for SWB to capture happiness, it is required 
that these errors occur randomly—in other words, that they are not 
structural. The precise formulation of this requirement may depend on 
the kind of comparison of SWB that is made. But consider, for example, 
that we want to compare two different groups. A significant share of one 
group may be overly-optimistic about their subjective wellbeing, such 
that two equally happy people would rate their happiness differently, due 
to such optimism. For example, if educated people tend to interpret a 
happiness scale differently than others, we may draw the wrong 
conclusions about the effect of education on happiness. In that case, SWB 
would be an unsatisfactory measure of happiness. More generally, in 
order to draw conclusions from self-reported SWB data on happiness, 
errors of this sort—reporting errors—need to be random. We can 
formulate this as follows: 
 
Ratability: In order for a self-reported measure of subjective wellbeing 
to be meaningful, people need to be able to rate their subjective 
                                         
Bentham had in mind” (Veenhoven 2010, 609). 
34 George MacKerron, for instance, writes: “SWB data consist, more or less by definition, 
of the aggregated self-reports of individuals—what people say about themselves when 
asked” (2012, 708).   
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wellbeing—be it happiness or life satisfaction—such that reporting errors 
do not occur structurally. In other words, different people—or, 
alternatively, people over time—may evaluate the same level of happiness 
differently, but these deviations should not have any relevant structural 
patterns. 
 
3. Mill and qualitative hedonism 
Hedonism is the view that happiness is constituted by the balance of 
pleasurable experience over painful experience. Hedonism as a theory of 
wellbeing additionally holds that wellbeing is constituted by happiness. 
This latter view is particularly controversial in philosophy,35 but as a view 
about happiness, hedonism is quite popular (see Haybron 2005). 
Bentham, as well as Mill, held both views of hedonism, but for the present 
purpose we will focus on hedonism as a view on the nature of happiness. 
While both hedonists, Mill’s view deviates from Bentham with respect to 
the nature of pleasure. Bentham’s view on happiness is characterized by 
the idea that pleasure is a homogenous sensation which is shared by all 
pleasurable experiences (Sumner 1996; Nussbaum 2004, 2008; Crisp 
2006). This feature is central to its appeal to happiness researchers. If 
pleasure is, indeed, a homogenous sensation, it seems plausible that it 
can be readily detected, and, consequently, rated by people. Moreover, 
the homogeneity of Bentham’s view on pleasure seems to play an 
important role in its liberalism with respect to pleasure, such as 
illustrated in his well-known view that there is nothing particularly better 
about poetry compared to pushpin. Nevertheless, there are two problems 
with Bentham’s account of happiness as a constituted by homogenous 
sensation.  
 Firstly, Bentham’s homogenous hedonism is vulnerable to the 
problem that there are certain experiences that we would call enjoyable 
that feel very different from typical enjoyable experiences—for example, 
enjoyment from masochism, or from running a marathon. But there are 
                                         
35 The most widely discussed argument against this view is the experience machine 
objection, originally formulated by Robert Nozick (1974; cf. Kawall 1999; Silverstein 
2000; Weijers 2011b; see Weijers and Schouten 2013 for a contemporary discussion).  
The argument is based on the following example: consider a machine which you could 
plug in that would create a virtual world for you in which you would have the most 
amazing experiences. Someone in this machine would have incredibly pleasurable 
experiences, and would be happy, but, Nozick argues, would not lead an enviable life. 
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also less trivial examples, such as Fred Feldman’s (2010) example of a 
woman who gives birth. While she is feeling ecstatic about holding her 
newborn in her arms, she is also in deep physical pain. What these 
examples show is that pleasure does not seem to share any specific 
phenomenological trait.  
 Another problem for a homogenous view of pleasure is that on that 
view, any pleasurable experience can be equated with a certain amount 
of another pleasurable experience to produce the same amount of 
pleasure. In other words, while someone who likes poetry may find it 
more enjoyable than pushpin, as long as she enjoys pushpin as well, at 
some point a large amount of pushpin will be more enjoyable than some 
amount of poetry. This can lead to deeply counter-intuitive conclusions. 
One well-known counter-example illustrating this problem is the example 
of the long oyster life (Crisp 2006). While an oyster may only experience 
some pleasure, a very long oyster life would have to be more pleasurable 
than a human life that lasts eighty years. If it is not, the life of the oyster 
can be extended, such that at some point, the pleasure enjoyed in the 
oyster’s life must compensate for the more intense pleasure of a human 
life. Many find the conclusion that the very long life of an oyster is more 
enjoyable than a normal human life counter-intuitive. 
 These problems for Bentham’s account resonate in some of the 
criticism on the conceptual framework employed by SWB researchers. 
Nussbaum, for instance, writes: “The apparent fact that pleasures differ 
in quality, that the pleasure of steak eating is quite different from the 
pleasure of listening to Mahler’s Tenth, bothered Bentham not at all; he 
does not discuss such examples” (2008; see Crespo and Mesurado 2014 
for similar concerns).  
 Mill was aware of such criticisms of hedonism—in particular, by 
the problem that any pleasure can be compensated for by some amount 
of another pleasure—and addresses them in Utilitarianism. Mill believed 
that many classical hedonist theories were able to deal with such 
objections to some extent by arguing that mental pleasures were better 
than bodily pleasures in terms of “permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc.” 
(Mill 1871, 56). However, Mill believed that such solutions were not 
sufficiently able to distinguish higher and lower experiences, such as that 
of a human life, and that of an oyster. Mill argued that there is a 
difference in kind between some pleasures in life: “It would be absurd 
that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as 
quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on 
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quantity alone” (1871, 56). Intuitively, there is something very attractive 
about Mill’s account of happiness. The experience of climbing the 
Kilimanjaro does not only differ from a day of playing board games in 
the amount and intensity of pleasure involved, the experience also seems 
qualitatively different. In a recent defense, Roger Crisp (2006) argues that 
what all such different enjoyable experiences share is that they are 
enjoyable, but that apart from that, they may all feel different. 
 There are different interpretations of how Mill’s view should be 
made more precise. While it is clear that Mill believed that some pleasures 
were qualitatively different from others, there is a variety of views on 
why that is. In particular, there is much debate about the question of 
whether Mill’s qualitative hedonism implies that a pleasure of a certain 
quality is preferred to any amount of pleasures of a lower quality. In 
other words, are qualitatively different pleasures lexicographically 
ordered? In Utilitarianism, Mill attempts to clarify his meaning of 
qualitative difference by reference to competent judges:  
 
“If one of two [pleasures] is, by those who are competently 
acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they 
prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a 
greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any 
quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable 
of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a 
superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to 
render it, in comparison, of small account.” (1871, 56). 
 
On the classical view of interpreting Mill—the lexicographical view—the 
passage is read as explaining a lexicographical difference between 
qualitatively different pleasures (Riley 2003; see Booher 2007). On this 
view, the pleasure experienced from higher pleasures can never be 
compensated by any amount of lower pleasures. This view is wedded to 
the idea that pleasurable experiences are intrinsically different from each 
other with respect to the pleasure they produce (Schmidt-Petri 2006). On 
the lexicographical view, either higher pleasures feel infinitely better, or 
they simply are infinitely more pleasurable than lower pleasures for 
other reasons. Jonathan Riley (1999, 2003) defends the view. The view is 
controversial because it begs the question of what it is about pleasures 
that makes them qualitatively different. Surely some experiences feel 
different in kind, but why would we assume that some are of such a 
higher quality that they are lexicographically ordered with respect to 
pleasure? Reading poetry does not really seem to feel infinitely more 
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pleasurable than pushpin. However, if poetry is infinitely better despite it 
not feeling infinitely better, the view seems to deviate from hedonism 
(Scarre 1997). Riley (1999) argues that some experiences do indeed feel 
infinitely more pleasurable than others. While such a defense is internally 
consistent, it relies heavily on the existence of an infinite difference of 
pleasure in felt experiences, a view that is highly contestable. 
 A second reading—the epistemological view—is provided by 
Christoph Schmidt-Petri (2003, 2006; but also Booher 2007; Crisp 2006; 
see also Saunders 2011 for a discussion). In his view, Mill’s qualitatively 
different pleasures need not imply that the higher pleasures are 
preferred to any amount of lower pleasures. A higher pleasure is 
definitely a lot more pleasurable than a lower one, but that does not mean 
that their difference in pleasure needs to be considered lexicographic. In 
Schmidt-Petri’s account, Mill’s passage suggests that if competent judges 
prefer one pleasure over an infinite amount of another pleasure, they are 
justified in ascribing a difference in quality between the pleasurable 
experiences, but it need not imply that any qualitative difference means 
that the experiences are infinitely more—or less—pleasurable. Schmidt-
Petri understands Mill’s passage as making an epistemological point: 
people who have not experienced higher pleasures are not able to 
appreciate them and compare them to lower pleasures. Some enjoyable 
experiences last equally long, and are equally intense as other 
experiences, but nevertheless produce more pleasure. The only way to 
learn whether this is the case is to experience both and judge. 
 In short, while there are two radically different interpretations of 
Mill’s views on qualitative differences in pleasure, both views consider a 
person who has not experienced a certain pleasure to be in a 
disadvantaged position to evaluate it. We can call this the qualitative view 
of pleasure, or more generally, the Qualitative View of Experiences (QVE).  
 
QVE: There are differences in the quality of experiences, and the variety 
of qualities of experience we have had influences the way we evaluate 
them. Two experiences that are of a different quality can only be fully 
evaluated by someone who has experienced both.36 
 
                                         
36 This need not imply that people cannot make justified guesses about other people’s 
happiness.  We may be justified in judging people in deprived circumstances to be 
unhappy, without having experienced it.  Our imaginative powers are likely to be 
roughly reliable, especially if it comes to obvious misery.  However, the QVE implies that 
when we experience something new, it changes how we evaluate our own happiness. 
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A person who has not fully experienced higher pleasures may believe her 
life is happy. But, as the addendum to Mill’s famous passage cited in the 
epigraph illustrates: Mill believes that a person who has only experienced 
lower pleasures is in a bad position to make a comparison of happiness 
between the higher and lower pleasures. For Mill, this has an important 
implication for people’s own perceptions of their happiness, or for the 
importance of their sense of satisfaction. Mill argues: “Whoever supposes 
that … the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not 
happier than the inferior, confounds the two very different ideas, of 
happiness, and content” (57). A person can be content, feel satisfied, and 
believe herself to be happy, but when this is based on having pleasurable 
experiences of a low quality, her happiness may not weigh up against the 
higher quality experiences of a person who does not feel quite as 
satisfied, and does not believe herself to be happy.  
 Mill’s language may be archaic and elitist. But consider the example 
of someone who has never been in a committed relationship. She may 
believe it to be dull and restrictive, and be perfectly satisfied with the 
situation as it is. Mill’s perspective indicates that it may happen that—if 
being in a committed relationship is a higher pleasure for her—after 
being in such a relationship, she learns that it is much more enjoyable 
than not being in one. She may, after learning this, be equally satisfied, 
or even less satisfied, but this need not imply that it is less enjoyable. 
According to Mill’s perspective that I want to defend here, such 
experiences can alter the way we evaluate our own happiness. 
 
4. Mill’s qualitative perspective and SWB 
QVE, if correct, poses a problem for ratability, in case lives are compared 
that are constituted by qualitatively different experiences. If correct, a 
person who believes herself to be unhappy may, in fact, be happier than 
a person who perceives herself as happy. In other words, if we use 
people’s own perception as a basis for judging happiness, people who 
have experienced few high pleasures would be judged overly 
optimistically. In order to meet ratability, people should not evaluate 
their current experiences differently purely on the basis of what they 
have experienced in the past. In order to meet ratability, the judgment of 
“very happy” for someone who has experienced few higher pleasures 
should correspond to the level of happiness of someone who has 
experienced a lot of higher pleasures and also judges herself to be “very 
happy”. However, if QVE is true, their judgments have different 
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consequences for happiness, and they cannot be considered equally 
happy. This consequence is particularly clear on a lexicographical 
interpretation of qualities. In order to see this, consider the following 
objection to ratability from a lexicographical perspective: 
A) There are lexicographical differences in the quality of 
experiences, such that some pleasurable experiences are 
lexicographically more pleasurable than others. 
B) Because of this lexicographical difference, the difference 
between higher and lower pleasures can only be evaluated 
by those who have experienced both. (The lexicographical 
version of the Quality View of Experiences (QVE I)). 
C) Those who have experienced only lower pleasurable 
experiences are not able to evaluate the value of higher 
pleasurable experiences in the same way as those who have 
experienced both. 
D) In order for self-reported SWB research to meet ratability, 
different subjects—or, depending on the research question, 
subjects over time—need to be able to evaluate the same 
pleasures in the same way. 
E) Subjects who have experienced only the lower pleasures 
cannot evaluate higher pleasures in the same way as people 
who have experienced both. 
F) SWB does not meet the ratability requirement. 
On this objection, a qualitative hedonist would not accept that 
differences in SWB correspond to differences in happiness if there are 
qualitative differences in the experiences they have had. This may not be 
so surprising, nor may it be bothersome to a SWB researcher. The 
lexicographical interpretation of Mill’s view may be more acceptable to 
people who are critical of Bentham, but may not be an attractive position 
for SWB researchers. After all, arguably, Mill’s conception of higher and 
lower pleasures seems somewhat elitist: favoring some activities—
typically those that people of higher classes would like—over others, on 
seemingly arbitrary grounds. Some SWB researchers have taken an 
explicit liberal stance on this issue. If a person playing simple video 
games says he is happy, a researcher should accept this person’s 
judgment. There is no reason to overrule it because the researcher finds 
this person’s judgment implausible. Martin Binder calls the liberal 
character of SWB an attractive normative feature of SWB, as it avoids the 
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danger of paternalism (Binder 2014).37 SWB researchers may reject the 
lexicographical account and ignore the lexicographical QVE objection, 
because its first premise (A) is rejected. 
 Much of the work in the lexicographical QVE objection is done by 
the first two premises. However, on an epistemological interpretation of 
Mill’s view, QVE still follows, even if premises (A) and (B) are false. The 
beginning of the argument—the epistemological formulation of the QVE 
objection—would then be as follows: 
 
A*) There are differences in the quality of experiences, such that 
knowing how long and intense a certain pleasurable experience 
is, is not sufficient to evaluate how pleasurable it is. 
B*)  Because differences in quality of experiences can only be 
known after they have been experienced, the difference 
between two qualitatively different experiences can only be 
evaluated by those who have experienced both (the 
epistemological version of the Qualitative View of Experience 
(QVE E)). 
The argument would continue in the same way as the lexicographical 
version of the objection. On this reading, a person who spends her days 
playing simple computer games (a modern variant of pushpin, perhaps) 
would be satisfied, and may believe herself to be very happy, but could 
only know if her life is happier than that of a poet, or scientist, when she 
has, in fact, experienced the life of a scientist or poet. As a poet or 
scientist has probably known the experience of playing a computer game, 
they are in a better position to evaluate both lives. The experiences are 
clearly different in kind. Knowing what it is like to spend your days 
playing computer games probably puts you in the position to evaluate 
how the pleasure of playing one hour compares to playing two hours. 
These are differences in quantity. However, it does not put you in the 
position to evaluate how the pleasure of playing video games compares 
to finishing a beautiful poem. This view of qualitative difference in 
pleasure comes with fewer problematic commitments than the 
lexicographical view. We need not presuppose that the pleasure of 
finishing a beautiful poem is infinitely, or lexicographically more 
                                         
37 As discussed above, within philosophical discourse there is also some debate about 
whether qualitative hedonism in its lexicographical interpretation is a coherent and 
plausible position to hold (Scarre 1997; cf. Feldman 1995; Riley 1999). 
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pleasurable than playing computer games, in order to appreciate that the 
pleasures are different epistemically: experiencing one pleasure tells you 
little about experiencing the other. QVE is thus not committed to an elitist 
view that certain kind of experiences are infinitely more enjoyable 
despite them not feeling as such. At the same time, it is not committed 
to identify every person who says she is happy as indeed being happy, 
because it illustrates that people may have a perception of their own 
happiness that is contingent on their past experiences. 
 To sum up: Mill provides an account of happiness in which 
happiness is constituted by pleasure that seems richer and more 
plausible than Bentham’s account of happiness that is often cited in the 
SWB literature. However, Mill’s qualitative view and his perspective on 
happiness evaluation (QVE) clash with a fundamental assumption in 
current SWB research: ratability. While one reading of Mill’s view comes 
with its own difficulties, QVE can be formulated so that it relies only on 
a very commonsensical assumption that Mill stresses: some experiences 
can only be compared to others by those who have experienced both (A* 
and B*).  
 
5. Example: children and happiness 
The literature on SWB is expansive and various. It is not fair to make 
general statements regarding the neglect of the qualitative perspective in 
pleasurable experiences in the literature. However, one example in which 
the qualitative perspective seems particularly relevant, but has not been 
sufficiently recognized, is the study of major life changes, in particular, 
that of becoming a parent. Perhaps surprisingly, the literature seems in 
agreement that the average effect of becoming a parent on happiness is 
negative or close to zero. In a review of the literature, Thomas Hansen 
(2012) describes a common “folk view” on parenting—that it makes 
parents happier—but argues that the empirical evidence points in the 
opposite direction. People generally do not become happier from having 
children, if we accept the evidence from SWB research. Others are more 
mild in their judgment of the evidence, and report that happiness may 
be positively affected by having children, but only “under the right 
conditions” (Angeles 2009). Does this count as sound evidence that 
becoming a parent does not make us (or most people) happier?  
 On Mill’s qualitative view this is problematic. Having children and 
not having children are qualitatively very different experiences. In fact, 
the two are so different, that it is hard to imagine what it is like to have 
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children until we have them. This is exactly the point made in a recent 
article by Laurie Paul entitled “What you can’t expect when you’re 
expecting”. In her view, having children is an epistemically transformative 
experience: 
 
At least in the normal case, one has a uniquely new 
experience when one has one’s first child. Before someone 
becomes a parent, she has never experienced the unique 
state of seeing and touching her newborn child. She has 
never experienced the full compendium of the extremely 
intense series of beliefs, emotions, physical exhaustion and 
emotional intensity that attends the carrying, birth, 
presentation, and care of her very own child, and hence she 
does not know what it is like to have these experiences. 
(2015, 8).  
 
Some empirical evidence supports the claim that parents do not have 
clearly worse experiences in general, but have different experiences. 
Parents may experience more stress and less pleasurable moments, also 
when they are with their children, but nevertheless find their activities 
more rewarding and find more meaning in them (White and Dolan 2009; 
Nelson et al. 2013). If Paul is correct in her judgment that having children 
is an experience that we cannot evaluate until we have experienced it, 
having children and not having children are qualitatively different 
experiences in the QVE sense. Consequently, on Mill’s QVE, asking people 
about their satisfaction or their rated happiness will not be informative 
about which of the two experiences produces more happiness. Based on 
the widespread view that children do make us happier, Hansen describes 
the finding that parents are not happy as paradoxical. However, on Mill’s 
perspective, the conclusion that there is a paradox does not follow.38 
 A possible way forward to judging the effect of parenting on 
happiness on Mill’s account would be to give evidential priority to the 
opinion of parents, perhaps by asking whether they believe their 
experiences have improved, or if they would want their old life back. 
After all, the parents seem to be the “competent judges,” having 
experienced both a childless life and a life with children. There is little 
                                         
38 QVE does not imply that the common belief about parenting and happiness is correct.  
It merely implies that in cases where qualitatively different lives are compared, drawing 
conclusions about happiness on the basis of people’s self-assessment is problematic. 
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scientific study that follows this, and it would deviate significantly from 
standard SWB methodology.39  
 
6. Objections to the QVE objection  
There are a number of possible objections to the claim that happiness is 
constituted by a combination of qualitatively different experiences whose 
contribution to happiness can only be judged after they have been 
experienced, and the problem I have argued this poses for SWB research.  
 A first objection may be that while ratability is often assumed in 
SWB studies, when more sophisticated statistical methods are used, the 
assumption can be relaxed without altering the results of SWB studies. 
This would be wrong. An influential paper about statistical methodology 
in SWB research is Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Paul Frijters’s (2004) often-
cited methodological contribution that derives important conclusions 
from Germany’s Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) on minimal assumptions 
about the structure of subjective wellbeing reports. Their statistical 
methodology assumes that people’s satisfaction reports have an 
individually fixed ordinal relationship to an underlying function (in their 
case, welfare). In other words, it does not assume that my 7 on a life 
satisfaction scale is equal to yours, but it does assume that my 7 this year 
is higher than my 6 last year. This statistical methodology is significant 
in reducing the measurement requirements of happiness or satisfaction 
data greatly. However, it still implies that if a person’s SWB score 
improves, so does her actual happiness, or wellbeing (see also Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2002). On QVE, this assumption would be problematic in 
instances where people go through new experiences that alter their 
perspective. The problem goes deeper than statistical methodology. If 
QVE is correct, a person may evaluate happiness in a different manner 
now than after having experienced something new. This goes to the heart 
of SWB research: a person rating her happiness lower than before may 
not be less happy.  
 A second objection may be that any view that presupposes that 
there are qualitatively better and worse pleasures is problematically 
paternalistic, even if these qualities are understood in a non-
                                         
39 An assumption of such a methodology would be that a childless life is similar to that 
of the life of parents up to the moment they have children, and that having a child does 
not bias a person’s judgment about happiness.  These assumptions may be false.  If that 
would be so, it could turn out that the question of whether parents are happier than 
non-parents would not be empirically answerable. 
Chapter 4 
 
69 
 
lexicographical way. This is probably a good objection against some of 
Mill’s examples, such as his view that poetry is better than pushpin. 
Presupposing such hierarchies on no clear evidential ground may be 
considered paternalistic. Nevertheless, these views should be separated 
from the more abstract view that there are differences in quality between 
pleasures. Mill might have been wrong about the former—poetry may not 
be better than pushpin—but right about the latter—qualitative 
differences do exist. Pushpin may be of higher quality than poetry. The 
quality of specific experiences could even differ between different 
people. For me pushpin may be qualitatively better, while for others 
poetry may be better than pushpin. The QVE is thus not based on the 
view that certain specific pleasures are of a higher quality, but only on 
the view that there are qualitative differences between pleasures that 
make the comparison between them difficult if both have not been 
experienced. 
 
7. Alternative views on happiness 
Both Mill’s and Bentham’s conceptions of happiness are based on the 
view that happiness is constituted by pleasure. A possible defense of the 
QVE objection can be that it does not go through on alternative 
conceptions of happiness. However, what is important about the second 
formulation of the QVE objection is that it seems compatible with a 
number of different views on what constitutes happiness. Without 
subscribing to the view that some experiences feel infinitely more 
pleasurable than others, or are lexicographically more pleasurable 
despite people not feeling infinitely more pleasure, it seems plausible 
that some experiences are harder to compare to others without having 
experienced both. Premises A* and B* in the argument are not based on 
a particular conception on happiness, but could apply to all conceptions 
of happiness that acknowledge that some form of experienced happiness 
can only be compared to others once they have been experienced. In 
order to avoid the problem QVE poses for ratability, SWB would require 
a conceptual view of happiness that would avoid having to commit to 
such qualitative differences in experiences.40 
                                         
40 The epistemic version of the QVE objection to ratability could even apply to a 
Benthamite conception of happiness, once it is acknowledged that while pleasure may 
be unidimensional, pleasurable experiences are not, and that experiencing one 
pleasurable experience may alter your attitude towards others.  On this view, pushpin 
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 One alternative to hedonism is the view that happiness consists of 
an attitude towards your life: the life satisfaction view (e.g. Sumner 
1996)—a view that is popular among SWB researchers (see Haybron 
2007b). Mill seems to reject the view that attitudes are ultimately the 
constituents of happiness, as can be read in the distinction between 
happiness and contentment that he employs. Nevertheless, prima facie, 
it seems that an attitude view of happiness may avoid the epistemic 
formulation of the objection. If a person’s attitude towards life is all that 
matters to her happiness, why would it matter whether an attitude is 
based on higher or lower quality experiences?  
 While this objection stands, it does point towards a counter-
intuitive conclusion of the life satisfaction view of happiness. Consider 
the same person from our earlier example who spends most of her time 
playing computer games. This person may have a good attitude towards 
her life. She likes her life as it is. However, at some point, she gets a 
purposeful job at which she flourishes, which changes her life in many 
ways. In the newly-gained perspective she feels that her old attitude 
towards the gaming life had been inappropriate, and feels that while she 
has similarly positive attitudes towards her new life now as she did in 
the past, she is now happier. On a strict interpretation of the life 
satisfaction view she would have to be mistaken. After all, if her attitude 
towards her life is roughly the same over time, then so would be her 
happiness. She cannot be wrong about the attitude she had in the past. 
This would seem highly counter-intuitive. If we would accept that 
attitudes can contribute differently towards happiness depending on 
their appropriateness, it would be conceptually possible that she is 
correct. However, we have now made the life satisfaction view of 
happiness vulnerable to QVE: the qualities of the experiences we have 
had can now affect the way we evaluate comparisons between different 
experiences, or different lives we lead. In other words, there are 
qualitative differences between experiences that are sufficient for QVE E.  
 Another recently developed view maintains that happiness is an 
emotional state quality (Haybron 2005). According to Daniel Haybron, 
happiness is not a experiential state, but describes our emotional state. 
We may be under stress, but not experience stress. In these cases, we are 
less happy than we would be if we were not under stress, but it is not due 
                                         
and poetry may result in the same output – pleasure – but in order to know which of 
the two produces more, they need to be experienced. 
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to a difference in pleasure. Does QVEE still pose a problem to SWB on this 
conception of happiness? On a first look it might not. If our emotional 
state were independent of our experience, we could see that the way we 
compare two emotional states would not depend on the qualities of the 
types of experiences that we have had. On the other hand, if we do 
evaluate our own emotional state, we are surely guided by our own 
experiences. Haybron himself is skeptical about our ability to know how 
happy we are on the grounds that we often fail to appreciate our 
emotional state (Haybron 2007a). In his view, there are reasons to 
question ratability, independent of QVE. However, some of his reasons 
come close to Mill’s perspective. In an example, Haybron describes a 
person, Glen, who has lived in the city for years under severe stress, but 
always had the impression he was happy. But now he moves back to the 
rural town where he grew up. The stress falls from his shoulders and he 
now realizes that his life in the city was not so happy after all. What this 
person experienced seems to be easily described in terms of QVEE. Glen 
experiences a new kind of experience—even though it is in some ways 
similar to his childhood, and he re-learns appreciating it: living a peaceful 
stressless life in the countryside. He now can fully appreciate the 
difference between two experiences: living a stressful life in the city, and 
a stressless one the countryside, and judges the countryside life to be 
superior in quality. 
 
8. QVE objection and adaptation 
The QVE is by no means the first philosophical objection against the 
identification of SWB with happiness. In particular, the QVE objection 
seems to have some similarity to the adaptation argument introduced in 
chapter 3 (Sen 1985a; see Qizilbash 2006a). Both objections are based on 
a discrepancy between satisfaction, or people’s own perception of their 
happiness, and their actual happiness. Mozaffar Qizilbash reads in the 
passages from Utilitarianism cited above the same view that Sen 
expresses when he discusses examples of people in deprived 
circumstances who nevertheless believe themselves to be happy, but 
clearly do not lead high-quality lives. Moreover, Qizilbash believes Mill’s 
view addresses Sen’s adaptation concerns. While I believe adaptation and 
Mill’s QVE address similar concerns, the points are different and QVE is 
more general. Originally, adaptation was formulated as a problem 
regarding people who changed their preferences due to the unavailability 
of a preferred option, which is a narrow and specific problem. Moreover, 
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the term “adaptation” itself seems to suggest that it applies only after a 
change in desires, preferences, or ability to be happy. QVE need not 
involve such change. A person may have low aspirations, and be content 
with low pleasures, only because that person has never had the 
experience of higher pleasure. If anyone adapts, in Mill’s examples, it is 
the person who learns to appreciate the higher pleasures. For Mill, 
examples of people who are content with little do not illustrate that they 
have adapted, but they illustrate that they have not fully developed their 
desires. The QVE objection to SWB is thus more general. Consider, for 
instance, the example of the gamer discussed above. In the example, the 
gamer is both satisfied and needs not to have adapted aspirations. 
However, as I argued, on Mill’s account there is still a difference in 
happiness between her life as a gamer and her later life as a person with 
a successful career. In brief, the adaptation problem illustrates a problem 
with the satisfied that have decreased their aspirations; the QVE objection 
illustrates a problem with the satisfied that have never developed their 
aspirations.  
 Just like the Epistemic Adaptation problem discussed in chapter 3, 
however, the QVE objection also shows an epistemic limitation of 
knowing how happy we really are.  
 
9. Conclusion and discussion 
In this chapter I have presented and assessed a perspective found in 
Mill’s Utilitarianism that illustrates a problem for taking self-reported 
SWB as sufficient evidence for happiness, in particular, in cases that 
involve qualitatively different experiences. While the argument is 
inspired by Mill’s qualitative view on hedonism, it is broadly compatible 
with a variety of plausible views on happiness. I have argued that the 
problem is based on plausible foundations. Out of the currently most 
prominent views on happiness, only on some Benthamite and life 
satisfaction views of happiness can the charge be avoided. However, 
given the charges of superficiality that have been raised against such 
views, we should wonder if happiness is still a prudentially interesting 
concept if we accept them.  
 The argument presented in this essay presents a problem for the 
measurement of happiness by means of SWB, in particular, in contexts 
involving happiness comparisons on the basis of SWB between 
qualitatively different experiences. Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is 
not to criticize the SWB project as a whole. Happiness is an important 
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feature of our lives—arguably the most important feature. It deserves to 
be treated in its full depth, but it also deserves to be studied. The QVE 
objection indicates a limit of SWB research. There are important ways in 
which the QVE objection can help SWB move forward. Firstly, there is a 
large variety of cases in which the rating of the enjoyment of experiences 
is not affected by the QVE objection. A straightforward example is the 
question of whether watching television or going to the cinema is more 
enjoyable to a certain group of people. The QVE objection does not seem 
to apply to the usage of SWB research for answering this question. In so 
far as watching television and going to the cinema are qualitatively 
different, the differences can be appreciated by those who have 
experienced both. The QVE objection thus helps to clarify which 
questions can and which questions cannot be answered by means of SWB 
methodology. By doing so, the QVE objection does not only indicate 
problems for SWB research, but also provides a stronger foundation for 
applications of SWB to which the QVE objection does not apply.  
Another way in which the QVE may be helpful relates to the large 
number of puzzles and paradoxes that are characteristic of the SWB 
literature (e.g. Deaton and Stone 2013). Just like in the case of parenting 
discussed above, the QVE objection may help explain certain paradoxical 
results. Lastly, I hope the QVE will inspire new empirical ways to research 
happiness. Following Mill, people with a rich experiential basis could be 
an important source of knowledge about happiness. As Haybron’s 
example of Glen illustrates, studying how people experience transitions 
between qualitatively different lives may be an important source of 
information about how happy different lives are. It may be that 
qualitatively different experiences should be addressed by means of 
different research methodologies. Happiness is a complex concept, and 
studying it will never be easy. However, awareness of the limitations of 
existing methods will ultimately bring the field of study forward.  
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Chapter 5: Can Welfare be Measured 
with a Utility-Index? 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the second half of the twentieth century welfare economics has 
been built upon the foundational assumption that welfare should be 
conceived of in terms of the satisfaction of preferences and that it is 
highly doubtful that preferences can result in a cardinal measures of 
welfare, or measures that are interpersonally comparable (Binmore 2009; 
Colander 2007). Lionel Robbins’ (1932) plea for expelling measures of 
psychological feelings of satisfaction out of the science of economics is 
said to be pivotal in the formation of this view. Rather than conceiving of 
welfare in terms of pleasure, welfare should be conceived of in terms of 
whether people get what they want, but this concept of satisfaction of 
preferences is difficult to measure on an interpersonally comparable 
scale. Consequently, welfare cannot be measured in such a fashion. 
However, in recent years, the rise of happiness economics has shaken 
economics’ attitude towards the measurement of welfare. Happiness 
economics has been growing expansively, but has also encountered much 
criticism (Barrotta 2008; Sugden 2008; Hausman 2010; Fleurbaey and 
Blanchet 2013; Stewart 2014).41 
This paper is concerned with one particular response to the trend 
to measure welfare in terms of happiness, which has come from 
economists who endorse the view that welfare should be conceived of in 
terms of preferences rather than in terms of happiness or life-
satisfaction, and do not believe that the latter are necessarily good 
proxies of the former. Namely, the response that rejects happiness 
measures because they do not (necessarily) cohere with people’s 
preference-satisfaction, but that welfare can nevertheless be measured in 
practice by means of elucidating people’s preferences, and measuring the 
extent of their satisfaction. The most prominent example of such 
                                         
41 It similarly has been fiercely defended against the charge that happiness measures 
are not cardinal (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004), and that it does not capture what 
it is intended to capture (see for example Diener et al. 2009; Veenhoven 2012a; and 
Alexandrova and Haybron 2016 and chapter 3 for a critical appraisal). 
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criticism comes from Benjamin et al. (2014) who argue that: “widely-used 
SWB measures may not capture all factors that enter into preferences” 
(Benjamin et al. 2014, 2700). As a response, they are revising the age-old 
skepticism about the possibility to measure preference-satisfaction 
meaningfully on an individual level. Benjamin et al. formulate a general 
formal framework and related measurement methodology for measuring 
a preference-based wellbeing index, novel in its aim to measure welfare 
comprehensively.   
The aim to provide preference-satisfactionist alternatives to 
happiness-based measures of wellbeing has also arisen in more applied 
contexts. In particular, in health economics, the need for welfare 
indicators for the valuation of interventions has led to a variety of 
methods to measure utility for health states. More recently, the need for 
more comprehensive measures has also led to the formulation of 
measures for the utility of quality of lives more generally. A prominent 
example is the ICEpop CAPability measure for Adults—or ICECAP-A (Al-
Janabi, Flynn, and Coast 2012; Al-Janabi et al. 2013; Flynn et al. 2015). 
While both preference-based welfare measures have arisen in quite 
different contexts, both have motivated their approach in response to 
happiness-based measures, aim to measure welfare in general, and 
intend their approach to be able to inform policy. As the ICECAP-A uses 
the preference-approach to welfare pragmatically—as a proxy for 
people’s valuation—and thus does not endorse the approach on 
substantive philosophical grounds, in this chapter, the approach is used 
to contrast with Benjamin et al.’s approach by offering an alternative set 
of methodological choices in a preference-based welfare measure. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the general success of 
this response; not, however, in terms of the plausibility of the underlying 
theory of wellbeing, but in terms of the success of the claim that 
preference-satisfactionism can feasibly be developed into individual 
indices of wellbeing. Before I analyze this at a general level of abstraction, 
I assess the empirical strategies of the mentioned approaches in detail in 
order to see how they deal with measuremental challenges. This 
discussion shows that the methodological dilemmas that are faced by 
these measures are very similar, even though the choices they make are 
different. Not only does this clarify the issues at hand in a concrete 
context, but also takes seriously the context of the development of 
concrete measures, in which theoretical problems may be tackled by 
pragmatic choices. Ultimately, however, I argue the pragmatic choices 
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they make come at a high cost. Regardless of the general skepticism on 
the basis of theoretical grounds, I argue feasibility constraints with 
respect to data-collection of individuals require economists to make 
steep methodological tradeoffs. A methodology that fully respects the 
theoretical commitments of a preference-based view on welfare that is 
also useful for policy would be so data-demanding that it would be 
infeasible.  
 Section 2 discusses the very idea of preference-measures of 
welfare, and the meaning of policy-relevance and theoretical 
commitments in this context, section 3 discusses the two case studies in 
detail, section 4 abstracts more general conclusions from this discussion 
with respect to the feasibility of measuring welfare through preferences. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring preference-based welfare, the very idea 
The idea that welfare is constituted by preference-satisfaction comes 
with a number of commitments. As discussed in the introduction 
(chapter 1), preference-satisfaction theories are, different from 
hedonism, not mental-state accounts of welfare.  While preferences are 
mental-states, the satisfaction of preference is not (Griffin 1986). Welfare, 
on a preference-satisfaction account represents the extent to which the 
world corresponds with how one wants it to be. Regardless of how 
strongly it influences a person’s sense of happiness or satisfaction, 
whenever a preference is satisfied, welfare is, ceteris paribus, increased.  
Preference-satisfaction theory is sometimes called a formal theory 
of welfare (Tiberius 2004), as it does not substantively take position on 
any specific good, but rather leaves individuals to be the author of what 
is good for them. An important underlying motivation for the formal 
nature of preference-satisfaction accounts is a strong anti-paternalistic 
intuition that the individual should be the ultimate judge on what makes 
her life good. A well-known formulation of this idea by Peter Railton is 
that: “it  would  be  an  intolerably  alienated  conception  of  someone's  
good  to  imagine  that  it may  fail  in  any  way  to  engage  him” (Railton 
1986; see also Yelle 2014; Fletcher 2013). By making wellbeing solely 
dependent on what we want, it is impossible that we judge someone to 
be well on the basis of things that they do not care about. This liberal 
conception of wellbeing is the core theoretical commitment of the 
approach.  
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On the concrete level of measurement, this implies two things. 
Firstly, the measure should be individualistic. That is, a preference-
satisfaction measure of an individual’s welfare should be based on her 
preferences, and not on the preferences or values of the group she is a 
part of, arm-chair philosophers, or policy-makers.42 Secondly, the space 
of things people may have preferences over, should not be restricted. If 
it is the case that people have strong preferences over the success of their 
football team, such preferences should have a place in a general measure 
of welfare. These two concrete commitments that follow from the liberal 
commitments of preference-satisfactionism we can call individualism 
and unrestrictedness respectively. 
So, what does it mean to measure welfare through preferences? 
The kind of things people have preferences over can be represented as a 
finite set of dimensions of welfare. To make this precise, consider the 
following general formalization of welfare: 
 
Wi ≡ fi(wi)            
 (5.1) 
 
Where Wi is an individual welfare function for individual i, wi a vector of 
elements that constitute welfare for i, and fi a function that describes how 
these combine into a welfare value. For example, hedonism can be 
characterized in this way, where fi=f is a linear function, while wi=w is a 
vector of one element, namely pleasure,43 while in case of objective list 
theories wi=w, contains a number of elements that contribute to people’s 
wellbeing in some way, fi=f.
44 Preference-satisfaction can be represented 
in two equivalent ways. In a limited form, it can be expressed as a version 
of (5.1) in which wi has one element, si: the extent to which one’s 
preferences are satisfied, where fi=f is a linear unindexed function. 
Equivalently, we can also say that fi(wi) is a completely individualized 
version in which both the contents of wi as well as the way they are 
combined are fully determined by the structure of a person’s preferences: 
 
                                         
42 More precisely, while some preference-based conceptions of welfare may exclude 
preferences on formal grounds (such as unstable desires, Chekola 2007), it could not 
do so on substantive grounds (such as seeming silly, like Rawls 1971’s famous grass-
counter) 
43 In case of qualitative hedonism, e contains a variety of versions of pleasure, in which 
case the relationship, between wi and wi is also more complex. 
44 The capability approach, merely limits wi to functionings and capabilities, without 
specifying fi, or wi in any substantive sense (Sen 1985a) 
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Wpi ≡ fsi = fi(wi)           
 (6.2) 
 
A measure of welfare is thus one that represents Wpi somehow. 
Such measures can differ in various ways, allowing for different types of 
comparisons. Most significantly, a measure of Wpi may be used to make 
comparisons between individuals, or within individuals over time. 
Because empirical work on the measurement of welfare aims to guide 
policy, it is useful to look at possible aims of wellbeing policy. Assuming 
that a policy maker is interested in the wellbeing of affected citizen when 
comparing two alternative policy actions to the status quo, a policy 
maker would be interested in total welfare effects, but also in where in 
the distribution the changes in welfare lie.  
In the ideal case, measures of preference-satisfaction—which 
economists generally call utility—are cardinally interpretable and 
interpersonally interpretable (see table 5.1). If this is the case, a policy 
maker can evaluate the degree and equality of welfare in the current 
state, and the effect of policies on both. In a less ideal case, utility can be 
compared across individuals, but only provides ordinal information. In 
this case, the worst-off in society can be identified, but the magnitudes 
of changes for different individuals cannot be compared. However, it may 
also be the case that a measure is cardinal, but not interpersonally 
comparable. In these cases, its policy relevance depends on whether the 
differences can be meaningfully compared. If units of utility can be 
compared, but levels cannot, aggregated changes in welfare can be 
estimated, even though the distribution of welfare cannot be identified. 
This thus allows for utilitarian considerations in policy-making. For 
policy purposes, the worst situation is that utility measures are not 
interpersonally comparable, and the differences are only ordinally 
comparable, or cardinally comparable only within individuals (but not 
between). In both these cases, welfare indices would be able to indicate 
whether the welfare of individuals has increased or decreased, but not 
how welfare of different individuals compares, nor how the aggregate 
magnitude of such welfare changes compares to other welfare changes. 
 The relationship between the comparability levels of measures and 
policy evaluation is best illustrated with an example. Consider a policy 
maker who has the option between keeping the status quo or doing policy 
A that affects Erik and Sophie. There is a measure of utility that is 6 for 
Erik and 8 for Sophie. We know that doing A would increase Erik’s utility 
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by 1, while it would decrease Sophie’s utility by .5. In case the measure 
can be interpreted cardinally and is interpersonally comparable, we can 
see that the situation brings Erik and Sophie closer together, while 
improving aggregate welfare. In case, they are ordinal and interpersonally 
comparable, we can see that Erik is worst-off, but we have no idea how 
Sophie’s decrease compares in magnitude to Erik’s. In case the utility 
measure is cardinal but levels of welfare are incomparable (and changes 
are comparable), we can see that A improves overall welfare, though we 
do not know if it equalizes the distribution. In the worst case—an ordinal 
measure that is not interpersonally comparable (or a cardinal measure of 
which neither the differences nor levels are comparable)—we know A 
improves Erik’s welfare and decreases Sophie’s, but we cannot say how 
this changes the distribution of welfare, nor whether Erik’s increase is 
larger or smaller than Sophie’s decrease.  The cardinality and 
comparability thus jointly make up the policy-relevance of utility 
measures of welfare.  
 
Table 5.1: levels of measurement and comparability 
 Cardinal Ordinal 
Interpersonal 
comparable 
Ideal: both the welfare 
effects and its impact 
on inequality can be 
assessed. 
No magnitudes, but 
we can identify the 
worst-off 
Not interpersonal 
comparable 
If differences 
comparable: 
utilitarian 
considerations 
If differences not 
comparable: 
Individual 
intertemporal 
judgments 
Ordinal individual 
intertemporal 
judgments 
 
A final consideration is feasibility of measures. Any measure of 
welfare, but particularly ones that are to be used to inform policy, should 
not be overly demanding on either respondents or government offices 
conducting them. In particular, in the discussion that follows, the term 
feasibility will be used to distinguish between welfare measures that use 
data that can be obtained through reasonably long questionnaires (or 
other informational bases) and cases that require so much information 
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from individuals that doing so would be prohibitively costly; in particular 
for the individual being evaluated.  
 
3. In practice 
Benjamin et al. (2014) motivate their article by describing “the principle 
of revealed preference” as the cornerstone of economics: “the ultimate 
criterion for judging what makes a person better off is what she chooses” 
(2014, 2698). However, while in some economic instances this principle 
may be informative, in particularly in the policy context, people do not 
actually make choices about options that may matter for their wellbeing. 
The aim of their paper is to provide an index of preferences to serve as 
an indicator of wellbeing in particularly these contexts. More precisely 
put, they want to develop: “an individual-level index that combines 
together different aspects of well-being that may be measured by survey 
questions” (2014, 2699) 
  They acknowledge and appreciate SWB measures as a candidate for 
this purpose. However, while such measures may be multi-dimensional, 
the weights attached to these dimensions are generally assigned by 
researchers themselves, and are thus “ad hoc” (2700). Consequently a 
person can score high on such indices without this reflecting this 
person’s preference.   
 The article provides a theoretical framework as well as an empirical 
illustration of this framework, which makes a number of pragmatic 
choices. Theoretically, the proposal is based on the consumption 
theoretic framework in which changes in utility are assumed to be 
proportional to changes in consumed goods: 
 
𝛥𝑢 ∝ ∑ 𝑝𝑚𝛥𝑐𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1           
 (5.3) 
 
Where M is the set of goods, m, consumed at price pm, and quantity cm. 
While this framework may be sufficient for assessing the impact of 
market transactions on welfare, the same does not apply to non-market 
goods, which policy typically is engaged with. Thus, they propose to 
broaden the framework accordingly. Rather than just market goods, they 
propose a welfare function exists out of a set w of welfare components, 
wj, over which people have preferences. Formally, this is captured by the 
following: 
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 𝛥𝑢 =  ∑
∂𝑢(𝒘)
∂𝑤𝑗
𝛥𝑤𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1          
 (5.4) 
 
Intuitively, this captures the idea that over a given time period, the 
changes in welfare are given by all the changes in welfare components 
multiplied by their impact on welfare, which corresponds to how strongly 
they are preferred. So, if only health improves, while all the other welfare 
components remain the same, welfare changes just as much as how 
strongly the health improvement was preferred over alternatives.  
  Interestingly, the theoretical framework does not stop here, but in 
fact, the welfare index that is proposed is defined as follows:45 
 
Wbhks,i = ∑
∂𝑢(𝒘)
∂𝑤𝑗
𝑤𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1          
 (5.5) 
 
Compared to (5.4), the Δ is removed from before wj. In practice then, an 
empirical strategy to get at the index is to measure the ∂𝑢(𝒘) from a 
stated preference survey, while the wj’s should be obtained 
independently from, among other sources, SWB surveys. In the stated 
preference survey, respondents are asked to report what their 
preferences are between two options in which 1-3 aspects are altered 
positively, and 1-3 are altered negatively, and they are asked whether they 
prefer either one of the options slightly, somewhat, or much. 
Benjamin et al. (2014) acknowledge that “[s]ince the marginal 
utilities are defined only up to an arbitrary constant, so is the index” 
(2014, 2704–5). As the index weighs the level of welfare components with 
their marginal relative utility, it can only sensibly compare changes in 
welfare within an individual over time. Even in the theoretical ideal that 
a full preference map can be made for a particular individual that maps 
the desirability of all the possible values of w, only “ordinal welfare 
comparisons could then be made between any of the individual’s SWB-
survey occasions” (2014, 2705). This indicates that even in the theoretical 
ideal, the index falls within the lower right corner of table 5.1, with a 
highly limited policy-applicability. 
                                         
45 To cohere with the rest of the formulations in this thesis the name of the index, Wbhks,i 
is my own input, the rest comes directly from Benjamin et al. (2014, 2704) 
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 However, in their proposed (and executed) empirical strategy, a 
number of pragmatic choices need to be made that complicate the 
validity of even such minimal intrapersonal ordinal comparisons.  
 
Selection of aspects 
The methodology Benjamin et al. propose to elucidate preferences is a 
stated preference method by which respondents are asked to make 
hypothetical choices between aspects in w. This requires that that the 
elements of w are specified. This puts Benjamin et al. for a challenge. 
After all, in order for the preference measure to be valid, it requires the 
set of aspects of welfare to be “exhaustive”, as well as “non-overlapping” 
(2014, 2707). Nevertheless, because they would not want their “ex-ante 
beliefs” to be an influence, and because they would not want to miss out 
on any important aspects, they decide to create “as comprehensive a list 
of candidate fundamental aspects as we practically can” (2014, 2707). 
The constructed list is made up of philosophical lists (such as Nussbaum 
2000) and aspects of wellbeing from both the empirical and philosophical 
literature, such as SWB constructs, as well as some aspects the authors 
themselves contributed. Benjamin et al. acknowledge that this may lead 
to overlapping aspects on the list. They propose a data-driven 
methodology to detect conceptual overlap (2014, appendix). 
 The resulting list contains 129 aspects, including, for example, 
“The extent to which humanity does things worthy of pride”, “The 
amount of pleasure in your life”, “Equality of income in your nation”, 
“You not feeling anxious”, and “People getting the rewards and 
punishments they deserve” (2715-2718). They acknowledge that many of 
these may overlap. The amount of pleasure in one’s life and “you not 
feeling anxious” is one such example. In order to abridge this list into 
non-overlapping aspects of welfare, Benjamin et al. propose a data-driven 
strategy. They argue that when a combination of two aspects is 
considered less desirable to an individual than the sum of the two 
separate aspects, it implies an overlap, and one of the two aspects may 
have to be deleted from the list.  
 This methodological choice has an important theoretical 
attraction: it minimizes paternalism with respect to the contents of wi, 
and thereby maximizes unrestrictedness.46 However, it comes with a 
                                         
46 The extent to which it minimizes paternalism is arguably still more restricted than 
necessary. It still excludes many possible aspects people may have preferences about, 
such as the status of the great barrier reef, that our children are successful in life, or 
having aesthetic experiences, just to name a few. 
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number of problems.47 The overlap between many of the concepts 
involved may very well be detected by the method proposed, but not 
clearly solved. Consider for example the overlap between health and 
pleasure. Feeling pleasure, up to an extent, must surely be seen as part 
of being healthy, while at the same time being in bad health will affect 
how much pleasure one feels. The proposed method will thus quite likely 
find overlap between pleasure and health, but this certainly does not 
mean that these are fully separate aspects and that one of them should 
be dropped. Quite likely many items on the list will overlap in a similar 
fashion. A potential solution to avoids overlap is to rely on theoretically 
motivated lists, such as objective lists in philosophy (e.g. Griffin 1986; 
see also Alkire 2002). However, Benjamin et al. rightly argue that relying 
on such ex ante lists would hostile to the unrestrictedness commitment 
of preference-satisfactionism. 
 
Data-demandingness and pooling of preferences 
Another problem arises from the large number of elements in w, namely, 
it now becomes effortful to map a person’s preferences. This would not 
only require an individual to rank 129 aspects in life, but because no 
particular functional structure is assumed, the large possible set of all 
possible values of the elements in wi may take have to be compared vis-
à-vis each other as whole. This means that the number of required 
comparisons to construct a full preference map increases exponentially. 
The intuition behind this is that when one aspect, such as health, 
suddenly deteriorates, this may not only affect the relative importance of 
health improvements in comparison to other aspects, but it may also 
affect the preference someone has between other aspects, such as 
between lack of anxiety and your sense of achievement. Such a nonlinear 
relationship between preferences over these aspects vastly increases the 
possible preference-comparisons required to construct a full preference-
                                         
47 A main problem is mentioned, but a further issue is that this methodology is blind to 
the distinction between conceptual overlap and overlap due to causal relationships. To 
a person who cares about income, education and income may overlap in terms of 
preferences (due to expected income increase education may provide), but need not 
think of the two as similar concepts. A second issue is that Benjamin et al. assume that 
people’s interpretation of concepts is fixed. This is dubious and, in the context of 
developing conceptual overlap, problematic. A person who is asked to make a tradeoff 
between “The happiness of your family” and “The amount of pleasure in your life” will 
probably understand happiness to be something different than someone who is asked 
to make a tradeoff between “The happiness of your family” and “The overall well-being 
of you and your family”. Moreover, the approach is highly data-demanding, adding to 
the concern discussed below. 
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map. This leads Benjamin et al. to a number of pragmatically motivated 
choices.  
  In order to overcome the data-demandingness of the proposed 
theoretical framework, Benjamin et al. assume that preferences are 
locally linear, thus assuming away the non-linear effect just described. 
Secondly, preferences are elicited only at the present level of values of w. 
This allows Benjamin et al. to limit themselves to asking respondents to 
make hypothetical tradeoffs at the present level of w. So, this means that 
they need not ask respondents how they would make the tradeoff 
between anxiety and sense of achievement given that their health level is 
X, where X may vary from very close to very far from their actual level of 
health. These assumptions, however, are highly restrictive. It excludes 
preferences that people plausibly may have. Nevertheless, even with 
these assumptions, deriving individual marginal utilities requires 
individuals to make large sets of comparisons in their proposed stated 
preference surveys.  
 A way Benjamin et al. overcome this difficulty is by pooling 
respondents. This means that the responses from the hypothetical 
tradeoffs are pooled together as if they all came from a single person. 
This heavily reduces the data-demandingness of the method, but such a 
method is equivalent to assuming a representative agent. As Benjamin et 
al. acknowledge, “[d]oing so is difficult to justify theoretically” (2014, 
2731). After all, in light of the individualistic commitment of the 
preference-satisfactionist approach, it is peculiar to assume that all 
individuals have (roughly) the same preferences. Their proposed method 
to counter this concern is to identify different groups, or “types” 
according to their demographic characteristics.  
 The general problem this discussion raises is related to the first. 
Because the number of welfare aspects Benjamin et al. consider is so 
large, constructing preference maps is so data-demanding, which in turn 
requires simplifying assumptions that are difficult to justify in light of 
the individualist commitment of the approach. The weights used to 
aggregate the different welfare aspects in w may very well be very 
different from the weights that an individual would want. To see this, 
consider someone whose preferences deviate from typical responses 
from her type. For example, while everyone of her type cares a lot about 
their health and the wellbeing of their families, one person cares much 
more about a sense of achievement. Her aggregate welfare, Wi, will then 
be weighed by weights that do not at all resonate with her own 
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preferences. Notably, even without attempting to develop a cardinal or 
interpersonally comparable measure of welfare, Benjamin et al. run into 
steep tradeoffs between feasibility and theoretical commitments. 
 
An alternative: ICECAP-A 
Preference-based indicators have been widely used to evaluate outcomes 
in cost-benefit analyses, in particular health care. In health care health-
related quality of life is generally evaluated with a well-known preference-
based measure, the QALY. A QALY captures the utility of being in a 
particular health state48. Health states can be defined in a number of 
dimensions. For example, a prominent measure (EQ-5D) uses: mobility, 
self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression. Each 
of these is scaled from 1-5, such that 13551 means that a health state 
comprises little mobility and much depression, medium self-care, but no 
pain and full ability to do usual activities. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between health-related quality of life and quality of life itself is not 
always clear, as the impact of decreased health states may affect a broad 
spectrum of aspects of our lives (Al-Janabi, Flynn, and Coast 2012). In 
order to overcome such problems, a number of health economists have 
proposed measures of general welfare. One such measure is the ICECAP-
A. While the measure uses a capability-based framework and as such 
works under the assumption that preferences should not themselves be 
seen as the relevant concept for the weighing of different components of 
welfare, preferences are assumed to be indicative for how strongly we 
value such aspects, and thus can serve as a proxy. Effectively, like 
Benjamin et al., it uses preferences to assign weights to different welfare 
components. 49 Like Benjamin et al.’s empirical proposal it pools the noted 
                                         
48 One way in which this can be done is asking respondents to make time-tradeoffs 
between health states (others are using standard gambles or visual analogue scales). 
Under the assumption that utility components of time and health states are separable, 
one may assess when a particular individual is indifferent between living for 10 years 
in a bad health state compared to living X years in a perfect health state. If the perfect 
health state is assigned the value 1, we know that x must be the value of QALY of living 
for a year in the bad health state. 
49 The remainder mainly considers the ICECAP-A measure as a preference-measure of 
welfare and identifies weaknesses of it as such. However, this is not the only way to 
understand this measure, and does not appear to be the way the developers themselves 
see the ICECAP-A. The authors instrumentally use preferences as a proxy of valuation. 
As a capability measure that uses population preferences a proxy of “having reason to 
value” (Sen 1999), many of the criticism may not apply. The ICECAP-A measure may 
very well be among the most defensible measures of welfare, both in terms of normative 
and empirical adequacy, if it is not seen as a preference-measure of welfare. The same 
arguments apply to a similar measure, the Adult Social Care Outcomes Toolkit (ASCOT; 
Forder and Caiels 2011). However, while this measure takes on a more explicit utility-
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preferences (Flynn et al. 2015). While the aim of the ICECAP measure is 
to construct a capability-based welfare measure, and only uses 
preferences instrumentally, it effectively is similar in structure. Both 
assume the framework in (5.2), and use stated hypothetical preferences 
to estimate f(.). However, there are a number of significant differences in 
the way the difficulties described above are addressed. 
  First, rather than using a list that is as comprehensive as possible, 
the developers of ICECAP-A decide to focus on a carefully constructed 
concise list, of 5 capabilities of a similarly high level of abstraction: 
stability, attachment, autonomy, achievement, and enjoyment. This list is 
not (only) informed by the academic literature, but extracted from 
structured interviews and focus groups (Al-Janabi, Flynn, and Coast 
2012). Secondly, Al-Janabi et al. (2015) assume that their welfare measure 
can be calibrated between 0 (having no capabilities whatsoever), and 1 
(having full capability). These two assumptions are arguably quite strong. 
It is restrictive to limit the set of w over which agents have preferences 
relevant for wellbeing to 5 capabilities. Nevertheless, if wellbeing were 
five-dimensional, it is not implausible to say that perfect wellbeing is 
reached if all these five dimensions are at their maximal levels. Al-Janabi 
et al. use a discrete choice-based valuational experiment, using best-
worst scaling, in order to elucidate preferences.50 This method, in 
combination with the two assumptions above, allow for a cardinal 
measure of welfare (or, the value of welfare).51 The measure ultimately 
presents a population level measure scaled from 0 to 1, in which each of 
the 5 capabilities affects wellbeing non-linearly.52 So, by filling out a 
questionnaire asking a respondent its 5 levels of capability, researchers 
can assign a welfare-value to the respondent on the basis of the weights 
from a population-wide discrete-choice experiment. 
                                         
based framework, it aims to measure “social outcome”  or “care-related quality of life” 
rather than well-being more generally. 
50 The methodology is based on asking respondents to compare well-being states – 
combinations of different levels of the 5 dimensions of the ICECAP-A measure. The 
estimates used to scale each dimension are based on the conditional probability an a 
well-being state is considered best (or worst) given the attribute level of the dimension. 
51 The authors are not very clear on the exact interpretation of their measure. They 
ultimately present their weights as a “tariff” to be used in economic valuations. It clearly 
presents the value of well-being states to each individual. It is not clear however, 
whether the authors believe there to be a distinction between the value of a well-being 
state for an individual and a well-being state itself. 
52 For methodological reasons however, no interaction in well-being value between 
capabilities is accounted for. 
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 The cardinal and interpersonally comparable nature of the 
measure of welfare fits in the top left concern of table 5.1, and as such 
has much policy-relevance. Not only does it allow identifying the worst-
off in society in terms of this measure, but it also helps to identify the 
impact of different interventions, and it can help assess how welfare has 
developed over time. Moreover, if the estimated weights can be 
extrapolated to other contexts,53 it does not require much data to 
estimate. However, while the measure only uses preferences as an 
estimate of individual valuation, as an individualistic measure of welfare, 
the policy-relevance comes at a high cost. The methodology takes the 
population seriously in the determination of the welfare function, both 
in terms of its contents—the formulation of the 5 capabilities that make 
up w—as well as its weights. However, because population values are 
used, it fails to meet the individualistic commitment inherent to 
preference-satisfactionism as an account of welfare. If someone has a 
different view than the rest of the population in terms of the weights and 
contents of the wellbeing measure, the welfare function may be alien to 
her, and it may be possible that she scores high on the measure, without 
her endorsing the values on which this is based. 
  
4. Steep tradeoffs 
We have identified a number of different dimensions on which 
preference-based welfare measure may differ:  
 
1) Does it restrict the list over which one can have preferences? 
2) Does it use individual or group preferences to weigh welfare aspects?  
3) Does it result in an ordinal or cardinal measure? 
4) Does it result in an interpersonally comparable or incomparable 
measure? 
5) Does it require a lot of data from individuals who are being assessed? 
 
In the discussion above, we saw that Benjamin et al.’s measure and the 
ICECAP-A make the following choices: 
 
 
 
 
                                         
53 The authors themselves see the estimates weights as having value nation-wide in the 
UK, but also believe that particular contexts may require different weights. 
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Table 5.2: tradeoffs in Benjamin et al. (2014) and the ICECAP-A 
 Benjamin et al. (2014) ICEPCAP-A 
Unrestricted 
preferences? 
Yes (or minimally 
restricted) 
No 
Individual or pooled 
preferences? 
Pooled Pooled 
Ordinal or cardinal? Ordinal Cardinal 
Comparable? Incomparable comparable 
Data-demanding? Relatively data-
demanding 
Not very data-
demanding 
 
While Benjamin et al. only minimally restrict preferences and aim at a 
measure that is ordinal and incomparable between individuals, and is 
relatively data-demanding, the ICECAP-A measure restricts the objects 
over which individuals have preferences to 5 capabilities, gets a 
cardinally and interpersonally comparable measure of welfare, which is 
not very data-demanding of individuals. However, both use group-level 
preferences, even though both submit that their methods can be used for 
substrata of the population, rather than the population as a whole, to get 
closer to the individual level. 
  The first two considerations on the list relate to the theoretical 
commitments of the approach. While neither approach truly provides a 
welfare measure that respects individual preference, Benjamin et al. do 
go at great lengths to leave the aspects over which individuals can have 
preferences as open as possible, while the ICECAP-A only captures 
preferences over five abstract capabilities.  
 The second two questions determine how useful the measure 
ultimately is for policy-makers. While the ICECAP-A is (plausibly) taken 
by its developers to represent a cardinal and interpersonally comparable 
measure of welfare, Benjamin et al.’s measure only captures ordinal 
changes in welfare that are not interpersonally comparable. While 
Benjamin et al. explicitly have a policy-context in mind when they 
consider the application of their measure, it is unclear how their measure 
can be helpful in guiding welfare-driven policies. Because of the limited 
comparability, it is neither able to make utilitarian judgments about the 
changes in aggregate welfare, nor is it able to identify relevant differences 
in welfare between individuals. At best, it is able to identify areas where 
Pareto-improvements are possible. 
 Lastly, the final question is ultimately about feasibility. As 
Benjamin et al. note, even under restrictive assumptions, fully comparing 
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the different possible combinations of 129 welfare aspects leads to such 
a large number of comparisons that this would be completely infeasible 
to do for each individual, and, despite the much lower number of welfare 
aspects in the ICECAP-A, the same applies. But, in light of the pragmatic 
choice to group preferences, the ICECAP-A strongly limits the data-
demandingness, and Benjamin et al. to a more limited extent. 
   While feasibility, policy-relevance and theoretical faithfulness are 
all attractive features of a measure, the development of both measures 
of welfare shows that in both cases these commitments cannot be met at 
the same time. An ideal measure of welfare does not limit the amount of 
welfare aspects (while, of course, avoiding conceptual overlap). But, 
welfare may very well be made up out of a very large number of aspects 
for certain individuals. Preferences that impact my welfare may include 
the color of my hair, as well as how sunny the days are where I live. 
Creating a full index of preference-satisfaction requires understanding 
how every possible configuration of w compares in terms of desirability 
to all other configurations of w. Ideally, a measure of welfare is not only 
comprehensive, but also cardinal and interpersonally comparable. It is 
highly contentious whether such a measure could validly exist in practice 
(e.g. Hausman 1995; List 2003; cf. Binmore 2009), but if so, a calibrated 
scale would be needed to standardize the preference ranking (as the 
ICECAP-A does). However, this requires that we do not only evaluate 
changes of welfare at the present level of w, but that we construct a full 
preference-map that will help us indicate how far away we are from 
calibrated points (e.g. 0 and 1). This again, raises the number of 
hypothetical choices a particular individual would make further. Making 
a preference-measure of welfare more attractive theoretically or in terms 
of policy-relevance thus comes with a major cost in terms of data-
demandingness. This is explicitly acknowledged by both groups of 
authors when it comes to the question whether a measure should use 
individual or population-level preferences. Benjamin et al. motivate their 
choice to use group-preferences rather than individual level preferences 
explicitly by referring to avoiding data-overdemandingness, and Flynn et 
al. (2015) also note that even with 5 welfare dimensions, it was infeasible 
for each individual to make 1024 discrete choices between all 1024 
scenarios that 5 dimensions allow for. In both cases the measure can be 
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individualized, but only at the cost of being over-demanding to 
individuals who are being assessed.54 
 While at this point it may seem as if this is simply a contingent 
feature of the current methodology to measure preferences, there is a 
necessary component to the problem at hand. There are simply a lot of 
dimensions on which lives may be different that can be relevant for 
welfare, and this means that there are a lot of different possible 
combinations of such dimensions that make up welfare on a preference-
satisfaction account. For every dimension added to the set of wi, and for 
every unit on which these dimensions may vary, the number of possible 
welfare states increases exponentially. The ICECAP-A is based on 5 
dimensions that may vary over 4 different levels. This leads to 1024 
possible values of wi that should be ranked in order to get at a full 
preference-map. In case of Benjamin et al., if we assume that each of the 
129 dimensions can vary over 4 different levels, we get at a total of 
4.63*1077 possible states of the world to compare. If we take seriously the 
idea that preferences are personal, we have to take seriously the idea that 
all these different possible combinations of welfare aspects can be valued 
differently by different individuals. A method that remains faithful to 
this idea simply requires a lot of information on how people make 
hypothetical tradeoffs between different possible combinations of 
welfare components. 
  Hence, as infeasibility is the hardest constraint for researchers 
wanting to provide a helpful measure for policy purposes, a tradeoff 
needs to be made between theoretical faithfulness and applicability. 
Without suggesting a correct way to make such tradeoffs, it should be 
clear that such tradeoffs come at a high cost to its theoretical 
commitmets. Neither of the two measures ultimately stays faithful to the 
individualism of preference-satisfactionism. Furthermore, Benjamin et 
al.’s measure falls short of providing a policy-relevant measure, while the 
ICECAP-A heavily restricts the space of valuation. 
 
                                         
54 Similarly, developers of the ASCOT (ft. 49) write: “There are practical limits on the 
number of indicators any preference-based measure can utilize, mainly due to the 
limitations of preference elicitation techniques. They include the difficulty respondents 
have in ranking over many different attributes and the tractability of statistical analysis 
of these data.” (Forder and Caiels 2011, 1768) 
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5. Conclusion 
For theoretical reasons, the possibility that welfare could be measured by 
means of an index of preference-satisfaction has for a long time been 
perceived with a skeptical attitude. Such attitude may have been overly 
skeptical. The theoretical frameworks of both reviewed approaches show 
that at a concrete level plausible pragmatic choices can be made that 
result in indices of utility. However, in light of methodological 
considerations, a preference measure of welfare falls short either in 
terms of normative and theoretical commitments, in terms of policy-
relevance, or faces the charge that it is overly data-demanding to be put 
into practice. 
 So, to what extent can welfare be measured with a utility-index? 
While a preference-based method of indexing welfare connects closely to 
economic theory, the tradeoffs identified in this chapter pose a stark 
challenge to this possibility. However, the tradeoffs also offer an 
opportunity to bring different approach to welfare measurement closer 
together. For example, by restricting the space of possible preferences in 
a welfare-measure, the developers of the ICECAP have incorporated 
insights from the capability approach. While this may make their 
approach less attractive to a pure preference-satisfactionist, it should 
make the approach more appealing to capability scholars. If indeed, a 
preference-measure needs to let go of its unrestrictedness, the usage of 
insights from alternative approaches—such as the capability approach 
and objective list theories—may be a way to build a synthesis in the 
ongoing debate on how to measure welfare. 
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Chapter 6: A Capability Measure of 
Wellbeing: Can it Exist? 
 
The Scylla of empirical overambitiousness threatens us as 
much as the Charybdis of misdirected theory 
- Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, p.32  
 
I. Introduction 
One important aim of the capability approach has been to formulate 
alternative operationalizations—or measures—of wellbeing for empirical 
purposes. The question whether the capability approach can be 
operationalized in practice has already received much attention within 
capability scholarship (Comim 2005; Robeyns 2006). Reasons for 
skepticism about the operationalizability of the capability approach to 
wellbeing are that the identification of the valuable functionings and 
capabilities is difficult (Robeyns 2003, 2005; Alkire 2007), and that 
capabilities and capability sets are unobservable and may be difficult to 
identify and disentangle (Basu 1987; Krishnakumar and Ballon 2008). I 
argue that there is an alternative problem that has more severe 
consequences for the possibility of wellbeing measurement by means of 
the capability approach in particular. The problem is, roughly, that the 
conception of individual human good as composed of functionings and 
capabilities55 that constitute each person’s wellbeing differently is 
practically incompatible with the skeptical attitude towards personal 
assessment of wellbeing within the capability approach. I argue that both 
features are central to the approach. While this may not pose a problem 
to the capability approach as a framework for conceptualizing and 
theorizing about justice, freedom, poverty or advantage, or even as a 
framework to theorize about wellbeing, it does pose a significant 
problem for the approach as a framework for developing a feasible 
operationalization of wellbeing in the social sciences. 
                                         
55 In Sen’s initial (1985a) – and to date most precise – statement of the relationship 
between functionings, capabilities and wellbeing, wellbeing (achievement) is initially 
formalized to consist only of functionings. However, he later states that capabilities 
may have wellbeing value as well. As such, I follow Sen in the remainder of the chapter 
by supposing that wellbeing consists in both functionings and capabilities. 
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 Amartya Sen originally motivated the approach in response to the 
shortcomings of existing approaches to measuring wellbeing, in 
particular desire-satisfaction and happiness-based interpretations of 
utility in economics. In recent years, these approaches have gained an 
increasing amount of attention (see chapter 3-5). In response to these 
developments, numerous criticisms have been written by capability 
scholars (e.g. Sen 2008, 2009; Nussbaum 2008; Stewart 2014), and the 
capability approach is generally suggested as an alternative. 
  This raises the question to what extent the capability approach is 
able to provide a feasible alternative measure of wellbeing. A number of 
proposals and attempts have been made to construct measures of 
wellbeing within the capability framework (Cookson 2005; Schokkaert 
2007; Anand et al. 2009; Van Ootegem and Spillemaeckers 2010; Anand, 
Krishnakumar, and Tran 2011). In this chapter I assess whether these 
proposals succeed, and more generally, whether the capability approach 
can be used to develop wellbeing measures. While my assessment of this 
issue is negative, the project also has a more constructive aim, namely, 
to clarify some limits of wellbeing measurement that may contribute to 
the development of wellbeing measures in the future. 
 
2. Wellbeing Measurement, Adaptation, and Wellbeing 
Pluralism. 
Consider the following three claims about the capability approach: 
 
1)  Wellbeing measurement: Wellbeing can, and should be, 
conceptualized and measured in terms of functionings and 
capabilities.  
2)    Rejection of Subjectivism:  Wellbeing should not be 
conceptualized and measured in terms of self-reported 
preferences or subjective wellbeing. 
3)  Wellbeing pluralism: Different functionings and capabilities 
contribute differently to the wellbeing of different people.   
 
As I defend below, these claims are all generally considered to be correct 
within the capability approach scholarship. Nevertheless, they lead to a 
clear tension. It is not feasible to have a measure of wellbeing (claim 1) 
that does not rely on subjective judgments of wellbeing (satisfying claim 
2), and at the same time respects that different functionings and 
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capabilities have varying degrees of importance to different people (claim 
3). The statements are not strictly speaking analytically incompatible, but 
I will argue that, in any realistic sense, they cannot be jointly held at the 
same time. In section 3 below I will present this argument more 
elaborately. But before I do so, I present some arguments for the claim 
that 1-3 are indeed part of the common core of the capability approach. 
Furthermore, in section 4 I discuss how this tension applies to capability 
measures of wellbeing in practice. Section 5 considers some objections, 
and section 6 concludes with a discussion of how the tension should be 
resolved. 
 
a) Wellbeing measurement 
The first claim is most trivial at first sight. Almost all introductions to 
the capability approach cite the conceptualization and measurement of 
wellbeing (or quality of life) as one of the main motivations and 
applications of the approach. Ingrid Robeyns, for example, writes:  
 
“The core claim of the capability approach is that 
assessments of the wellbeing or quality of life of a person, 
and judgements about equality or justice, or the level of 
development of a community or country, should not 
primarily focus on resources, or on people’s mental states, 
but on the effective opportunities that people have to lead 
the lives they have reason to value.” (Robeyns 2006, 351; 
similar statements can be found in Nussbaum 2011) .56 
 
What is less trivial is what exactly counts as wellbeing assessment. Firstly, 
it must be noted that wellbeing measurement within the capability 
approach is sometimes broadly understood, as to include the 
measurement of poverty, advantage or development. The standard usage 
of wellbeing in philosophy is that the term wellbeing describes what 
makes life go well for the person living it. Being poor is an indication that 
life is not going well, but is clearly a different, narrower, concept than 
wellbeing itself. In his original formulation, Sen is primarily concerned 
with the more specific, broader notion of wellbeing, which comprises the 
answer to the question: “how ‘well’ is his or her being?” (Sen 1985a, 3) 
                                         
56 Nussbaum writes: “The capability approach can be defined as an approach to 
comparative quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing about basic social justice” 
(2011, 18). 
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  Even on this specific notion, the capability approach distinguishes 
between a variety of wellbeing concepts that all play an important role in 
the evaluation of a person’s situation (Sen 1985a). Firstly, the values 
people have generally are not only self-regarding, but may be other 
regarding too. Wellbeing only refers to those values, or goods, that 
contribute to the person’s life itself, but agency refers to the values a 
person holds in general, including those regarding other people. 
Furthermore, in specifying these concepts, we may both be interested in 
their achievement—which values are actually achieved—as well as 
freedom that a person has to achieve these values. The terms wellbeing 
achievement, wellbeing freedom, agency achievement and agency 
freedom all play an important role in the capability approach. However, 
while the capability approach considers all these aspects to be important, 
our focus will be on wellbeing achievement. This is not to say that 
capabilities, which represent the freedom space of valuable 
achievements, do not play a role. Capabilities themselves can be a central 
part of what makes a life go well too. The opportunity to choose may be 
considered as important to a person’s wellbeing, as well as valuable in its 
own right. In the former sense, capabilities may be considered part of the 
relevant vector of considerations making up wellbeing achievement (Sen 
1985a, 44). 
  While it is trivial that the capability approach aims to provide a 
framework for measuring wellbeing, there are many different possible 
interpretations of what measurement entails. It may be objected that the 
measurement the capability approach seeks to guide is something quite 
different from what alternative approaches aim to do. In order to clarify 
how these different aims compare, consider the different levels of 
measurement that measurement theory typically distinguishes: 
nominal—not allowing for comparisons—, ordinal—allowing for 
comparisons of rank—, interval—allowing affine transformations—and 
ratio—allowing for ratio transformations. While some authors in the 
literature on wellbeing in economics have made the claim that wellbeing 
can be measured at an interval scale (Van Praag 2007; Blanchflower and 
Oswald 2004; see Kristoffersen 2010), other conceptualizations of 
wellbeing are more modest and aim at ordinal measurement (Benjamin 
et al. 2014). The objective Scandinavian approach to wellbeing 
measurement is more careful still. In an introduction to the approach, 
Robert Erikson and Hannu Uusitalo write:  
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“There is no yardstick that allows for a combination of the 
components into a single measure of welfare. There is no 
objective or impartial way to decide whether, say, a man with 
more severe working conditions but better economic 
resources than another man is better off, equal to, or worse 
off in welfare. Each man must decide who is better and who 
is worse off according to his own values.” (1986, 187–88).  
 
Such an approach thus provides a nominal measure of wellbeing. It 
describes different welfare states, without ordering them. For this reason, 
the approach is severely limited in the information it can provide about 
wellbeing. Without any yardstick, we cannot say whether a person’s life 
has improved over time, nor can we make interpersonal comparisons of 
welfare. The ideas within the Scandinavian approach share many 
characteristics with the capability approach (Robeyns 2006), but the 
capability approach is more ambitious in this respect. While Sen (1985a) 
acknowledges that very often comparisons cannot be made precisely, it 
is also often true that rough comparisons can be made. Sen speaks in 
such an instance of an incomplete ordering,57 which allow for clear 
comparisons when differences between capability sets are large, or one 
dominates the other, but do not result in a clear ordering otherwise. Sen’s 
position on how welfare can be measured is thus half-way between 
ordinal and nominal measurement. Whenever comparisons can be made, 
the comparisons are ordinal, whenever they are not the measurement of 
welfare is merely nominal.  
  It is easy to see that a nominal measurement of welfare is deeply 
unsatisfactory. It reduces welfare measurement to a mere reporting of 
states that are relevant to welfare, without facilitating any sort of 
comparison. What we want from a measure of welfare for the purpose of 
scientific practice is the possibility of arriving at some ordinal rankings. 
Would it turn out that no (non-trivial) ordinal comparisons could be made 
with such a measure, we cannot say that the capability approach is able 
to provide an interesting welfare measure. Given the widespread views 
within the capability approach that it is a helpful and useful way to 
conceptualize and measure wellbeing within the social sciences, it seems 
                                         
57 More elaborately, Sen describes this as follows: “The "natural" form of wellbeing 
ranking is indeed that of a partial, incomplete order. It would be just as extraordinary 
if every possible pair of functioning vectors could be compared in terms of over-all 
wellbeing, as it would be if none of them could be. There will, of course, be many agreed 
valuations, and many decisive judgments, and the clarity of these cases is not 
compromised by the muddiness of other.”(Sen 1985b, 198)  
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that most capability scholars do believe, with Sen, that interesting ordinal 
comparisons of welfare can be made on the basis of measures of 
functionings and capabilities, at least in certain instances.  
   
 
b) rejection of subjectivity 
The second claim finds its basis in one of the main motivations of the 
capability approach: the criticism of utility approaches of welfare—
including conceptions based on happiness, life-satisfaction and desire-
satisfaction (Sen 1985a, 1987, 2008, 2009, Nussbaum 2000, 2003, 2008, 
2011; see D. A. Clark 2009; Qizilbash 2006a, see chapter 3). The main 
argument for this rejection is the adaptation argument, which is central 
in motivations of the capability approach. The problem of adaptation is 
that happiness and desire-based measures are both heavily dependent on 
people’s attitudes, ambitions and desires, which at the same time are 
malleable. A deeply deprived person may succeed in leveling down her 
ambitions and desires in order to achieve a sense of happiness or 
satisfaction. Focusing merely on reported happiness and satisfaction will 
make it difficult to distinguish between those that are reportedly happy 
and well, and those that report high levels of happiness and satisfaction 
despite deprivations, while there is an important welfare difference 
between the two according those who employ the argument.  
  Different capability scholars derive different conclusions from the 
adaptation problem with respect to the usage of self-evaluations to 
measure wellbeing. To name a few: Francis Stewart, in a paper called 
Against Happiness, cites the adaptation argument in order to substantiate 
her claim that subjective wellbeing is a bad measure of progress. While 
such measures can be used to supplement objective measures in her 
view, it does show that they are not very reliable. Sabina Alkire describes 
the possibility to use individual valuation or life evaluation as a basis for 
the identification of valuable functionings, but adds that: “it sidelines 
practical reason and people’s own aspirations, and studies them as 
objects.” (2007, 14). Sen, similarly, has stressed that despite the 
adaptation problem desires and happiness could at most be used as 
evidence of a person’s values, not as a direct measure itself: “[h]appiness 
may be linked to success, but the metric of happiness need not be a 
particularly good guide to the force and extent of our valuations in 
general” (2008, 27). The rejection of happiness or life-satisfaction 
measures of wellbeing due to the malleability and adaptivity of desires 
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and mental states is quite ubiquitous among authors within the 
capability tradition (see also Robeyns and van der Veen 2007; Nussbaum 
2008; Alkire and Deneulin 2009). 
  An important point of contention is whether subjective 
information should not be used to index wellbeing at all. Sen remains 
mildly optimistic that wellbeing could be measured by measuring 
people’s values rather than desires or happiness, but notes: “The 
problem, however, is made a good deal more complicated by the fact that 
questions of valuation are often hard to pose, and harder to answer, and 
also by the fact that the need for cool and non-mechanical reflection on 
these issues is not easy to fulfil.” (1985a, 32). Martha Nussbaum, among 
others, has criticized Sen for leaving the option of personal valuation 
open—albeit only with a heavily qualified enthusiasm. The same 
arguments Sen uses against the desire-satisfaction and happiness 
approach also appear to apply to values:  
 
“Just as people can be taught not to want or miss the things 
their culture has taught them they should not or could not 
have, so too they can be taught not to value certain 
functionings as constituents of their good living, where their 
culture has an interest in, or cannot avoid, denying them 
access to these functionings” (1988, 39; see D. A. Clark 2009 
for a similar argument).  
 
Nussbaum continues in arguing that values may even be more malleable 
than desires, as they do not have the same biological basis as some 
desires do.  
  In more recent formulations of the adaptation problem, Sen 
formulates the problem of subjective measures more generally, not 
restricting them to happiness or desire. In the Idea of Justice, he 
concludes from adaptation examples that “our perceptions may tend to 
blind us to the deprivations that we do actually have, which a clearer and 
more informed understanding can bring out” (2009, 284).  
  While Nussbaum and Sen may disagree on whether there is a 
relevant distinction between the subjective measurement of happiness, 
desires or values, both present important arguments to reject the 
conceptualization and measurement of wellbeing solely in terms of 
subjective evaluations or preferences.  
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c) Wellbeing pluralism 
Both pluralism and diversity play an important role within the capability 
approach in a variety of places (see Qizilbash 1997 for a discussion on 
the varieties of pluralism about well-being). Firstly, the capability 
approach is pluralistic about values in general and prudential value in 
particular. Human good cannot be reduced to a single entity such as 
happiness or desire-satisfaction, but, wellbeing is constituted by a variety 
of aspects. Similarly, there is not one type of life that is good for people, 
but there may be a variety of kinds of life that are good for people. 
Another sense in which human diversity plays an important role within 
the capability approach is within the concept of conversion factors. Given 
the same amount of resources different individuals may achieve more 
functionings or capabilities than others. A disabled person may require 
a wheelchair to get around, while shoes suffice for others. But there is 
one further form of diversity, namely the one central in claim 3: not only 
is the nature of wellbeing pluralistic, but these different goods may also 
contribute differently to the wellbeing of different individuals. In a recent 
article defining the capability approach Ingrid Robeyns writes:  
 
“The importance attached to human diversity is also shown 
by the fact that capabilities are plural—different people will 
need a different combination of the corresponding 
functionings in order to have the same levels of wellbeing.” 
(Robeyns 2016, 11) 
 
We may call the view that the value of specific functionings and 
capabilities is person-dependent pluralism about prudential value—or, 
simpler, wellbeing pluralism. It is important to note that the view excludes 
a completely objective notion of wellbeing, in which the aspects that 
make up wellbeing are both exactly the same for everyone, but also their 
relative importance to wellbeing is the same for everyone. Robeyns is 
right in asserting that this is a central feature within the capability 
approach. This is reflected in Sen’s (1985a) original formulation, in which 
personal good, vi is defined as:58 
 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖(𝑏𝑖)  (6.1) 
                                         
58 This is an amalgamation of two functions defined by Sen (1985a): 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 (𝑓𝑖(𝑐(𝑥𝑖))) 
(2.3) and 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖(𝑐(𝑥𝑖)) (2.1), where c(.) is the function converting a commodity vector 
into a vector of commodity characteristics, f(.) a utilization function, and xi a vector of 
commodities owned by i. 
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where bi is a vector of functionings and capabilities. What is important to 
note is that the function connecting the personal good and functionings 
is personalized. It thus exactly captures wellbeing pluralism: not all 
functionings and capabilities are equally important to everyone. In a later 
chapter Sen argues against the view that inter-personal comparisons 
would require a universal identification of the wellbeing function: 
“Indeed, the subscript i in 𝑣𝑖(. ) is referring precisely to the authorship of 
the valuational statement” (Sen 1985a, 37). This clearly supports Robeyns 
claim that this feature is essential to the approach. 
  Several objections can be made against the claim that wellbeing 
pluralism is essential to the capability approach. Firstly, Martha 
Nussbaum has defended a list of capabilities which she has argued to be 
necessary for a “truly human life”, or a human life in dignity. In her view 
these capabilities are not person-relative, but shared by all human beings 
(see also Qizilbash 1998). However, Nussbaum writings dismiss the view 
that her list describes the human good independently of a person’s 
individual or cultural identity. She stresses that it is not the intention of 
her approach to provide a full description of the human good, but to 
provide a minimal description within a theory of political entitlements. 
She acknowledges that political liberalism within the approach should 
leave open a variety of possible lives that can be considered good for 
people. Moreover, she believes that her account can, and should, be able 
to endorse the diversity of cultural values by describing the capabilities 
on the list as generally as “vague” as possible (Nussbaum 1988, 2011; see 
Qizilbash 1996).  
  Another possible argument against the view that this type of 
pluralism is inherent in the capability approach is the fact that Sen’s 
explicit acknowledgment of personal differences in the valuation of 
functionings and capabilities has also explicitly not excluded the 
possibility that an objective standard could be applied within the 
capability framework. For example, in the Dewey lectures Sen describes 
Nussbaum’s suggestion to move to a single list of functionings that 
constitute a good human life: “That view would not be inconsistent with 
the capability approach presented here, but not, by any means, required 
by it.” (Sen 1993, 47). Hence, it appears that Sen, without rejecting it, also 
does not require wellbeing pluralism. However, at the same time, Sen 
endorses arguments for the view that there is diversity in the things that 
individuals have reason to value (Qizilbash 2013). For example, in 
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Inequality Re-examined (1992) he explicitly endorses Rawls’ claim that 
there is diversity in conceptions of the good life that determine a person’s 
ends. Moreover, throughout his work, Sen has focused on individual 
values that make up a person’s good. That these are diverse in Sen’s view 
can be read of his discussion in Commodities and Capabilities in which 
he discusses the need for individuating measures of wellbeing: “the 
question of the identification of functionings has to be supplemented by 
their own evaluation” (1985a, 31–32).  
  The discussions about what is the core of the capability approach 
and what is not is in full flux, and it is not easy to substantiate claims 
about this. However, it should be clear these three claims—beside all 
being plausible in themselves—are widely shared among capability 
scholars. 
 
3. Measuring Wellbeing? 
As the epigraph illustrates, the capability approach does not maintain 
that measuring important concepts such as wellbeing is meant to be easy. 
The three claims that I have defended as central to the approach pose a 
clear challenge: on the one hand, wellbeing is somehow individualistic. 
Because of human diversity, friendship, for example, may be more 
important to your wellbeing than it is to mine. On the other hand, 
measures of wellbeing cannot be too individualistic. At least, direct 
questions about happiness, life-satisfaction or desires cannot be taken as 
a direct indication for wellbeing. So, how do we identify the difference in 
value between different functionings/capabilities making up wellbeing 
achievement for different people without relying on individual reports 
on wellbeing in some form? A little more formally, we can illustrate the 
challenge as follows. If we would like to get to some measure of 
wellbeing, we would estimate Sen’s formalization as follows: 
  
 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖(𝑎𝑖)  (6.2) 
 
 
Where wi is a wellbeing measure that is to be estimated, ai a vector of 
estimates of functioning and capability scores, and wi(.) a function linking 
these estimates to our wellbeing measure. Given the view on 
measurement discussed above, the relationship between the measure 
and wellbeing itself can then be seen as follows: 
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𝑣𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖(𝑎𝑖) + 𝑢  (6.3) 
 
where u is an error term, capturing the incompleteness of the measure.59 
What is important to notice, is that because vi is individually indexed, so 
is wi. The weights in the function that links different individual (measures 
of) functionings and capabilities to wellbeing is thus person-dependent. 
The difficulty thus lies with estimating wi(.), which is a personalized 
function, without using a personal evaluation. 
First of all, note that this problem is different from the 
identification of relevant functionings. We have taken the list of 
components of wellbeing, bi, as given. Even if we could agree on, for 
example, Qizilbash’s (1998) list of valuable functionings, then we have 
not yet accounted for how these functiontings contribute differently to 
different people’s lives. The same applies to the problem that some 
categories of functionings and capabilities may overlap, or may be so 
interconnected that they cannot be disentangled. None of these problems 
determine the difficulty of this challenge, and for the present purpose, 
we may even assume them resolved. 
  The difficulty is that a priori assumptions could not really be used 
to identify wi(.). A personalized function, must somehow be based on 
specific information about the individual. There are two possible types 
of information on which the function can be identified. The most 
straightforward method would be to rely on subjective information about 
individual values. It seems almost impossible to imagine how wi(.) could 
be individually specified without employing an individual evaluation of 
life satisfaction, happiness, or wellbeing. However, this is exactly what 
subjective skepticism is meant to exclude. An alternative is to use 
information about individual values that are not based on information 
provided by the same individual. This is rare in the empirical literature, 
and, as I will argue, for good reasons.  
If these observations are correct—there is indeed no possible 
alternative to personalizing a welfare measure besides relying on self-
reported preferences or subjective wellbeing that is also sufficiently 
plausible and feasible—we can see how the tension between the three 
                                         
59 Because of u, vi will be an estimate with bounds. When another set falls within these 
bounds, a comparison cannot be made clearly, while if it falls within outside, we can 
compare.  
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claims made within the capability approach so far leads to a strict 
impossibility: 
1)  Wellbeing measurement: Wellbeing can, and should be, 
conceptualized and measured in terms of functionings and 
capabilities.  
2)     Rejection of Subjectivism: Wellbeing should not be 
conceptualized and measured in terms of self-reported 
preferences or subjective wellbeing. 
3)  Wellbeing pluralism: Different functionings and capabilities 
contribute differently to the wellbeing of different people.   
4)  Necessity of Subjectivism for wellbeing pluralism: There is 
no alternative to identifying how different functionings and 
capabilities contribute differently to wellbeing of different people 
besides relying on self-reported preferences or subjective 
wellbeing that is sufficiently feasible and plausible. 
 
These statements are jointly not compatible. If we accept the argument 
presented in this section (4), and accept that the capability approach 
indeed aims to measure wellbeing (1), as it explicitly states, either (2) or 
(3) must be rejected. The main tension, is thus this: without relying on 
subjective judgments of wellbeing or its close associates, a wellbeing 
measure cannot take interpersonal differences into account in the 
contribution of different functionings and capabilities to wellbeing. 
 
4. Lopped-off Legs and Compromise 
There are a number of capability researchers who have developed 
wellbeing measures. Sabina Alkire (2007) describes a number of 
approaches to arrive at a list that are open to the capability scholar: 
normative assumptions, using existing data pragmatically, using public 
consensus, participatory methods, or to use individual data on what 
people value in their lives. While the use of existing data does not provide 
a methodology for valuating at all, in particular the latter has been put 
to work to operationalize the capability approach to wellbeing. In 
discussing this work and alternative possibilities discussed by Alkire in 
light of the three claims, the tension between these claims becomes clear 
in empirical practice. 
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  The most straightforward way to estimate wi(.) is to use an 
alternative proxy of wellbeing, vi. The most prominent example of an 
empirical attempt to measure wellbeing using the capability approach—
Paul Anand et al.’s paper The Development of Capability Indicators 
(2009)—has solved the identification problem this way. The relevance of 
separate capabilities on Nussbaum’s list is evaluated by means of 
assessing their contribution to a life satisfaction question. This 
contribution is both important as well as controversial. While the paper 
presents a unique first operationalization of wellbeing based on 
capabilities, it uses a subjective wellbeing indicator to do so. Due to a 
lack of data, the paper is unable to individualize the wellbeing value of 
separate capabilities. In a follow-up paper (Anand, Krishnakumar, and 
Tran 2011), the authors are able to allow for heterogeneity in the 
relationship between different capabilities and life satisfaction, opening 
the door for individualizing their capability measure of wellbeing.  
  This approach has been heavily criticized by other capability 
scholars for neglecting the central focus within the capability approach 
of going beyond single subjective measures of wellbeing, which play a 
crucial role in Anand et al’s approach (Robeyns 2011; Richardson 2015). 
For example, in reference to Anand et al.’s work, Henry Richardson 
suggests that “Nussbaum’s central capabilities fit nicely in the welfarist’s 
Procrustean bed, as long as one does not worry about the limbs that have 
been lopped off.” (2015, 167). While this may be strong, it is easy to see 
how a capability scholar may object to the way in which the capabilities 
are valued by their relationship to subjective wellbeing. Moving away 
from using subjective valuation as a measure of wellbeing is one of the 
key motivations of the approach. Richardson continues by questioning 
whether capabilities are sought with the purpose of increasing life 
satisfaction, or whether life satisfaction is simply one valuable outcome. 
Anand et al. acknowledge some of these problems and argue that it may 
be that the relationship between capabilities and wellbeing, and 
capability and the happiness measures that are used may be different. 
However, in a later paper, such qualifications disappear when Anand 
cites this result as an example refuting “early concerns about the 
impossibility of measuring potential concepts such as ‘opportunity’” 
(Anand, Durand, and Heckman 2011, 852–53). 
 Another area of research in which the operationalizations of 
wellbeing have been formulated using the capability framework is the 
context of health economics (Cookson 2005; Al-Janabi, Flynn, and Coast 
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2012; Flynn et al. 2015, see chapter 5). In this literature it is 
acknowledged that while desires and choices do not constitute wellbeing, 
population preferences are the best available evidence we have for what 
is a valuable capability. Nevertheless, aware of the seemingly tension, 
Flynn et al. refer to the solution as the “Cookson’s compromise” (259). 
   A commonly made suggestion within the capability literature is 
that democratic deliberation should be a key resource in filling out the 
blanks of the approach. Sabine Alkire (2002), for example, argues that in 
the context of development and poverty alleviation projects, the 
capability approach can be put to work through participatory studies to 
identify the people’s agency values. However, as far as I am aware, for the 
case of wellbeing values, this has not been put to use. Alkire (2007) 
distinguishes between global consensus methodology and small 
participatory methods. Both are problematic in light of the three claims 
discussed above.  
 Firstly, the reason a consensus methodology is widely endorsed if 
based on rational deliberation between different viewpoints, is that it is 
likely that irrelevant desires and values, such as those driven by 
adaptation, will not make it on such a list.60 However, this method can 
only identify a list of abstract and global goods. It would not be possible 
to identify individual differences in what makes for a good life. While 
such methodology would use people’s view on wellbeing, in terms of 
individual diversity, the approach stands at par with the usage of a priori 
assumptions about wellbeing. A consensus view, or a list of goods that 
applies to all, can simply not be used to identify differences in the 
importance of ingredients of wellbeing among different individuals. 
  The same reasoning does not strictly speaking apply to the usage 
of small scale studies to identify the functionings and capabilities 
constitutive of individual wellbeing (e.g. Van Ootegem and 
Spillemaeckers 2010). In fact, the usage of small scale participatory 
studies may be the most promising way of developing a wellbeing 
measurement able to accommodate all three central claims. For example, 
you could imagine that it would be possible to use community input on 
the valuation of capabilities for separate individuals. By relying on 
information provided by family members, friends or other people close 
                                         
60 This is a common view among capability scholars. David Clark, for example, argues: 
“In so far as value judgments are informed by intercultural exchanges and ‘improved’ 
through public reasoning, we can expect them to be more reliable (and less susceptible 
to adaptation).” (2009, 26) 
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to someone being evaluated, individual weights of different functionings 
and capabilities could be identified. While this results in individualized 
weights, it at the same time has potential to overcome the adaptation 
problem leading to skepticism about individual valuation in the 
capability approach. We could imagine that a caring mother may notice 
that her daughter who has adapted to work in a dirty factory is not doing 
very well, even though the daughter reports to be fine.  
  Clearly, as an empirical research strategy, this would involve much 
more work than other approaches to wellbeing, which are typically based 
on a questionnaire of the person whose wellbeing is evaluated. 
Nevertheless, if families and friends of an adapted person would be 
immune to adaptation about views on the good life with respect to the 
person evaluated, this would resolve the tension the three claims pose. 
This is, however, not the case. The adaptation of evaluation standards as 
a result of deprivation does not only affect individuals, but communities, 
if not societies as a whole. In a community that collectively suffers deep 
deprivations, the person who suffers least may be considered to lead a 
good life, but this does not mean her life is good.   
  Such evaluations may have the benefit that personal whimsicalities 
may be avoided. But, it also comes with a disadvantage. While a family, 
or a person’s community at large, may have a more neutral and cool 
stance towards evaluating the wellbeing of their friend or family member, 
they may also apply community values which would not be beneficial for 
the person that is being evaluated. For example, a person living in a 
conservative religious community, who has recently acknowledged her 
own homosexuality, may do well in her own view, while their community 
may strongly disagree with this. People may adapt exactly to the views a 
community may impose, while such adaptation is clearly goes against a 
person’s interest.61 Even if a community itself would be more robust to 
adaptation of some sorts, it may also hold biases as a community that 
would ultimately not contribute to the objectivity of the wellbeing 
evaluation.  
                                         
61 Ingrid Robeyns, for example, writes: “Most versions of the capability approach 
advocate for people being involved in determining which capabilities are relevant, and 
how to weight them. But this opens a can of worms that are well-known to social choice 
theorists and theorists of deliberative democracy, such as the tyranny of the majority.” 
(2006, 373). David Clark (2009) argues that the force of the adaptation argument is so 
strong that it seems difficult to see how it would not result in a total neglect of poor 
voices, a result that clearly seems to go against main motivations behind the capability 
approach.  
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  So, existing measures and proposals are not successful in resolving 
the challenge put forward in the former section. Is this due to the lack of 
creativity of empirical researchers? What the discussion so far illustrates 
is that there is a deeper problem. The capability approach has two deep 
commitments that are in conflict. On the one hand it has a commitment 
to the view that deprivation is more than the effect it has on mental states 
and wellbeing should not be equated with mental states, because they are 
malleable. On the other hand, it acknowledges that what makes a life go 
well is deeply personal. However, the only access we have of individual 
values that determine what constitutes a good life is through mental 
states themselves. Richardson’s criticism to approaches using life 
satisfaction as a proxy of wellbeing, and “compromise” made in the 
capability based quality of life measures in health are an inevitable part 
of the approach as a framework for the measurement of wellbeing. Such 
criticism seems unfair in light of the unresolved tension within the 
approach. The empirical researchers were setup for failure—or, at least 
set up to be inconsistent with their theoretical framework. Strictly 
speaking the two commitments (2 and 3) need not make the 
measurement of wellbeing impossible. But, in any realistic sense they do.  
5. Objections 
The conclusion drawn at the end of the last section may be considered 
too grim, and there are a number of objections to it that need to be 
acknowledged. 
  A possible objection to the pessimistic conclusion is that my 
interpretation of wellbeing pluralism has been too narrow. While it may 
not be possible in scientific practice to differentiate how different 
capabilities affect wellbeing for different individuals, some rough 
differentiations can clearly be made. Indeed, the discussion on wellbeing 
pluralism within the capability approach is vague and underspecified. 
And indeed, we could interpret wellbeing pluralism as something that 
can be satisfied objectively. For example, we could formulate wellbeing 
lists either a priori or by means of consensus methods that differentiate 
between rough categories of people such as children and adults, the 
elderly and younger adults, pregnant and non-pregnant women, etc. This 
would not result in individual differences in how different functionings 
and capabilities constitute for different individuals wellbeing, but it 
would do so with respect to classes of people, and would thereby be able 
to incorporate some of the pluralistic intuition described in claim 3. 
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Nevertheless, such an interpretation would completely erode the concept 
of wellbeing pluralism. Some of the reasons why mobility may be more 
important to someone than others may be due to type of person she is: 
young, educated, female, etc. However, for the most part it is due to her 
individual makeup. Rather than other people in her category, she may 
find traveling particularly exhilarating. Not only would such an 
interpretation of wellbeing pluralism be erosive, it would also strongly 
go against the spirit of the capability approach to take diversity seriously, 
and accept the variety of good lives that people may lead. 
  A second objection is that even if there is no way to identify 
individual weights, we may be able to make welfare comparisons—or, 
measure welfare—whenever one person dominates another in all 
possible capability and functioning dimensions. If all the functionings 
and capabilities constituting wellbeing are identified, and person A does 
better on all dimensions than person B, we can be entitled to say that A 
has a higher wellbeing than B. While this is a fair point, and while it 
illustrates how wellbeing may be measured in an ordinal fashion in some 
instances, a number of caveats apply. Firstly, this possibility only 
provides a rather limited possibility of welfare comparisons. If there is a 
large list of things that matter to wellbeing, it is unlikely that there are 
many cases in which comparisons can be made on ground of dominance. 
Even the severely deprived are able to achieve functionings and 
capabilities in their lives that the wealthy may miss, such as close family 
ties, time to spend with family members, or religious fulfillment. It would 
be a disappointing measure of welfare that is unable to conclude that a 
wealthy New Yorker is higher on wellbeing than a poor Indian living in a 
slum, just because the New Yorker does not dominate on all the wellbeing 
dimensions.62 Secondly, it is not at all that obvious that a domination of 
a capability set necessarily leads to a higher wellbeing  (Vallentyne and 
Tungodden 2013). For example, a person who likes to travel and has 
much mobility options, but poor access to shelter, may be better off than 
a person who has a similar capability set with even more mobility options 
if that latter person is very homey and does not like to travel. Domination 
in a set of functionings and capabilities does not necessarily make a 
person better off. 
                                         
62 Sen seems to disagree with the view that dominance rankings would be very rare, and 
notes that in practice dominance rankings would cover the most important cases 
(1985a, 20, fn. 7). He does not present an argument for this, however. 
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  Lastly, a final objection is that claim 2—stating the skeptical 
attitude of the capability approach towards personal life assessment—is 
formulated too strongly. While Nussbaum would support it as it stands, 
Sen, and other capability scholars, are open to the view that while 
information about self-assessed happiness and satisfaction should not 
be used to index a wellbeing measure, personal evaluation of wellbeing 
values, or a self-assessment of wellbeing at large, can be used for this 
purpose. Someone who would defend this position would have to explain 
why it is that the arguments that apply to the former—such as the 
adaptation argument—do not apply to the latter. Such an argument is yet 
forthcoming, and I see no coherent way in which such argument can be 
made. However, if this option would be open to a capability measure of 
wellbeing, it would be possible to use this information to index the 
relevance of functionings and capabilities to individual welfare, avoiding 
the skeptical conclusion that was drawn in the previous section. 
  The objections show that there are ways to resist the skeptical 
conclusion, but that these leave much to be explained.  
 
6. Conclusion 
If measures of wellbeing cannot satisfy non-reliance on subjective 
evaluations (claim 2) at the same time as sensitivity to personal weighting 
of the functionings and capabilities set (claim 3), we must doubt that the 
capability approach is able to measure wellbeing in terms of functionings 
and capabilities (claim 1). So, if the argument in this paper is accepted, 
one of these should be abandoned or changed.  
  One possible conclusion to be drawn—dropping claim 1—is that 
the capability approach actually is a framework of thinking about 
wellbeing that shows that the concept of wellbeing is not something that 
can be measured. Wellbeing is a complex concept, and while the kind of 
pieces of information required to make judgments about wellbeing can 
be identified within the approach, it is overly ambitious to believe that it 
can be measured in a procedurally standardized way. 
  A second response is to drop claim 2.  On this view, there is no 
principled reason to reject subjective judgments of wellbeing altogether. 
We could, for example, embrace Sen’s suggestion that personal values 
can be identified in a somewhat reliable fashion. While this would not 
result in a perfectly reliable judgment, smart social scientist would be 
able to come up with ways to overcome measurement problems. Many 
researchers have already embraced such a synthesis between the 
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capability approach and approach to wellbeing measured based on 
subjective judgments (Comim 2005; Cookson 2005; Schokkaert 2007; 
Anand et al. 2009; Binder 2014; Al-Janabi, Flynn, and Coast 2012) 
  Lastly, we could abandon the commitment to wellbeing pluralism 
Robeyns identified (claim 3). On this conclusion, the wellbeing value of 
functionings and capabilities is ultimately universal. Things that 
constitute wellbeing, such as mobility, health, friendships, etc. constitute 
wellbeing for everyone in the same degree. The relative importance of 
friendship, for example, is not personal, but shared among all.  
  While all of these solutions require a significant alteration of the 
position the capability approach represents, in my view, none of the 
solutions threaten the key insights the capability approach has provided 
in relation to the debate about social justice (see also Begon 2016). 
Nevertheless, it shows the challenges involved in measuring wellbeing. 
Wellbeing measurement clearly is very important. At the same time, from 
a theoretical point of view, interpersonal diversity as well as endorsement 
of the adaptation argument are highly attractive positions to hold, not 
only from a capability perspective. This makes the measurement of 
wellbeing practically infeasible. Perhaps, in line with Sen’s words in the 
epigraph of this chapter, a fully sound measurement of wellbeing may be 
an unachievable ideal. 
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Chapter 7: Are Measures of Wellbeing 
Philosophically Adequate?63 
 
1. Introduction 
While wellbeing has played an important motivational role in the 
foundation of many social sciences, wellbeing itself has generally not 
been seen as a measurable object,64 in particular in twentieth-century 
economics (cf. Colander 2007; see Alexandrova and Haybron 2012). 
However, in recent years, this has been changing. A variety of measures 
of wellbeing has gained acceptance as objects of study in economics and 
other social sciences. Research questions about wellbeing—such as 
whether our wellbeing has improved with the rise in income in the past 
40 years—are now widely being posed and studied by empirical 
researchers (e.g. Easterlin 1995; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008; A. E. Clark, 
Frijters, and Shields 2008; Easterlin et al. 2010). The fact that social 
scientists have now pointed their arrows toward this important concept 
is laudable provided that the reasons for believing that the measures are 
successful at measuring wellbeing are sound. Unfortunately, evaluating 
whether this is the case is difficult. There is a significant variety of 
different measures and constructs in the literature. Moreover, there is an 
even larger variety of views on how specific measures relate to the 
concept of wellbeing.65 At least some of these disagreements are based 
on a deep conceptual disagreement on the nature of wellbeing. The 
selection of a particular conceptualization of wellbeing for the 
development of wellbeing measures lands social scientific study in the 
morass of a difficult philosophical question: what is wellbeing? 
The conceptual foundation of wellbeing research faces an 
important challenge: Assuming that researchers would like to construct 
                                         
63 This chapter was originally published as Van der Deijl, Willem J.A. (2017) “Are 
Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 
(3): 209-234. Some modifications to the published article have been made. 
64While there is research on wellbeing in sociology and development studies in earlier 
stages (e.g. Easterlin 1974; see also the Scandinavian approach, e.g. Erikson and Uusitalo 
1986), this did not receive widespread attention it has gotten over the last decades 
(Fleurbaey 2009; Noll 2011). The idea that wellbeing could not be measured was more 
centrally present (Colander 2007; Alexandrova and Haybron 2012). 
65For example, there is much discussion about whether SWB is equivalent to wellbeing, 
an indicator of wellbeing, or a dimension thereof (see chapter 3, and footnote 68 below). 
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wellbeing measures on the basis of a thorough philosophical foundation, 
it is not clear which philosophical foundation they should use. The 
application of philosophical theories to formulate or evaluate wellbeing 
measures in science is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the 
purpose of philosophical theories is first and foremost not to make 
wellbeing measurable, but to capture the necessary and sufficient 
conditions—or the essence—of wellbeing. For example, the popular view 
among philosophers that wellbeing is the satisfaction of rational and 
informed desires may very well be a plausible philosophical theory of 
wellbeing, but cannot be directly employed in empirical practice, unless 
some procedure is specified by which rational and informed desires can 
be identified in practice.66 Second, there is much disagreement in 
philosophy about the correct theory of wellbeing, and the literature is 
filled with compelling arguments against all major theories. Even though 
wellbeing constructs in scientific practice and philosophical theories are 
different in their aims, the question whether wellbeing measures are 
successful at capturing wellbeing depends on our view on the nature of 
wellbeing. A certain wellbeing construct may be sound or misguided 
depending on which theory of the nature of wellbeing is correct. This 
latter problem—which I call the problem of conceptual uncertainty—has 
attracted a discussion in philosophy, in which a number of solutions have 
been proposed (Sondøe 1999; Alexandrova 2012b, 2015, Hausman 2011, 
2015; Wren-Lewis 2014; Hersch 2015; Taylor 2015). The proposed 
responses to the problem come in roughly two versions. Some have 
argued that selection of a conceptual framework is more straightforward 
in specific research contexts (Sondøe 1999; Alexandrova 2012b, 2015). 
For example, on these accounts, hedonism may be the appropriate theory 
for assessing wellbeing measures in the context of psychological 
research, while objective list theories should be applied in the context of 
wellbeing assessment in development economics. Alternatively, it has 
also been argued that the problem can be overcome by identifying 
common practical implications that conflicting conceptual frameworks 
share. Certain wellbeing measures—such as preferences and subjective 
                                         
66 Qizilbash (1998) makes a similar point. However, he argues that it is an assumption, 
or requirement, of the informed-desire view that people have rational capacities with 
full information, and presents this is an argument against this view. This, I think, is a 
mistaken interpretation. The informed-desire view is not committed to the view that 
people actually have such capacities, but that if they would, their desires would identify 
with wellbeing. The problem for empirical practice, of course, is that informed desires 
need to be identified, and when people do not actually have such capacities (or, when 
researchers are unable to recognize when they do), the approach is impractical. 
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wellbeing—can be considered to be an indicator, or close determinant, of 
wellbeing regardless of which theory is endorsed (Hausman 2011, 2015; 
Wren-Lewis 2014; Taylor 2015). They argue that such agreement is 
sufficient for making wellbeing judgments. 
In this chapter, I aim to develop an alternative way to deal with the 
problem of conceptual uncertainty in wellbeing science. I argue that there 
is more relevant agreement about the nature of wellbeing for evaluating 
wellbeing constructs than may appear from the philosophical debate at 
first glance. Below, I argue that certain principles, or intuitions, about the 
nature of wellbeing are both widely shared among contestants in the 
philosophical debate and make an important difference for the 
evaluation of empirical wellbeing constructs (Section 3). On this basis, I 
argue in particular for two principles (Section 4): subject-dependence, a 
principle stating that wellbeing is an inherent personal notion, and 
epistemic limitation, stating that there are epistemic limits to evaluating 
our own wellbeing. The principles are not sufficient to determine a 
specific wellbeing construct, but they illustrate the conceptual 
weaknesses of existing measures and help identify improvements 
(Section 5). In Section 6, I reflect upon other proposed solutions to the 
problem of the evaluation of wellbeing measures in light of philosophical 
disagreement. But, first, I will characterize the literature on wellbeing in 
philosophy and the social sciences and describe conceptual uncertainty 
in some more detail. 
 
2. Wellbeing Science and Conceptual Uncertainty 
As the present focus lies with the concept of wellbeing in different 
disciplines, it is important to distinguish the relationships between the 
terms that are used. A concept is a basic building block of thought. In 
case of wellbeing, there is a semantic agreement that wellbeing is what 
makes life good for the person living it, but there is no agreement about 
what this means on a more concrete level. Philosophical theories of 
wellbeing describe necessary and sufficient conditions for wellbeing on 
a substantive level. In the context of social scientific research, a construct, 
similarly, is a constituent of thought, but one that is developed with the 
particular purpose of operationalizing it, or, in other words, making it 
measurable. (Hence, constructs are concepts, but not all concepts are 
constructs.) A construct may be formulated to relate closely to a concept 
of interest. Finally, a measure is a numerical representation of such a 
construct. In this, measures come with a particular methodology. 
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Subjective wellbeing is a construct which is often identified with the 
concept of wellbeing itself, while it can be measured, among other things, 
by means of a self-reported Life Satisfaction Scale survey question 
ranging from zero to 10. 
  As discussed in chapter 1, philosophical theories of wellbeing are 
classically grouped into three categories (originating from Parfit 1984): 
(1) hedonism—the view that wellbeing consists in enjoyable experiences 
(Crisp 2006; Bradley 2009; Feldman 2010), (2) desire-satisfaction 
theories—which maintain that wellbeing consists in the fulfillment of 
(possibly qualified) desires (Murphy 1999; Lukas 2009), and (3) objective 
list theories of wellbeing, which state that wellbeing is found in a set of 
goods which are considered to be valuable independent of a person’s 
attitude toward them (Finnis 1980; Murphy 2001; Rice 2013; Fletcher 
2013). This taxonomy does not exhaust the space of existing theories. 
There are hybrid theories, such as preference-hedonism—the view that 
wellbeing is constituted by pleasure insofar as we have a positive attitude 
toward it (Heathwood 2006)—and views that fall outside of the 
taxonomy—such as value-theories,67 viewing wellbeing as constituted by 
the fulfillment of personal values (Tiberius 2008; Yelle 2014). 
If we consider the classical taxonomy, constructs of wellbeing are 
organized, at least at the surface, in a highly similar fashion. A first 
strand of empirical research is SWB research (chapter 3 and 4; Easterlin 
1995; Veenhoven 2000; Kahneman et al. 2004; Diener et al. 2009; see 
Dolan, Peasgood, and White 2008; and MacKerron 2012 for overviews). 
While there is much disagreement about the exact relationship between 
SWB and wellbeing at large, many researchers seem to assume that SWB 
is a good measure of wellbeing at large (Angner 2011; MacKerron 2012).68 
A second strand, which is particularly popular within (health) economics, 
studies people’s preferences after which it is independently assessed 
whether these preferences can be said to be satisfied (see chapter 5; 
Arnesen and Trommald 2005; Benjamin et al. 2014). A last strand of 
research, which seems to have lost some popularity recently, assesses 
wellbeing on the basis of objective standards (Erikson and Uusitalo 1986; 
                                         
67Arguably, value-achievement theories are closely related to desire-satisfaction 
theories, due to their shared subjectivity. 
68For example, Kahneman and co-authors have suggested on multiple occasion that the 
direct measurement of momentary pleasure captures wellbeing directly (Kahneman et 
al. 2004; Kahneman and Krueger 2006), while leading positive psychologist Ed Diener 
has argued that subjective wellbeing is one of a number of dimensions of wellbeing 
(Diener, Sapyta, and Suh 1998; Diener 2000). 
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Boelhouwer 2002).69 The differences between such measures make a 
significant difference in the assessment of wellbeing (Gasper 2005; 
Loewenstein and Ubel 2008). 
The similarity between the taxonomies, even if superficial, 
indicates a tight relationship between philosophical theories of wellbeing 
and empirical practice. While part of this may have resulted from social 
scientists having taken inspiration from philosophy (Alexandrova 2012b, 
2012a), it also shows the nature of wellbeing plays an important role in 
determining the efficacy of wellbeing measures. For example, an 
objective list theorist would not be likely to accept that a hedonic 
measure captures wellbeing well, while a hedonist might. 
The study of wellbeing has attracted much philosophical 
discussion. In particular, the increasingly popular study of SWB has been 
heavily criticized by philosophers (Annas 2004; O’neill 2006; Haybron 
2007b; Nussbaum 2008; Feldman 2010; Raibley 2012). While these 
philosophers from different perspectives agree in their critical attitude 
toward the study of SWB, they diverge in their proposed alternatives. A 
wellbeing researcher who would want to take such philosophical 
criticism to heart and adjust a wellbeing construct accordingly, would 
have to take a philosophical stance and would thus run into the problem 
of conceptual uncertainty. 
For example, Martha Nussbaum (2008) has criticized happiness 
constructs in wellbeing research in economics and psychology on 
grounds that some forms of displeasure, or dissatisfaction, can be 
valuable, while a life filled only with pleasure may not be the prudentially 
best life possible. At the same time, Fred Feldman (2010) criticizes the 
same constructs, on grounds that while pleasure is the only thing that 
contributes to wellbeing, the notion of happiness or pleasure employed 
by SWB researchers does not capture the right notion of pleasure. Such 
opposing criticisms, and in particular, its proposed directions of change, 
are problematic because they depend on the plausibility of the theories 
of wellbeing from which they stem. Nussbaum’s criticism is convincing 
to someone who accepts her eudemonic position on wellbeing, but it is 
not convincing to a hedonist. Similarly, Feldman’s criticism depends on 
his specific view on pleasure and wellbeing. 
                                         
69There are also hybrid measures here, such as psychological measures that are based 
on people’s evaluations of a number of dimensions inspired by Aristotle’s eudaimonia 
(see, for example, Deci and Ryan 2008). 
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Not all wellbeing researchers may be moved by such criticisms, but 
even if they are, they would have to find their way in selecting a wellbeing 
theory—all of which are compelling, and all of which have to face up 
against strong arguments against them (Hausman and McPherson 2006). 
Even if wellbeing researchers want to take philosophical 
recommendations seriously, it is not clear to whom they should listen. 
From the standpoint of scientific practice, Anna Alexandrova (2012b) is 
clearly correct in arguing that philosophical disagreement is a significant 
problem for determining the conceptual adequacy of wellbeing 
constructs in science. Or, as she puts it herself, 
. . . perhaps it is too much to expect that scientists take a stand on 
the nature of wellbeing. How could a resolution of an ancient 
philosophical debate be a precondition for a scientific project? (2015, 
225) 
In this chapter, I take Alexandrova’s question to heart. Given the 
philosophical disagreement regarding wellbeing, we cannot expect 
empirical research to take a stance in this debate. It would be deeply 
undesirable if a wellbeing constructs in scientific practice would rely on 
the plausibility of a highly contentious view in a philosophical debate. In 
the following section, I develop some arguments for why Alexandrova’s 
worry need not lead us to reject the value of philosophical theorizing for 
the development of wellbeing constructs. The philosophical debate need 
not be resolved in order to employ philosophical expertise to the 
selection and development of wellbeing constructs. There are some 
important insights from the philosophical debate about the nature of 
wellbeing that help to demarcate the concept of wellbeing for empirical 
purposes. The following section describes a methodology to arrive at 
such insights. 
 
3. Intuitions, Principles, and Theory-Building 
Valerie Tiberius characterizes the philosophical method of theorizing 
about wellbeing as a reflective equilibrium (Tiberius 2013). Because this 
will be central to the argument, it is useful to quote her at length: 
(1) we start with a theory that purports to make sense of all 
the relevant considerations (the various intuitions, 
principles and background theories, i.e., the data); (2) 
considerations that conflict with this theory are presented 
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as objections to the theory; and (3) we modify the theory to 
meet the objections, explain why the objections needn’t be 
heeded in the first place, or reject the theory entirely and 
start over. This process is repeated until we have answered 
all the objections and any further modification to the theory 
would result in conflict with other, more weighty 
considerations. (2013, p. 320)  
Valerie Tiberius uses the metaphor of data to explain the role of 
intuitions and principles in philosophical theorizing about wellbeing. 
Philosophical theories of wellbeing need to fit the intuitions and 
principles just like scientific theories need to explain the data. Different 
theories of wellbeing may partly be based on the same intuitions, just 
like different scientific theories are generally partly based on the same 
data. This is a significant observation in light of Alexandrova’s challenge. 
There is no agreed upon theory in the philosophical discourse, but it may 
be there is a body of principles or intuitions that philosophers do agree 
on. Even if there is no single theory of wellbeing that can be used to 
evaluate the conceptual adequacy of wellbeing constructs, we can still 
assess whether wellbeing constructs are compatible with a shared body 
of philosophical intuitions. In order to meet Alexandrova’s challenge, we 
can assess whether there is a body of intuitions that is shared by 
philosophers, and can be used to formulate meaningful criteria for the 
evaluation of the conceptual adequacy of wellbeing constructs in 
science.70 
Tiberius does not specify clearly what the nature of intuitions is, 
nor is this easily done. Intuitions are basic beliefs, or dispositions to 
belief. In the context of wellbeing, intuitions are basic judgments about 
what kind of things matter to a person’s wellbeing. These can be, but are 
not restricted to, the kinds of insights that are pumped by philosophical 
(counter-) examples. For example, Nozick’s well-known experience-
machine example—in which he purports that most people would not like 
to plug into a machine that generates great, but unreal experiences—
illustrates the intuition that imaginative pleasurable experience is not 
enough for wellbeing (see Weijers and Schouten 2013). However, they 
                                         
70Placing shared philosophical intuitions at the core of my methodology to identify 
conceptual constraints in social scientific practice raises the question where these 
intuitions come from? and who belongs to the relevant group of people to intuit them? 
While solving these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter, I assume for reasons of 
feasibility that the debate in academic philosophy is a sufficiently good source to find 
such intuitions. 
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may also involve more general beliefs about wellbeing that are often 
already taken as given—platitudes—such as the idea that being sick 
generally affects wellbeing negatively. Intuitions can be generalized to 
form principles. For example, from the intuition pumped by the 
experience-machine example, we can form a generalized principle that 
wellbeing requires that our experiences correspond with reality—that 
they are authentic.71 
Philosophical theories of wellbeing will contrast each other in the 
essence, but they may overlap in terms of the intuitions that they are able 
to capture. Surely, there are many intuitions that are not shared within 
the philosophical debate about the nature of wellbeing. One such case is 
whether the experience-machine counter-examples sufficiently ground 
the intuition that a life of inauthentic pleasure is not a good life to live. 
Such examples, and corresponding disagreements, exist for other 
(families of) philosophical theories as well.72 However, there are shared 
intuitions too. Consider the example of the intuition that achievements 
greatly matter to wellbeing. This intuition can be captured by all major 
theories of wellbeing in some way. For a hedonist, its value is accounted 
for by the pleasure it provides (Crisp 2006), for a desire-satisfactionist, 
achievement is the successful reach of an important desire, while 
objective list theories list achievement as valuable in itself (e.g. Fletcher 
2013). The same applies to many intuitions, such as the intuition that 
being sick affects wellbeing negatively, or that quality friendships 
contribute to wellbeing. This feature of intuitions about wellbeing—that 
they may be shared between people holding different views about the 
nature of wellbeing—is methodologically useful and will be central to the 
approach developed here. 
                                         
71This distinction between intuitions and principles is underspecified. For the present 
purpose, the exact demarcation makes little difference. What is important for the 
present purpose is that different theories of wellbeing may be partly build on the same 
building blocks—more basic beliefs about wellbeing. 
72A well-known counter-example against desire-satisfactionist theories of wellbeing is 
the stranger on the train example from Parfit (1984): you meet a stranger on the train 
who tells you about some of her pursuits. You like the strangers and would like her 
endeavors to go well. In fact, her endeavors do go well, but you never learn this. Does 
this indeed improve your life? It would be counter-intuitive to say so. Similarly, objective 
list theories often contain achievement as one of the goods that is valuable in itself. 
Roger Crisp (2006) provides the example of the anhedonic achiever: someone who 
achieves many important goals, such as becoming a well-known piano player, but finds 
no pleasure in them. According to Crisp, it would be highly counter-intuitive to say that 
the anhedonic achiever is leading a good life. 
Chapter 7 
 
121 
 
The shared intuitions and principles between different theoretical 
perspectives provide the opportunity to assess whether wellbeing 
constructs cohere with a widely shared conceptual understanding of 
wellbeing in philosophy. To be precise, what I propose is that such 
overlap in intuitions and basic principles regarding the nature of 
wellbeing may play the role of a conceptual requirement to meet for 
wellbeing constructs in empirical practice. This does not only require an 
identification of agreement but also an answer to a normative question: 
why should philosophical agreement be authoritative for empirical 
practice? An appeal to the division of labor of disciplines—philosophy 
being concerned with conceptual questions—may not suffice. A more 
promising rationale is that conceptual uncertainty should be dealt with 
by means of a reflective equilibrium, as described by Tiberius. Wellbeing 
philosophy may not be a perfect representation of a discourse aimed at 
such equilibrium, but it is the closest thing to it. Nevertheless, the 
rationale required for the present methodology is slightly weaker. It 
starts from the idea that it surely is undesirable if a particular empirical 
construct is open to criticism on the basis of a particular philosophical 
view that has some plausibility. For example, Martha Nussbaum’s 
criticism of the SWB approach, based on Aristotelian views on the good 
life, is, at least to some extent, problematic for the SWB approach to 
measuring wellbeing. Because Martha Nussbaum’s theoretical stance has 
some plausibility, its grounds for rejecting the SWB approach put the SWB 
approach in unfavorable light. However, if the SWB approach is open to 
criticism on grounds of a principle shared by all (or a large set of) 
philosophical theories of wellbeing, it seems detrimental for the 
approach, and some adjustments are required. 
The formulation of the methodology illustrates that it is possible 
to employ philosophical expertise in the formulation of empirical 
constructs, even in light of disagreement. Shared intuitions and 
principles are unlikely to yield a specific empirical construct, and I will 
certainly not defend a specific empirical construct on their basis 
presently. However, I will argue that some shared intuitions or principles 
can be defended and can be used as non-trivial requirements, which will 
help to illustrate weaknesses in current wellbeing constructs, and to 
suggest improvements. 
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4. Two Principles 
Specifying shared intuitions, and in particular those that have an 
important bearing on debates in scientific practice, is challenging. There 
may be a large variety of shared intuitions that could be used to 
formulate criteria of conceptual adequacy, such as the intuition that 
being sick somehow should reduce a person’s wellbeing. Such obvious 
intuitions—or platitudes—may be used to make rough inferences about 
which wellbeing constructs are clearly false, such as a wellbeing measure 
based on the length of people’s hair.73 However, platitudes will most likely 
not yield criteria that are substantive enough to shed any light on the 
conceptual adequacy of wellbeing constructs (Hersch 2015; cf. Hausman 
2011, 2015). In the following, I will focus on intuitions that have played 
an important role in motivating philosophical theories of wellbeing. Such 
intuitions also play a central role in motivating many constructs of 
wellbeing in scientific practice, and thereby have more potential to apply 
to disputes about wellbeing in scientific practice. 
The first starting point is a very broad intuition central to both 
hedonism and desire-satisfactionism. Hedonism and desire-
satisfactionism contrast each other. It may take some creativity to think 
about cases in which a person is happy without having what she wants, 
and vice-versa, but not too much. As discussed in chapter 1 and 5, desire-
satisfactionism is not a mental-state theory, as a person can have 
satisfied desires without knowing about it, while hedonism is not a 
subjective theory, as it implies that pleasure matters even to those who 
do not want to experience pleasure. However, they do both share an 
important feature, which Hall and Tiberius (2015) describe as subject 
dependence (p.177).74 Subject-dependence is the idea that what makes a 
person’s life go well depends on that individual person’s make-up: the 
way she is like. It denies that what is good for someone can be completely 
read off her membership of a type or species. Individual characteristics 
play a role in determining what makes for a good life. Subject-
dependence, formulated like this, does not imply desire-satisfactionism, 
because whatever makes a person happy is also determined by her 
                                         
73Amartya Sen uses this example in an interview conducted with Ingrid Robeyns in May 
2010 conducted for the Dutch National Science Foundation. 
74The intuition describes something different from what Sumner calls subject-relativity, 
which just states that wellbeing theories must describe an individual’s good, rather than 
something else. The latter does not imply that such individuals cannot be described 
independent of an individual’s make-up. Daniel Haybron calls this intuition internalism. 
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individual make-up. For the present purpose, we can formulate subject-
dependence as follows: 
Intuition 1 (I1): Subject-dependence: The things that are good in life for 
the person living it depend on the person’s individual characteristics, 
such as her values, attitudes, desires, and things she enjoys.  
Objective theories of wellbeing can be traced back to Aristotle’s 
eudaimonistic view on wellbeing, but in the contemporary literature, they 
are often formulated in response to problems with hedonistic and desire-
based theories. Objective theories are often motivated from the idea that 
what apparently makes people happy, as well as what they desire, may 
not be what is good for them. Or, as Mozaffar Qizilbash (2006b, 84) 
phrases it in the context of desires, “People’s actual desires are too often 
unrelated to what is good for them or in their interests.” (original 
emphasis). Amartya Sen,75 for example, has provided counter-examples to 
hedonist and desire-based theories to put this point across. One well-
known example is the case of adaptation to deprivation: 
Such a person, even though thoroughly deprived and 
confined to a very reduced life, may not appear to be quite 
so badly off in terms of the mental metric of desire and its 
fulfilment, and in terms of the pleasure-pain calculus. (Sen 
1992, 7) 
A central feature of this central intuition for objective list theories is the 
idea that a theory of wellbeing should not take people’s beliefs about 
what is good for them, or how well they are doing, at face value. People’s 
desires, as well as their beliefs about what makes them happy, are 
idiosyncratic, and do not have a necessary relationship to wellbeing. They 
may be bad sources of information about wellbeing. We can call this 
intuition epistemic limitation and formulate it as follows: 
Intuition 2 (I2): Epistemic limitation: People’s beliefs about personal 
values, desires, and senses of happiness may be misguided sources of 
information about wellbeing.  
                                         
75This is not to say that Amartya Sen subscribes to an objective list theory of wellbeing. 
There is in fact much debate about the kind of theories that are compatible with his 
capability approach, and it is possible he endorses an informed-desire view (see 
Qizilbash 2013). 
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Both these intuitions share an important feature, which is 
important for the present purpose: as philosophical criteria, they are very 
weak. They are broadly formulated. Subject-dependence is a weaker 
version of the subjective intuition—the idea that something can only 
contribute toward a person’s wellbeing if that person has a pro-attitude 
toward it (Fletcher 2013)—that plays an important role in motivating 
subjective theories in specific (see Hall and Tiberius 2015). Hedonism is 
unable to accommodate the subjective intuition, because hedonism 
implies that pleasure is good for a person even if that person does not 
want to feel pleasure. However, subject-dependence is central to both 
theories. Epistemic limitation is occasionally formulated in a stronger 
fashion as well. Sen, for example, sometimes formulates his intuition 
about happiness, and desire-satisfaction views, much more fundamental 
than just being about a person’s perception of her happiness. For 
instance, in On Ethics and Economics, Sen writes: 
This particular problem of influence of contingent 
circumstances on the metric of utility is only a reflection of 
a more basic problem, to wit, the insufficient depth of the 
criterion of happiness or desire-fulfillment in judging a 
person’s wellbeing (1987, 46). 
Such a formulation would, per definition, rule out desire-satisfaction 
views and hedonism as plausible wellbeing theories. However, in this 
weaker formulation, this is not obvious. 
The weak formulation of these criteria may be seen as making them 
philosophically hollow. These two formulations clearly are not conclusive 
as criteria to select a correct philosophical theory of wellbeing. However, 
as I argue below, while they may be considered philosophically hollow, 
they have an important application in scientific practice. As weak as they 
may be formulated, the intuitions may still not be widely shared. It seems 
that I1 is not a clear consideration for objective theories of wellbeing, 
while I2 is not a central concern for hedonists or desire-satisfactionists. 
While prima facie this may appear to be so, hedonists and desire-
satisfactionists are, as a matter of fact, centrally concerned about I2, as 
are objective list theorists about I1. 
While epistemic limitation may, prima facie, appear hostile toward 
hedonism and subjectivist theories, there is actually a fairly wide 
endorsement of the intuition among many proponents of those views. As 
I argued in chapter 4, in the most well-known hedonist text in which this 
observation gets attention, John Stuart Mill’s (1871) Utilitarianism, Mill 
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defends the view that a lack of high-quality experiences may make people 
bad judges of their own happiness. I argued that even many simple 
versions of hedonism, such as Torbjörn Tännsjö’s, acknowledge our own 
limitation in assessing how happy we are. 
It is not obvious that this is accepted by all hedonists. For example, 
Fred Feldman (2010) is not altogether pessimistic about the ability to 
measure happiness by means of self-assessment. However, he neither 
believes that we can measure it directly, nor that asking people how 
happy or satisfied they are would yield sensible answers about 
happiness. I have not been able to find a defense of hedonism that does 
not endorse some epistemic limitation to our ability to know how happy 
we are (see chapter 3 and 4 for a substantive argument against the view 
that we can know precisely how happy we are; see also Haybron 2007a). 
Similarly, desire-satisfactionists are well-aware of the misleading 
nature of people’s desires as sources of information about wellbeing. 
Peter Railton, in a well-known defense of a desire-satisfactionist account, 
writes, “There are important classes of cases in which we question 
whether our good coincides with what we most desire.” (1986, 12). 
Almost all formulations of the desire-based account limit the range of 
desires that make a difference to wellbeing (see also Qizilbash 2006b). 
Non-idealized accounts of desire-satisfactionism are rare (e.g. 
Heathwood 2015). There are (partial) defenses of a simple desire 
accounts, such as Heathwood (2006) and Murphy (1999) who argue the 
most plausible form of desire-satisfactionism is a non-idealized version. 
However, both acknowledge that their defense goes straight against the 
status quo. Murphy writes: 
. . . differences [among desire-satisfaction theorists] should 
not distract us from the remarkable consensus reached 
among [desire Fulfillment] theorists both that the theory 
should appeal not to actual desires but to desires had in a 
hypothetical desire situation and that the idealization of the 
information available to the agent will be a feature of that 
hypothetical desire situation. (1999, 248)  
So, we can safely conclude that both hedonism and desire-satisfactionist 
theories of wellbeing take epistemic limitation seriously and are generally 
able to accommodate it. While there are some theorists who believe that 
simple desire-satisfactionist theories are more plausible than idealized 
ones, they are a clear exception. 
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In Parfit’s taxonomy, objective list theories are defined as those 
theories that formulate a list of global goods in life that are valuable for 
a person, independent of that person’s attitude toward them.76 So, for 
example, if an objective list includes friendship, friendship matters to 
everyone regardless of whether someone wants to have friends. At first 
sight, it seems the contrast with I1 could not be bigger. However, the 
contrast may be illusionary. For one, hedonism shares the same feature. 
A hedonist also believes that happiness matters to someone independent 
of whether that person cares about happiness. Whether or not an 
objective list is able to incorporate I1 depends on the specific goods on 
the list (Fletcher 2015). An objective list that includes happiness, 
pleasure, and the achievement of personal goals makes wellbeing 
dependent on the individual characteristics of a person. What is objective 
in objective list theories is the prudential value ascribed to the goods on 
the list, but the nature of these goods themselves may still be subject-
dependent, such as in case of pleasure. Whether they generally are is an 
open question. Guy Fletcher’s (2013) formulation of an objective list 
theory expresses an explicit concern for attitude-dependence as a 
criterion for goods on an objective list. John Finnis’s (1980) defense does 
not express such explicit concern. Nevertheless, most authors do. 
Qizilbash, for example, puts himself to this task: “I need to show that 
[my] view of wellbeing is compatible with considerable variety in the 
forms of life that are good. It is crucial that the prudential values make 
(distinctively) human lives better” (Qizilbash 1998, 67; see also Brink 
1989, 233 for a similar position) 
For our purpose, we can identify two ways in which objective list 
theories have been concerned with subject-dependence. First, objective 
list theories are often concerned about human diversity: the view that 
there is a variety of lives that can be prudentially good for different 
people. Some objective lists leave the account explicitly open, or vague, 
with the purpose of leaving space for individual differences (Brink 1989; 
Qizilbash 1998; Nussbaum 2000). For example, in relationship to human 
diversity, Nussbaum argues, 
                                         
76Parfit (1984, 4) writes, “On the objective list theories, certain things are good or bad for 
us, even if we would not want to have the good things or avoid the bad things.” (original 
emphasis) I will base myself on the following defenses and formulations of objective 
list theories, which, to my knowledge, is an exhaustive list of recent formulations of 
objective list theories: Finnis (1980), Brink (1989), Griffin (1986), Qizilbash (1998), 
Murphy (2001), Fletcher (2013), Rice (2013), and Nussbaum (2001). Nussbaum’s list, 
however, is arguably not an objective wellbeing theory, but a public conception of the 
human good for the purpose of democratic theorizing. 
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I can begin by insisting that this normative conception of 
human capability and functioning is general, and in a sense 
vague, for precisely this reason. The list claims to have 
identified in a very general way components that are 
fundamental to any human life. But it allows in its very 
design for the possibility of multiple specifications of each 
of the components. (1995, 93) 
Second, objective lists generally include clear subject-dependent 
goods, such as personal goals (Brink 1989); accomplishment or 
achievement77 (Fletcher 2013; Qizilbash 1998); happiness, pleasure or 
enjoyment (Fletcher 2013; Qizilbash 1998; Nussbaum 2000), practical 
reason or autonomy (Finnis 1980; for Nussbaum 2000; Qizilbash 1998; 
and in Brink 1989 this plays the role of making accounts sensitive to 
personal differences). 
The remaining category of objective list theories makes the list 
completely subject-independent. Such list would include goods that in no 
way depend on a person’s individual make-up. For example, some goods, 
such as bodily and mental health, may be considered to be good for a 
person in the same form for everyone. If human achievement, or 
knowledge, could be specified without relying on personal aims, goals, 
and values, the same would apply to those values. A subject-independent 
objective list would include only such goods. Examplars are difficult to 
find. While not an objective list theory of wellbeing, Thomas Hurka (1993) 
argues that perfectionism’s view on the human good (which strictly 
speaking concerns prudential as well as moral values78) is dependent only 
on the human essence, excluding personal essence. Aristotle is 
sometimes interpreted to present a subject-independent view on human 
wellbeing, but modern Aristotelian accounts generally do not accept such 
a stance (Haybron 2016). Richard Kraut (1979) has defended a subject-
dependent view of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, in which personal satisfaction 
and psychological happiness play a crucial role. Overall, defenders of 
objective list have made sufficient space for subject-dependence in their 
views. Objective list theories share the view that there is a plurality of 
                                         
77Personal achievement or accomplishment can be understood in both a personal and 
universal way. It may be that what counts as accomplishment is universal for all 
humans. However, it seems more plausible to think about achievements as being 
person-relative. 
78Hurka is somewhat unclear at this point. While his view on the human good does seem 
to be similar to objective list theories, he explicitly argues that he does not believe that 
perfectionism provides an account of wellbeing, that is, a theory of what is “good for” 
people, but only an account of what is good, generally speaking. 
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goods that matter to human beings, but at the same time, individual 
identity seems to play an important role in determining what kind of life 
is specifically good for a particular individual. 
If the argument presented here is correct, there is more agreement 
at the level of important intuitions than appears from the disagreement 
on the level of wellbeing theories. While the two principles defended are 
very broadly formulated, they indicate that there is an important 
agreement about what wellbeing is that limits the set of permissible 
wellbeing constructs. We have reached an ecumenical, but attractive 
conclusion: while philosophers are indeed in deep disagreement about 
the correct theory of wellbeing, there is an important and interesting 
agreement about some significant intuitions about wellbeing. 
 
5. Living Up to Standards 
The position defended so far points to two important implications of the 
development of wellbeing constructs in science. First, on the basis of I1, 
wellbeing constructs should be required to make space for individual 
differences in what kind of lives are good for different people. It may be 
that ultimately wellbeing is identical to happiness, but if so, it should be 
acknowledged that the kind of things that make a person happy may be 
different for different people. Similarly, it may be that there is a variety 
of goods that make up wellbeing, but if so, it should be acknowledged 
that different kinds of lives can be good for different people. Second, on 
the basis of I2, wellbeing constructs should be required to acknowledge 
people’s epistemic limitations in evaluating their own wellbeing. Even if 
wellbeing is solely a subject-dependent value such as happiness or 
satisfaction, people may misjudge their happiness, and wrongly identify 
the desires relevant for their wellbeing. While these two requirements are 
based on philosophically weak assumptions, their tension is obvious. It 
is difficult to make an empirical construct sensitive to individual 
differences without relying on individual judgments of wellbeing (see 
chapter 6). Nevertheless, the two requirements do leave some space. I will 
first apply these requirements to the main wellbeing constructs in 
empirical practice, and point toward directions of improvement. 
First, consider happiness research. The most widely used 
constructs in this field of research—general happiness questions, general 
life satisfaction questions, and momentary happiness measures—are 
specifically based on the assumption that people are good sources of 
information about their levels of wellbeing. The constructs are often 
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motivated by the idea that wellbeing is something personal, about which 
the individual surely knows more than a third-party observer. Martin 
Binder (2014), for example, cites such non-paternalistic sentiment as a 
main attraction of the approach. This focus on the personal seems 
motivated by, and is clearly compatible with, I1: wellbeing is ultimately 
something that depends on our individual make-up. However, in 
emphasizing the personal and non-paternalistic, it goes by on concerns 
regarding I2: people’s fallibility in evaluating their own wellbeing. This 
point has actually been at the center of some of the well-known 
philosophical criticisms of the SWB approach to wellbeing measurement 
from the capability perspective, in the form of the adaptation argument 
(chapter 3). However, it has not often been recognized that the criticism 
need not be based on a non-hedonistic, or non-desire-based view, on 
wellbeing. For example, Wayne Sumner’s (1996) theory of wellbeing as 
authentic life satisfaction is often used to motivate the subjective nature 
of SWB measurement (e.g. Dolan, Peasgood, and White 2008; Schimmack, 
Schupp, and Wagner 2008). However, Sumner himself endorses an 
epistemic limitation in his view that is often left out of SWB research.  
According to Sumner, life satisfaction itself may not be a good guide to 
wellbeing in case this satisfaction is inauthentic, that is, based on false 
beliefs about reality.79 Such a qualification of subjective judgments is 
often not acknowledged in the empirical literature (Binder 2014 is an 
example of an exception). Another conceptual framework cited by some 
working on (momentary) happiness measurement is Jeremy Bentham’s 
narrow hedonism (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997; Blanchflower and 
Oswald 2004; Veenhoven 2010). However, as mentioned above, even 
contemporary defenders of such a view in philosophy do not believe that 
people themselves tend to be infallible sources of their own experienced 
momentary happiness levels (see chapter 4). In short, there is a 
discrepancy between conceptualizations of wellbeing in happiness 
research and the philosophical discourse, even if we consider happiness 
research’s closest philosophical allies: hedonists and subjectivists. 
Does the same apply to preference-satisfaction–based measures of 
wellbeing that have recently found some renewed interest? In the article 
by Daniel Benjamin et al. (2014), elaborately discussed in chapter 5, a 
                                         
79Sumner’s example is of a woman who is satisfied with her life in part because she has 
a successful and happy marriage. However, she is unaware her husband has love affairs. 
While the woman is satisfied, her satisfaction is inauthentic, because it is based on false 
beliefs. For this reason, we are not correct in asserting that her life goes well for her. 
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general procedure is proposed to measure wellbeing on the basis of such 
a utility framework. Like in case of SWB measures, the proposed 
preference-based measure is clearly able to accommodate I1. In fact, the 
authors explicitly describe non-paternalism as being important to them: 
we believe it is more attractive to rely on what people’s own 
stated preferences suggest about what they themselves care 
about than to paternalistically rely on the opinions and 
introspections of “experts” (such as researchers and 
policymakers) regarding which aspects to track and how to 
weight them. (2014, 2703). 
What is interesting about this example is that its defenders 
acknowledge some of the conceptual problems in measuring preferences. 
They have to assume that what people choose is what they call “‘(true)’ 
preference” (Benjamin et al. 2014, 2703). As a matter of fact, they argue 
that with respect to the instrument that they develop, the “assumption is 
surely wrong.” The reasons they provide are, however, not exactly the 
same as the reasons that have moved desire-satisfaction theorists to 
qualified versions of their views in philosophy: “there are known ways in 
which stated preference is biased relative to incentivized choice, for 
example when one choice option is viewed as more socially desirable” 
(Benjamin et al. 2014, 2703). The problems that philosophers see go 
further than such biases. As discussed above, most desire-satisfaction 
theorists worry that in a variety of (very real) cases, people may take on 
desires whose satisfaction does not contribute to their wellbeing. 
Benjamin et al. acknowledge that their empirical strategy cannot be used 
to identify a difference between “right” or “correct,” preferences, and 
biased, or “false,” ones. They argue that they believe their stated 
preference approach gets close enough. However, if we do take I2 
seriously, we see the empirical construct has an important conceptual 
flaw, whether it is (partly) acknowledged or not. 
Finally, we can consider the objective approach to wellbeing 
measurement. Unfortunately, this approach is much less unified. One 
view within the objective wellbeing measurement literature is that 
wellbeing judgments can only be made very limitedly, namely, only in 
case of domination: when for one person one of the wellbeing dimensions 
is higher than those of another person, while the rest is at least as high, 
the first person is better off. However, all-encompassing judgments 
cannot be made, because some dimensions may be more important to 
some than others (see chapter 6; Erikson and Uusitalo 1986). As argued 
Chapter 7 
 
131 
 
in chapter 6, these types of judgments are very limited, but compatible 
with the personal nature of wellbeing (I1), as well as with the idea that 
subjective information may not be a reliable source of wellbeing (I2). 
However, in empirical applications, such overall judgments are often 
desirable (Boelhouwer 2002; Anand et al. 2009). In such cases, 
dimensions of wellbeing (or wellbeing capabilities) have to be aggregated 
somehow.  
As discussed in chapter 6, the capability approach generally 
acknowledges that life aspects—functionings—matter differently to 
different people, meeting I1. However, in the empirical context, taking 
account of such heterogeneity without relying on subjective judgments 
is difficult. In empirical applications, every dimension of wellbeing is 
generally counted similarly for every individual (Boelhouwer 2002; 
Anand et al. 2009). In other words, the difference in importance of the 
different dimensions to different people is not accounted for. Objective 
wellbeing measures are sometimes explicitly motivated by the idea that 
subjective valuations may be misguided sources of information about 
wellbeing, and thus successfully accommodate I2. However, objective 
measurements of wellbeing that do not take into account that the value 
of objective factors, like education, housing, and culture, are somehow 
different for individuals fail to accommodate I1. 
We can safely conclude that while the discussed intuitions are not 
controversial within the philosophical debate, and as such not 
particularly useful in theory-choice, the same does not apply to the 
context of construct-selection in wellbeing science. While they appear to 
be very weakly formulated, as a matter of fact, the three main strands of 
wellbeing research are unable to accommodate both completely. In 
Martin Binder’s (2014) recent proposal to develop a wellbeing construct 
based on SWB using the capability framework, large deviations from an 
estimated “capability-to-be-happy”—based on objective indicators—from 
actual SWB scores are taken as evidence that a person has had adapted 
preferences, in which case the subjective report is disregarded. While 
Binder focuses on a limited set of possible ways in which information 
about people’s perceptions about their life satisfaction of happiness may 
be misguiding sources of information about their wellbeing, his approach 
accommodates I2 and I1, and is innovative in doing so. Examples such as 
these—while rare—show that even though it is by no means easy to 
formulate concrete proposals of constructs that can accommodate both 
intuitions, it is possible to do so. 
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6. Relationship to Other Solutions 
While the present suggestion of dealing with the problem of conceptual 
uncertainty about wellbeing does not conflict with alternative proposals, 
there are some advantages to endorsing the proposal compared with the 
proposals that have been put forward so far. 
First, it has been suggested by a number of different authors that 
some platitudes are correct on all theories of wellbeing, but that such 
platitudes are nevertheless helpful in resolving some problems with 
respect to conceptual uncertainty. For example, Daniel Hausman argues, 
Platitudes concerning what makes people better or worse off 
like the claims that enjoyment contributes to wellbeing and 
illness diminishes it depend on no philosophical theory that 
specifies what things are intrinsically good for people and 
why. (Hausman 2011, 7; see also Hersch 2015). 
Tim Taylor has recently defended a list of what he calls markers of 
wellbeing, which are either constitutive, a causal promoter, or an 
indicator of wellbeing. Taylor argues that such markers may be sufficient 
to develop wellbeing measures for the purpose of policy making: “. . . 
although only certain theories regard health as constitutive of wellbeing 
in its own right, a much wider range of theories—perhaps all mainstream 
theories (see below)—could acknowledge it as a marker of wellbeing” 
(Taylor 2015, 76). While there is some similarity between the present 
proposal and theirs, there is an important difference too. The approach 
defended here focuses only on agreement among philosophers regarding 
the concept of wellbeing itself, rather than its indicators or causal 
determinants. Because platitudes, or markers, are based not only on the 
conceptual nature of wellbeing, but also on its causes and its indicators, 
the view is overly liberal with respect to what counts as a wellbeing 
measure (see Hersch 2015 for a more elaborate argument). There is a 
broad category of things that can be identified as indicative or causally 
related to wellbeing, but one of the aims of wellbeing researchers is 
exactly to make wellbeing measurement more “direct” (e.g. Kahneman 
and Krueger 2006; see Alexandrova 2005, 2008; Angner 2011). Being 
successful in education and enjoying oneself may both be indicative of 
wellbeing, but this is not a particularly helpful insight for a researcher 
who is interested in the question, which party-study balance is most 
conducive to a college-student’s wellbeing? While the approach defended 
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here does not answer this question directly, it does provide some 
guidance to researchers who would like to develop wellbeing measures 
that are able to answer such questions. 
Anna Alexandrova (2012a, 2012b, 2015) as well as others (such as 
Sondøe 1999) has argued that the context in which wellbeing is 
understood in philosophy indicates a different interest in wellbeing than 
empirical researchers with a more narrow focus. Wellbeing theories can 
only be considered relevant or irrelevant in particular contexts. A health 
researcher interested in the effect of a particular treatment may not be 
interested in the fulfillment of life-long dreams of the patient that is 
being assessed, while this may very well be relevant for wellbeing 
understood by philosophers. Such a contextual perspective has the 
advantage that it does not require a particular theory of wellbeing to be 
universally correct, or the philosophical debate to be resolved, in order 
for the conceptual frameworks to be put into practice. However, this 
comes at a significant price. For one, it makes particular contextual 
notions of wellbeing incomparable across different contexts. If wellbeing 
in the development context is something significantly different from 
wellbeing in developed countries, comparing wellbeing in poor and 
wealthy countries may be conceptually impossible, while wellbeing 
researchers have explicitly posed questions about the comparison of 
wellbeing between rich and poorer nations (Easterlin 1995; A. E. Clark, 
Frijters, and Shields 2008). On my view, such comparisons need not be 
excluded, even though the specific criteria I have proposed illustrate 
some of the challenges that such comparisons may involve. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Wellbeing is a complex and controversial topic. It is unlikely that 
philosophical debates about its nature will come to a consensus, or 
conclusion, any time soon. However, if the argument presented is correct, 
this lack of consensus need not mean that evaluating a measure of 
wellbeing is a subjective matter. Clear constraints on the measurement 
of wellbeing can be derived from broadly shared philosophical views. 
These constraints put social scientists to a challenge. A good measure of 
wellbeing is subject-dependent, without taking people’s views on their 
own wellbeing at face value. The tension that these constraints leave may 
prove to be perplexing in certain contexts. Indeed, they may very well 
explain why certain philosophers have been skeptical about our ability to 
measure wellbeing entirely (e.g. Hausman 2015). 
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At the same time, the constraints leave ample space for creative 
constructs that some social scientists are already developing. While 
wellbeing science does not yet meet the minimal standards of conceptual 
adequacy presently defended, the field is undergoing a fast development, 
and closer synthesis between philosophical and empirical expertise may 
be forthcoming. If successful, the dream to measure wellbeing may very 
well be becoming closer and closer. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Is measuring wellbeing impossible? 
In the argumentative part of this thesis (chapters 2-7), I have first 
scrutinized the main measuremental accounts of wellbeing in economics, 
happiness economics (chapter 3 and 4) and preference-satisfactionism 
(chapter 5). I argued that we are necessarily limited in knowing the degree 
of someone’s happiness and preference-satisfaction. I then argued in 
chapter 6 that the capability approach does not offer a feasible 
alternative to these approaches. These chapters can be interpreted as 
reasons to be pessimistic about measuring wellbeing in economics. 
However, in chapter 7 I argued that a notorious problem for the 
measurement of wellbeing—philosophical disagreement about the 
concept—need not result in a lack of standards to evaluate 
measuremental accounts of wellbeing. So, where does this leave us? In 
chapter 1, we started by asking if we can find empirical answers to 
questions about wellbeing: does becoming a parent contribute to one’s 
wellbeing or not? Is economic growth good for the population of a 
country of not? How bad will a change of climate be for us? Do we have 
reason to be optimistic or pessimistic about our ability to answer such 
questions empirically? There is a pessimistic outlook and an optimistic 
one that I would like to review as a way of concluding. 
 Firstly, both in chapter 6, on the capability approach to wellbeing, 
and chapter 7, on the axiological adequacy of measuremental accounts 
of wellbeing, we saw a tension between two commitments that are both 
plausible as well as practically problematic.  Wellbeing is a deeply 
personal concept, while at the same time, we have good reasons to believe 
that we are only limitedly able to have assess our own wellbeing, and how 
good our lives are compared to others. On the basis of the arguments 
developed in this thesis, we can formulate a general defensible highly 
skeptical attitude: 
1) Regardless of what wellbeing is exactly, either happiness or 
preference-satisfaction matters intrinsically to wellbeing. 
Happiness (in one conception or other) matters to wellbeing on 
most accounts, either because it matters intrinsically, or because 
people want to be happy (see also chapter 2). On accounts on which 
this is not the case, such as objective lists accounts that do not 
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value happiness itself, or desire-accounts if a person does not want 
to be happy at all, preference-satisfaction, or a related concept, 
such as goal-achievement, matters for wellbeing (chapter 7). 
2) Our ability to measure happiness is limited (chapter 3 and 4), and 
so is our ability to measure preference-satisfaction (chapter 5).  
3) There is always a significant part of wellbeing researchers have 
limited access to, and hence, wellbeing measures are necessarily 
incomplete. 
This argument, represents the gloomiest picture about our ability to 
measure wellbeing. However, while such a picture may be correct, there 
are two important ways in which this pessimism can be resisted.  
 Firstly, the conclusion of the skeptical argument is that measures 
of wellbeing are necessarily incomplete. That is, they necessarily allow 
the possibility to be inaccurate. However, the ultimate goal of measures 
of wellbeing need not be to be flawless. The argument shows that the 
possibility of important mismeasurement exists in particular instances, 
but it does not show how often such mismeasurements will occur and 
how badly they will affect our inferences. In chapter 3, we touched upon 
the problem that measurement problems themselves cannot themselves 
be empirically gauged. This implies that the degree to which these issues 
present themselves as problems must remain, for an important part, a 
matter of speculation. Due to the lack of empirical grounds to base such 
judgements on, this requires a conceptual evaluation that may be 
different in different instances. We may sometimes have reasons to 
believe that the problems only play a role to a very limited degree. For 
example, in case of preference-satisfaction measures, we can wonder how 
different people’s preferences really are. If they are highly similar (contra 
chapter 2), it may not be problematic to group preferences to reduce the 
data-demandingness identified in chapter 5. And, with respect to chapter 
6, perhaps differences in how functionings and capabilities contribute to 
wellbeing differently for different individuals may be small. If so, the 
possibility for mismeasurement that I have identified in this thesis may 
have little real impact on the extent to which they are able to capture 
wellbeing successfully. While the extent of problems discussed is difficult 
to assess, it leaves space for optimism. 
 Secondly, conditions under which we can reliably measure 
wellbeing have a contextual nature to them. Comparing the wellbeing of 
people with vastly different backgrounds, living conditions and 
aspirations may be much less feasible than making comparisons between 
people who are highly similar in these respects. The adaptation problem 
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does not apply to wellbeing comparisons between people who have not 
adapted, or adapted similarly, to external shocks to their happiness. The 
problem of qualitative differences in happiness discussed in chapter 4 
similarly does not apply to comparisons in happiness between those 
people who have had very similar experiences. These problems thus leave 
the possibility to use subjective wellbeing as a wellbeing measure in cases 
such factors can reasonably be expected to be (roughly) the same among 
compared groups. Context can also help us in case of preference-
satisfaction measures of wellbeing. In the context of health, where the 
ICECAP-A wellbeing measure (see chapter 5 and 6) was developed, we can 
reasonably assume certain aspects we may have preferences over are left 
unaffected, such as preferences over states of the world that are left 
unaffected by diseases and treatments (world peace, for example). This 
does not take away from the fact that even in such contexts the welfare 
aspects over which one has preferences may still be large, but it may 
make welfare comparisons more feasible.  
 We have reached a split conclusion. It may be overly ambitious to 
believe that any wellbeing measure can provide us with sound 
comparisons across all contexts, even regardless of the particular 
substantive view on wellbeing one takes. However, under some 
restrictions, we can be reasonably confident that certain measures can 
result in sound comparisons conditional on our axiological position on 
wellbeing. If this is correct, such a state may not be unique to wellbeing 
research. Many scientific enterprises proceed under specific untestable 
assumptions. For example, an analogy with the rationality assumption in 
much of positive microeconomics may be appropriate. Whether or not 
people are truly rational or not is generally may not be a testable 
assumption, even though arguments may be provided either way.  
Wellbeing is a highly important concept, and we should strive to 
know more about it. In light of untestable assumptions that are needed 
to gauge epistemic challenges and conceptual problems, about which we 
may have good reasons to cast much doubt, the best response seems to 
be pluralism of approaches. If, on the basis of a variety of doubtful 
assumptions, the same conclusion is reached, this may still provide some 
reason to believe it. If on the basis of different assumptions very different 
conclusions are reached, this casts doubt on the conclusions. Given the 
problems empirical research on wellbeing is faced with that I have 
described in my thesis, these types of findings would provide useful 
insights both about wellbeing itself and the efficacy of our measures.  
Sticking to a single measure is putting all your eggs in one basket. 
In light of a deep disagreement about what the best measure of wellbeing 
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is, it is unlikely that the field will soon converge to a consensus. This, I 
conclude, is a good thing.  
 
Policy implications and future research 
What does this mean for the possibility of wellbeing policy, that so many 
wellbeing researchers espouse? Or, stated differently, in light of the 
challenges for wellbeing science raised in this thesis, what kind of policy 
implications does wellbeing science have? A first implication is a call for 
caution in following policy recommendations from research coming out 
of a single strand of research. For example, if on the basis of SWB studies, 
it is concluded that age of retirement is neutral with respect to well-being 
(e.g. Horner 2014), policy makers should not act on such conclusions, 
before various types of evidence, from different strands of well-being 
research, are available. 
 What is more, while empirical research on wellbeing often suggests 
policy implications, it is not clear how knowledge about wellbeing should 
be translated into policy. Some of the chapters have discussed the 
particular demands of wellbeing science applied to the context of policy, 
but this question does not only pertain to the extent to which wellbeing 
science can successfully capture wellbeing in a policy context, but also 
on what the role of the government is taken to be in the promotion of 
wellbeing. In political philosophy, the idea that the promotion of 
wellbeing is the sole aim of the government—welfarism—is highly 
controversial. However, on the other hand, the idea that wellbeing should 
be of no concern to the government whatsoever is also not particularly 
plausible. In recent years, some philosophers have started to draft 
proposals of how our knowledge about wellbeing should affect policy (in 
particular, Haybron and Tiberius 2015). However, the arguments in this 
thesis, which challenge our ability to have knowledge about wellbeing, 
only complicates this discussion. Given the importance of the wellbeing 
concept, giving up our aim to know more about wellbeing to make lives 
better would be deeply unfortunate. Can wellbeing still be an aim of the 
government given our limited ability to know what wellbeing is and how 
best to measure it? While I cannot provide an answer to these questions 
now, future research hopefully can. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Welzijn is het concept dat beschrijft hoe goed ons leven is voor degene 
die het leven leidt. Dit is een behoorlijk belangrijk en breed concept. In 
dit proefschrift wordt de vraag beantwoord: In welke mate kan welzijn in 
de economie empirisch bestuurd worden? Daarbij analyseer ik de 
verschillende methodologische benaderingen in de economische 
literatuur, en de verschillende filosofische theorieën over het concept. In 
de economie hebben een verscheidenheid aan benaderingen een 
belangrijke positie in de empirische literatuur verworven; specifiek: 
gelukseconomie, dat welzijn meet op subjectieve wijze, voorkeur-
gebaseerde welzijnsmaten, en de capability approach, geïnitieerd door 
Amartya Sen. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt in welke mate deze stromingen 
erin slagen om welzijn te meten. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 is een verkennend hoofdstuk. Het bespreekt het 
probleem dat hoewel het idee dat welzijn multidimensionaal gemeten 
zou moeten worden wijd geaccepteerd is, het identificeren van deze 
dimensies erg lastig is. Het hoofdstuk presenteert een empirisch 
onderzoek naar de visie van mensen op hun welzijn. Een aantal typische 
visies worden geïdentificeerd die samen de visies van mensen goed 
kunnen verklaren. Hoewel we vinden dat het beeld van veel mensen 
overeenkomt met een visie dat welzijn voornamelijk bestaat uit gezond 
zijn en je gelukkig voelen, vinden we ook dat er veel diversiteit is in de 
visies die mensen hebben over wat welzijn voor hen betekent.   
  Hoofdstuk 3-6 gaan over specifieke manieren om welzijn te meten. 
Gelukseconomie is de afgelopen 20 jaar snel gegroeid, maar gaat wel 
recht in tegen het prominente idee in de grondslag van het veld binnen 
de economie dat gaat over welzijn – welvaartseconomie –, namelijk, dat 
geluk niet meetbaar is op een wetenschappelijke manier. Hoewel 
gelukseconomen hiertegen inbrengen dat hun geluksmaat wel resulteert 
in bevindingen die goed te rationaliseren zijn, is deze aanpak nog steeds 
controversieel binnen de economie.  Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 bespreken 
filosofische problemen binnen deze school. Ik analyseer eerst een 
veelbesproken tegenwerping tegen de gelukseconomie, namelijk het 
probleem dat onze aspiraties en voorkeuren zich kunnen aanpassen aan 
slechte omstandigheden, zodat zelfs tijdens langdurige ontberingen 
mensen zich gelukkig kunnen voelen, terwijl hun leven duidelijk niet 
goed is voor ze. Hoewel dit vaak als een probleem wordt gezien voor 
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filosofische welzijnstheorieën beargumenteer ik dat er ook een 
alternatieve manier is om de tegenwerping te begrijpen, namelijk dat in 
het geval van adaptatie (zoals dit probleem genoemd wordt), we onze 
standaarden om ons geluk te evalueren aanpassen, ondanks dat we net 
zo (on)gelukkig blijven. Ik beargumenteer dat als argument tegen 
gelukseconomie het laatste probleem plausibeler en toepasselijker is. Dit 
impliceert dat zelfs als welzijn bestaat uit geluk, geluk moeilijk te meten 
is in het geval dat adaptatie optreedt.  
 In hoofdstuk, 4, wordt het succes van gelukseconomie ook 
onderzocht, maar dit hoofdstuk limiteert zichzelf deze keer tot de vraag 
of het succesvol is als methode om geluk te meten. Het hoofdstuk 
beschrijft dat veel gelukseconomen Jeremy Bentham’s conceptie van 
geluk lenen, maar niet ingaan op de problemen die andere filosofen 
hebben genoemd met betrekking op deze theorie. Ik analyseer Mill’s 
kritiek op Bentham’s theorie en illustreer dat als we een plausibel aspect 
van zijn kritiek ter harte nemen, dit significante implicaties heeft voor 
ons vermogen om ons eigen geluk te meten – een cruciale aanname voor 
de methodologie van gelukseconomie. Deze kritiek is dat het hebben van 
nieuwe ervaringen de manier hoe we geluk evalueren verandert. Dit 
impliceert dat mensen die flink uiteenlopende ervaringen hebben gehad 
hetzelfde geluk anders kunnen beoordelen. Hoewel dit een ander 
probleem is dan het adaptatieprobleem, laten beide problemen zien dat 
ons vermogen om ons eigen geluk op een vergelijkbare manier te 
beoordelen gelimiteerd is. 
 De voorkeur-bevredigingsconceptie van welzijn staat centraal 
binnen de economische theorie, maar wordt over het algemeen niet 
gebruikt om het welzijn van individuen te meten. Recentelijk, als 
antwoord op de ontwikkelingen binnen de gelukseconomie, zijn 
economen begonnen met het maken van voorkeurs-indexen om welzijn 
te meten. In hoofdstuk 5 analyseer ik de specifieke uitdagingen waarmee 
dergelijke methodes te kampen hebben als ze succesvol willen zijn in het 
meten van welzijn. Ik beargumenteer dat, hoewel het in principe mogelijk 
is om dit succesvol te doen, een aantal centrale aspecten van de 
voorkeurstheorie van welzijn zoveel informatie vereisen om te meten, dat 
het in de praktijk niet mogelijk is om welzijn op deze manier te meten, 
zonder tekort te doen aan de voorkeurstheorie van welzijn. In het 
bijzonder, het feit dat de verscheidenheid aan voorkeuren die mensen 
kunnen hebben onbeperkt is, en dat voorkeuren wel individueel-specifiek 
zijn, zijn voorbeelden van dit soort aspecten. Bovendien is het zo dat om 
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een maat nuttig te laten zijn deze ook vergelijkbaar moet zijn tussen 
individuen en binnen individuen over dezelfde tijd. Dit zijn ook aspecten 
die veel informatie over de voorkeuren van individuen vereisen. Derhalve 
zijn welzijnsmaten gebaseerd op voorkeuren slechts praktisch mogelijk 
als een aantal centrale aspecten niet worden gerespecteerd. 
 Een potentieel alternatief voor zowel de geluksbenadering en de 
voorkeursbenadering is de capability approach. De capability approach 
is een breed evaluatief raamwerk dat de dingen die mensen 
daadwerkelijk doen en zijn – hun functioning – en hun vermogen dit te 
bereiken – hun capabilities – centraal stelt. Het meten van welzijn is één 
van de doelen van deze benadering. De capability approach is 
geformuleerd als alternatief voor zowel de voorkeursbenadering als de 
geluksbenadering, en is gecommitteerd aan het idee dat onze mentale 
staat niet altijd een goede bron van informatie over welzijn is. Bovendien 
stelt het pluriformiteit centraal op een aantal verschillende manieren, 
waarvan er een is dat de waarde van een functioning kan verschillen per 
individu. In hoofdstuk 6 analyseer ik in welke mate deze ideeën samen 
kunnen worden gerealiseerd in een welzijnsmaat. Ik concludeer dat dit 
niet het geval is. Derhalve moet de capability approach of 1) zijn 
scepticisme over subjectieve evaluaties laten varen, of 2) ontkennen dat 
verschillende functionings in verschillende mate bij kunnen dragen aan 
welzijn voor verschillende individuen, of 3), ontkennen dat welzijn te 
meten is. 
 In hoofdstuk 7 verschuift de aandacht van specifieke benaderingen 
naar de algemene vraag hoe sociale wetenschappers welzijnsmaten 
kunnen ontwikkelen in het licht van de onenigheid over het 
welzijnsconcept. Het hoofdstuk introduceert een term, conceptuele 
onzekerheid, om dit te beschrijven. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft een aantal 
posities met betrekking tot dit probleem, zoals het idee dat 
wetenschappers de filosofische theorie kunnen uitkiezen die het best bij 
hun veld past. Een andere positie suggereert dat er meer overeenkomsten 
zijn tussen theorieën als het gaat over de brede categorie van aspecten 
die of welzijn zijn, of welzijn veroorzaken, en dat deze brede categorie 
voldoende basis biedt om wetenschappelijke welzijnsmaten op te 
baseren. Ik ontwikkel een alternatief op deze twee posities die gebaseerd 
is op het idee dat niet verwacht kan worden van welzijnsmaten dat ze 
niet op een controversiële basis gestoeld zijn, maar wel dat ze niet op 
een basis gestoeld zijn die afwijkt van alle belangrijke welzijnstheorieën.  
Ik beargumenteer dat op basis hiervan we twee centrale principes kunnen 
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verdedigen. De eerste onderkent het persoons-relatieve aspect van 
welzijn: wat welzijn ook precies mag zijn, op een substantief niveau is 
wat ons leven goed maakt iets persoonlijks. Een tweede principe is de 
ontkenning van het idee dat we zelf perfect kunnen weten hoe goed onze 
levens zijn. Hoewel er een duidelijke spanning bestaat tussen deze twee 
principes in het ontwikkelen van welzijnsmaten, suggereer ik ook dat 
sommige sociale wetenschappers al maten ontwikkelen die rekening 
houden met deze twee principes. 
 In het laatste, concluderende hoofdstuk (8) ga ik terug naar mijn 
onderzoeksvraag, en observeer ik dat de gemaakte argumenten een 
uitdaging duidelijk maken in het meten van welzijn. Hoewel ik heb 
beargumenteerd dat welzijn noodzakelijkerwijs persoons-relatief is op 
een substantief niveau, heb ik ook beargumenteerd dat onze enige 
methoden voor het meten van persoons-relatieve welzijnsaspecten, 
geluks- en voorkeursmaten, feilbaar zijn. Ik geef een simpel argument, 
op de basis van de argumenten gemaakt in dit proefschrift, waaruit volgt 
dat het niet mogelijk is om een geldig, volledig en context-vrije 
welzijnsmaat te ontwikkelen. Tegelijkertijd suggereer ik dat het belang 
van welzijnsmaten zo groot is dat het desondanks toch een concept is 
dat wetenschappelijk bestudeerd verdient te worden. Het feit dat welzijn 
moeilijk te meten is, zou niet moeten leiden tot het stoppen met het 
meten, maar tot een pluralistische benadering. Geen maat kan worden 
gezien als gouden standaard, en ze moeten allemaal worden gezien als 
feilbaar, maar dat betekent niet dat ze niet gebruikt moeten worden. 
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Summary 
 
Wellbeing is a concept that describes how well life is for the person who is 
living it. This thesis sets out to answer the question: To what extent is it 
possible to study wellbeing empirically in economics? In doing so I analyze 
the different methodological strands in the economic literature as well as the 
philosophical debate on the nature of wellbeing. In economics, a variety of 
approaches have gained a salient position in the empirical literature. In 
particular, happiness economics, which uses measures of subjective 
wellbeing, preference-based measures of wellbeing, and the capability 
approach, initiated by Amartya Sen. 
  Chapter 2 is an exploratory chapter. It discusses the challenge that while 
many agree that measures of wellbeing should be multi-dimensional, 
identifying the correct dimensions is a challenging task. The chapter presents 
an empirical investigation on the perceptions that people have regarding 
wellbeing. A number of typical views are identified, that jointly represent 
people’s views. While we find that that many people align with a view that 
values physical health and feeling well, there is much variety in the views that 
people hold with respect to their wellbeing. 
 Chapter 3-6 deal with specific approaches to wellbeing measurement. 
Happiness economics has been growing rapidly over the last twenty years, but 
it goes straight against a prominent idea in the foundation of the subfield of 
economics that deals with wellbeing – welfare economics –, namely, that 
happiness cannot be measured scientifically. While happiness economists 
generally object that their measures result in reasonable findings, their 
approach still is controversial within economics. Chapter 3 and 4 focus on 
philosophical problems within this approach. I first analyze one widespread 
objection against the happiness approach, namely the problem that our 
aspirations and preferences may adapt to bad circumstances, such that even 
in prolonged deprivation, people may find happiness, even though their lives 
are not good for them. While this problem is often seen as an objection against 
theories of wellbeing that identify wellbeing with happiness, I argue that there 
is also an alternative interpretation, namely, that in cases of adaptation, 
people adjust the standards by which they evaluate their own happiness, even 
though their lives remain equally unhappy. I argue that as an argument against 
the efficacy of happiness economics, the latter is more plausible and salient. 
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This implies that while happiness-conceptions of wellbeing may be plausible, 
our ability to evaluate our happiness may be compromised in case we have 
adapted. 
 The subsequent chapter, 4, also questions the extent to which happiness 
economics is successful, but this time limits itself to the question if it is 
successful as a method to measure happiness, given a plausible account of 
happiness. The chapter notes that many happiness economists borrow 
Bentham’s conception of happiness, but do not consider the problems that 
have been raised in the philosophical literature with this conception. I analyze 
Mill’s criticism of Bentham’s conception, and illustrate that taking on board a 
plausible part of this criticism has significant implications for our ability to 
rate our own happiness – a crucial assumption for the methodology of 
happiness economics. The criticism is that having new experiences changes 
the way we evaluate our own happiness. This implies that people who have 
had very different experiences may evaluate the same sense of happiness 
differently. While this is a different problem than the adaptation problem, the 
problems are both illustrations of the limitation of our ability to evaluate our 
happiness such that it can be compared between individuals. 
 The preference-satisfactionist conception of wellbeing has been central 
in economic theory, but is generally not used to formulate measures of 
individual welfare. In recent years, in response to the developments of 
happiness economics, some economists have started to develop preference-
indices of welfare. In chapter 5, I analyze the particular methodological 
challenges that such approaches are faced with if they aim to be a successful 
preference-satisfaction measure of welfare. I argue that, while it is in principle 
possible to have such a measure, a number of central commitments of 
preference-satisfaction theories of wellbeing are so data-demanding that in 
practice, satisfying them all is virtually impossible. In particular, 
unrestrictedness of the preference space, and individuality of preferences are 
such features. Moreover, achieving a satisfactory level of measurement, such 
as ordinal comparability, and interpersonal comparability are features that 
require much information about individual preference-structures. As a result, 
measures of wellbeing based on preference-satisfaction are only feasible at 
the cost of failing to meet some of their central axiological commitments. 
 A potential alternative to both preference-satisfaction and the 
happiness approach that is assessed is the capability approach. The capability 
approach is a broad evaluative framework that takes people’s plural actual 
doings and being – their functionings – and our ability to choose them – our 
capabilities – to be the central evaluative aspect of lives. The measurement of 
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wellbeing is one of the aims of the approach. The capability approach has been 
formulated as an alternative to both preference-satisfaction approaches and 
happiness measures, and is committed to the view that our mental states are 
not always a good source of information about our wellbeing. Moreover, it 
attempts to incorporate a number of concerns about the plurality of lives in 
its account, one of which being the fact that certain functionings may be more 
important to some than to others. In chapter 6 I analyze to what extent these 
commitments jointly can be realized in the context of wellbeing measurement, 
and argue this is not the case. As a result, the capability approach must either 
1) drop its skepticism of measures of wellbeing based on mental-states, 2) 
deny that different functionings may matter in different degrees to different 
individuals, or 3) deny that wellbeing is a measurable concept.  
 Chapter 7 shifts the discussion from specific approaches to the 
measurement of wellbeing back to the general question how social scientists 
should develop measures of wellbeing in light of the disagreement about the 
nature of the concept. It introduces a term, conceptual uncertainty, to describe 
this difficulty. The chapter reviews some positions about this problem, one of 
which is to suggest that different scientific practices can select the 
philosophical position that best suits their field, given the context. Another 
position suggests that while there is no agreement on the nature of wellbeing, 
there may be agreement on a large share of goods that either constitute or 
contribute to wellbeing, which may be used in scientific practice and policy 
making. I develop an alternative position, which is based on the idea that while 
it cannot be expected of measures of wellbeing to be uncontroversial, it can 
be expected that they are not based on conceptions of wellbeing that are 
incompatible with all major positions on wellbeing in philosophy. I argue that 
on the basis of this idea, two central widely shared principles can be defended. 
The first is an affirmation of the personal nature of wellbeing: whatever 
wellbeing is on a substantive level, what makes our lives good is highly person-
relative. A second principle is a denial of the infallibility of our own ability to 
assess our own wellbeing. While these two principles create a clear tension in 
the development of wellbeing measures, I suggest that some social scientists 
are already developing measures that cut across this tension. 
 In the final, concluding chapter (8), I go back to my research question, 
and observe that the argument presents a clear challenge for the measurement 
of wellbeing. While I have argued that wellbeing is person-relative in a 
substantive sense, I have also argued that our only methods available for 
assessing people’s person-relative wellbeing information, preference and 
happiness measurement, are fallible in a significant sense. I present a simple 
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argument on the basis of the arguments made in the thesis that denies that it 
is possible to develop a sound, complete measure of wellbeing across 
contexts. At the same time, I suggest that the importance of the concept of 
wellbeing warrants scientific attention, and that the lack of an ideal measure 
should not deter scientists from studying the concept. However, it should 
inspire social scientists to take a more pluralistic outlook on the measurement 
of wellbeing, as no single measure should be seen as a gold standard, and all 
as potentially fallible.  
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statistical testing. EIPE PhD Seminar. December, 2012. 
 
GRANTS  
• Travel Grant ($300), Human Development and Capability Association 
conference, September 2016, Tokyo, Japan. 
• Travel Grant ($227,50), PSA Travel Grant for  
• the 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 
(PSA2016), November 2016 (not used) 
• Travel Grant ($500), Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable, Seattle, 
May 2015 (not used) 
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OTHER POSITIONS 
Student Assistant of prof. Jack vromen 06/2015 – 10/2017 
 
Member of Advisory Council of a national political youth organisation 04/2014 – 04/2015 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
• Guest lecture on economic growth and development, Introduction to 
Economics (ESHCC, Erasmus University), March 2017 
• Economie and Filosofie, lecturer (Hogeschool voor de Toegepaste Filosofie), 
December 2016-January 2017. 
• Quality of life and health, lecturer, September-October 2016 
• Social, moral, and political philosophy  tutor, June 2016 
• Philosophy of Economics, tutor, may-June 2016 
• Guest lecture on economic growth and development, Introduction to 
Economics (ESHCC, Erasmus University), March 2016 
• Basic income for all, seminar class in OZSW winter school in philosophy, 
November 2014 
• Philosophy of Economics, tutor, may 2014 
 
SERVICE 
 
Refereeing: Journal of Happiness Studies, Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and 
Economics, Symploke 
 
Co-organizer of the Ghent-Rotterdam-Antwerp-Tilburg graduate 
workshop (GRATuate)  
14/09/2016 
 
Organizer and initiator of the EIPE lunch seminar series 09/2016 – present 
 
Co-organizer of the OZSW peer-review circle (a national graduate 
seminar with the purpose of providing presenters with detailed 
constructive feedback). 
 
03/2015 – present 
Member of Educational Council (onderwijscommissie) of the 
Philosophy Faculty of the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
06/2014 – present 
 
Co-organizer of the Eipe-TiLPS Graduate Workshop in Philosophy of 
Science 
20/02/2014 
 
Student representative at Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and 
Economics, organizing the graduate seminar. 
09/2012 – 08/2013 
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LANGUAGES 
 
English:  Fluent 
Dutch: Fluent 
French:  Intermediate/Good 
German:  Basic 
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